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Abstract
In Chapter 1, I study the efficiency properties of competitive search equilibria in economies
with informational asymmetries. Employers and workers are both risk-neutral and ex-ante
homogeneous. I characterize an equilibrium where employers post contracts and workers direct
their search towards them. When a match is formed, the disutility of labor is drawn randomly
and observed privately by the worker. An employment contract is an incentive-compatible
mechanism that satisfies a participation constraint on the worker's side. I first show that in
a static setting the competitive search equilibrium is constrained efficient, that is, it cannot
be Pareto improved by a Social Planner subject to the same informational and participation
constraints faced by the decentralized economy. I then show that in a dynamic setting, on
the contrary, the equilibrium can be constrained inefficient. The crucial difference between the
static and the dynamic environment is that the worker's outside option is exogenously given in
the former, while in the latter it is endogenously determined as the equilibrium continuation
utility of unemployed workers. Inefficiency arises because the worker's outside option affects the
ex-ante cost of information revelation, generating a novel externality which is not internalized
by competitive search.
In Chapter 2, I explore whether match-specific heterogeneity, with or without full informa-
tion, can amplify the responsiveness of unemployment rate and market tightness to productivity
shocks. On the contrary, I show that heterogeneity can dampen the response of market tight-
ness to productivity, once one calibrates the model to match two main facts: the finding rate
and the finding rate elasticity to market tightness. First, I show a theoretical result for the
steady state analysis in the extreme case of no aggegate shock. Then, I report the calibration
exercise for alternative specification of the idiosyncratic shocks distribution.
Chapter 3 is the product of joint work with Daron Acemoglu and constructs a model of
non-balanced economic growth. The main economic force is the combination of differences
in factor proportions and capital deepening. Capital deepening tends to increase the relative
output of the sector with a greater capital share (despite the equilibrium reallocation of capital
and labor away from that sector). We first illustrate this force using a general two-sector model.
We then investigate it further using a class of models with constant elasticity of substitution
between two sectors and Cobb-Douglas production functions in each sector. In this class of
models, non-balanced growth is shown to be consistent with an asymptotic equilibrium with
constant interest rate and capital share in national income. We investigate whether for realistic
parameter values, the model generates transitional dynamics that are consistent with both
3
the more rapid growth of some sectors in the economy and aggregate balanced growth facts.
Finally, we construct and analyze a model of "non-balanced endogenous growth," which extends
the main results of the paper to an economy with endogenous and directed technical change.
This model shows that non-balanced technological progress will generally be an equilibrium
phenomenon.
Thesis Supervisor: Daron Acemoglu
Title: Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Ivan Werning
Title: Assistant Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Efficiency of Competitive Search
under Asymmetric Information
1.1 Introduction
The extent to which decentralized labor markets achieve efficiency is a central economic ques-
tion. In labor markets, trade occurs bilaterally and is typically costly. Firms need to post
vacancies and workers must spend time searching for jobs. Moreover, employment contracts
are commonly characterized by informational imperfections. The surplus produced by a worker-
firm match may depend on idiosyncratic features that are private information of the contracting
parties. Costly trade and informational imperfections impose a departure from the Walrasian
paradigm,' but not necessarily from the property of efficiency. Given these frictions, can the
price mechanism still achieve a socially optimal allocation of resources?
Search theory typically models labor market imperfections under the heading of matching
frictions, by assuming an aggregate matching technology. These frictions are meant to capture
the general idea that trade is time-consuming and costly both in terms of coordination and of
informational incompleteness. The conventional model, built on Diamond (1982), Mortensen
(1982a, 1982b) and Pissarides (1984, 1985), combines random matching with a wage determina-
lIn his AEA presidential address, Friedman (1968) highlights how, in a Walrasian world, a market economy
cannot be kept away from the unemployment level that "... would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general
equilibrium equations, provided there is imbedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and
commodity markets... "
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tion process based on Nash bargaining. In this context, the equilibrium level of unemployment
is generically inefficient. Decentralized markets do not internalize the search externality gener-
ated by the matching frictions2. However, going back to the Walrasian spirit, a new generation
of search models, Shimer (1996), Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a), introduces
a novel notion of competition in environments with trading frictions, referred to as competitive
search. In competitive search models firms post wages and workers direct their search towards
them. In this environment, decentralized markets internalize the search externality and the
resulting equilibrium is efficient. The efficiency property of competitive search has been proven
robust in several contexts and sheds light on the power of the price mechanism to induce firms
to open the optimal quantity of vacancies.
In this paper, I propose a search model where informational frictions are modeled explicitly.
Informational asymmetries seem to be a crucial element of employment relationships. Here,
the problem for firms is not only to meet workers, but also to find out the profitability of their
match. Employment contracts are designed optimally in order to extract this information and
to induce workers to participate in the productive relationship. In this context, a new type of
externality arises. The ability of a firm to extract information depends on the worker's outside
option. The outside option, in turn, is determined by the contracts offered by other firms in
the future. Because of this externality the equilibrium can fail to be constrained efficient. My
model retains the Walrasian spirit of competitive search, by allowing firms to post contracts
so as to attract workers. Moreover, I allow for general employment contracts. Therefore, the
inefficiency does not depend either on the presence of search externalities or on restrictions on
the contract space.
I construct a tractable framework for investigating the role of informational asymmetry in
search environments. Employers and workers are both risk-neutral and ex-ante homogeneous.
Employers post contracts and workers direct their search towards them. When a match is
formed, the disutility of labor is drawn randomly and observed privately by the worker. An
employment contract is an incentive compatible mechanism that satisfies a participation con-
straint on the worker's side. The participation constraint can be interpreted as the result of
lack of commitment. A worker cannot be forced to work, he can always quit and join the ranks
2 See Hosios (1990).
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of the unemployed.3
I begin by characterizing the competitive search equilibrium. I show that whenever the
ex-ante cost of posting a vacancy is positive, ex-post inefficiency emerges. In particular, some
matches that would produce a positive net surplus are not created. The key source of allocative
distortion is that the optimal contract has to offer the same wage to all the types that are
hired. This comes straight from incentive compatibility. Moreover, the participation constraint
implies that the wage has to be equal to the disutility of the marginal worker. To induce the
first-best level of job creation, the wage should be set equal to the firm productivity, driving
the firm's profits to zero. This is inconsistent with an equilibrium where firms pay a positive
vacancy cost ex-ante. A trade-off emerges between the two margins of job creation: efficient
creation at the hiring stage has to be sacrificed in order to induce vacancy creation ex-ante.
Then, I address my central question: is the competitive search equilibrium constrained
efficient? I define a social planner who faces the same frictions of the competitive economy.
The social planner controls the matching process by deciding how many vacancies to post at the
beginning of each period and allocates consumption among employed and unemployed workers.
He does not observe the match-specific disutility of the workers and has to induce them to
reveal it. Moreover, he is subject to the same participation constraint on the workers' side.
Workers can always quit and enjoy private utility from leisure, which cannot be transferred.
Moreover, workers who quit cannot be distinguished from all the other unemployed workers.
First, I show that in a static setting the competitive search equilibrium is constrained
efficient. As in the perfect information benchmark, competition among firms induces them to
design contracts in order to attract workers' job applications. This implies that vacancy creation
and labor contracts are set to maximize workers' utility, subject to a zero profit condition. This
ensures that firms correctly internalize the search externality.
By contrast, I show that in a dynamic setting the competitive search equilibrium is con-
strained inefficient. The crucial difference between the static and the dynamic environments is
that the worker's outside option is exogenously given in the former, while in the latter it is en-
dogenously determined as the continuation utility of unemployed workers. When informational
asymmetry is present and workers must be induced to participate, the workers' outside option
3This corresponds to the typical at will employment contracts enforced in the United States.
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affects the ex-ante cost of information revelation. This generates a novel externality which is
not internalized by dynamic competitive search. Firms who post contracts at time t + 1 do
not take into account the informational cost they impose on contracts designed by other firms
at time t, by affecting the workers' outside option. This externality can be the source of con-
strained inefficiency. The social planner takes into account the impact that the continuation
utility of unemployed workers has on current contracts, and can improve upon the equilibrium
allocation.
The main result of the paper is that, under asymmetric information and the workers' par-
ticipation constraint, the competitive search equilibrium is constrained inefficient whenever the
economy is away from the steady state. Imagine that the social planner decreases the contin-
uation utility for unemployed workers. An intertemporal trade-off emerges, that is not taken
into account by the competitive equilibrium. On one hand, the outside option for a worker who
meets a firm today decreases, making it easier for the firm to extract information and increasing
job creation today. On the other hand, the social planner has promised to give less utility to
the unemployed workers from tomorrow onward. This means that workers will receive smaller
informational rents in the future, reducing job creation tomorrow.
When the economy is at the steady state level, the flow of workers out of unemployment,
who enjoy the informational gain from a reduction of the outside option, is perfectly offset by
the flow of workers into unemployment, who are damaged by a future lower expected utility.
When the economy is away from the steady state, the inefficiency depends on the equilibrium
dynamics of the unemployment rate. I characterize the direction of the inefficiency and show
that it depends on whether the initial unemployment rate is above or below the steady state
level. Consider a competitive equilibrium. If the initial unemployment rate is above the steady
state level, this means that the mass of potential matches is higher today relative to tomorrow.
Hence, the shadow cost of informational extraction is relatively high today and the social
planner would like to reduce the continuation utility of unemployed workers in order to achieve
higher job creation today. On the contrary, when the unemployment rate is rising, the planner
would like to increase the continuation utility of unemployed workers in order to increase job
creation tomorrow. The planner can indeed manipulate the continuation utilities by changing
the future choices of vacancy creation and hiring margins.
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Finally, I explore an alternative environment in which unemployed workers own a transfer-
able endowment which can be seized by the social planner. I show that if these resources are
high enough, the social planner can use them to finance the informational rents of employed
workers,4 restoring the full information allocation.5 Moreover, when these resources are even
higher, the full information allocation can be decentralized also by bond posting in private
contracts.
Related Literature. My work is related to a vast literature on search theoretic models of the
labor market, surveyed by Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005). The conventional model builds
on Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982a, 1982b), Pissarides (1984, 1985) and Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994).6 By combining random matching and Nash bargaining, it does not generically
achieve efficiency, as shown in Hosios (1990). Departing from this benchmark, more recently,
Shimer (1996), Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a), introduce the equilibrium notion
of competitive equilibrium, which combines directed search and wage posting, internalizing the
search externality. A series of papers highlights the robustness of the efficiency properties of
competitive search.7 In my model, I use competitive search as equilibrium concept, with the
explicit purpose of eliminating the inefficiency coming from the standard search externality and
highlighting the novel externality generated by informational frictions.
My work is also related to a growing literature on asymmetric information in search en-
vironments. In particular, Shimer and Wright (2004) and Moen and Rosen (2005) analyze,
as in my model, labor markets where trading frictions interact with asymmetric information,
using competitive search. However, they both explore a static environment, where, as I will
show, even in the presence of informational frictions, competitive search keeps its efficiency
property. Shimer and Wright (2004) analyze an economy where the employer has some private
4An example of feasible policy that I explore in the static analysis is one of subsidizing job creation by taxing
lump-sum all the workers.
5What is needed to restore the full information allocation is that the economy is able to appropriate enough
resources to cover the informational costs without distorting the allocation. In this alternative environment
those resources come from home production of unemployed workers. An economy with access to enough external
resources could achieve the same outcome.
6See Pissarides (2000) for a general treatment.
7For example, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b) show that competitive search is efficient even with ex-ante
investments, Mortensen and Wright (2002) generalize results on price determination and show how competitive
search achieves efficiency by exploiting all gains from trade. Hawkins (2005) shows that even when a firm can
hire more workers, competitive search is efficient when firms post contracts that are general enough.
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information about the match and the worker a private effort choice. They show that under
mild regularity assumptions, in their environment, contracts take a simple form with at most
two wages. In the same spirit, Moen and Rosen (2005) study a competitive search equilibrium
with private information on the workers' side. They focus mainly on the impact of asymmetric
information on the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to productivity shocks. Moreover,
they show that cross subsidization between workers and firms can restore the full information
allocation. This result is similar to the one I derive for the case of trasferable endowment.8
Another related paper is Faig and Jerez (2004) who propose a theory of commerce, where
buyers have private information about their willingness to pay for a product. They also show
that the static model is constrained efficient, if the social planner cannot transfer utility across
agents. However, they point out that another source of inefficiency can be the non-linearity
of the production function. They calibrate a dynamic version of their model embodied in a
neoclassical framework where the existence of capital induces a non-linear production function.
They show that the welfare losses of competitive search are negligible. In a similar spirit,
Wolinsky (2005) analyzes the efficiency properties of a sequential procurement model where a
small buyer cannot commit to a mechanism and finds inefficient equilibria. However, in his
model the inefficiency arises because of contracting restrictions. The fact that the seller's effort
is not contractible distorts the buyer's search intensity. In my paper, private contracts are
unrestricted and the equilibrium inefficiency comes from a general equilibrium effect.
My work is also indirectly related to a growing literature more focused on the impact of
asymmetric information on the business cycle. Reacting to Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005), they
have proceeded in the direction of some form of wage rigidity in order to match the business
cycle unemployment volatility. 9
Finally, from a methodological standpoint my paper is related to the literature on mecha-
nism design with asymmetric information, e.g. Mirrlees (1971), Myerson (1981), Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1981), Laffont and Maskin (1980).
8 See subsection 3.2.
9Among others, Kennan (2004) constructs a model with hidden information and bargaining, Menzio (2004)
assume employers have private information about productivity and contracts are non-binding, Nagypal (2004)
combines workers' heterogeneity, asymmetric information and on-the-job search and Hall and Milgrom (2005)
construct an equilibrium characterized by Nash-type bargaining where the threat points are the payoffs of endless
delay. None of these papers explore the welfare properties of the models.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the static environment of the
economy, defines and characterizes the competitive search equilibrium. Section 1.3 analyzes the
efficiency properties of the static economy both for the benchmark environment and for alter-
native settings. Section 1.4 describes the dynamic environment, defines and characterizes the
dynamic competitive search equilibrium. Section 1.5 describes the dynamic welfare properties
of the model and derives the main result that competitive search, away from the steady state,
is constrained inefficient. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
1.2 Static Economy
The crucial ingredient of my model is the interaction of informational asymmetry and trading
frictions, when there is a participation constraint on the worker's side. This section intro-
duces the static version of a decentralized economy highlighting this interaction. I define and
characterize the competitive search equilibrium for this economy.
Environment. The economy is populated by a continuum of measure 1 of workers and a large
continuum of potential employers. Both workers and employers are risk-neutral and ex-ante
homogeneous. Workers can search freely, while employers need to pay an entry cost k to post
a vacancy. Each worker wants to match an employer and each employer with an open vacancy
wants to match only one worker. When a match is formed, the disutility of labor is drawn
randomly from the cumulative distribution function F (.), with support - [, , and is
observed privately by the worker.l0 I assume that the cumulative distribution function F (.) is
differentiable, with f (.) being the associated density function, and that it satisfies a monotone
hazard rate condition, that is, d [F () /f ()] /d > O. The net surplus of the match is given by
y - , where y represents the amount of output generated by a productive match. The value of
y is common to all the matches and is exogenously given in the benchmark model."l
At the beginning of the period employers can open a vacancy at a cost k which entitles them
to post an employment contract C E C, where C is the set of ad interim incentive compatible
'°The value 0 can also be interpreted as the cost of effort that the worker has to exert to make the match
productive, which depends on the specificity of the match.
lWhen the asymmetric information is on the side of the employer, the analysis is similar. The equilibrium
allocation still exhibits less trade than in the full information case. However, now firms appropriate ex-post the
informational rents required by incentive compatibility.
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and individually rational mechanisms. As I describe below, a contract C : e - [0, 1] x R+
specifies the hiring probability and the wage for each matched worker who reports type 0.
Therefore the strategy of a firm is a pair (a, C) E {0, 1} x C where a denotes the decision of
posting a vacancy and C is the posted contract. Next, each worker observes all the contracts
posted and decides where to apply. He chooses a contract C E CPC C, where C P denotes the
set of contracts posted by active firms. After workers start to search for a specific contract,
matching takes place and for each match the draw 0 is realized and is private information of
the worker. The worker's behavior is described by a map (a, s) : 1- ( x {0, 1} that for each
type specifies a report 0 = s () and a participation decision a (). The worker can either
implement the contract, that is choose a () = 1, or walk away, that is choose a () = 0. If he
walks away he gets b, a flow of non-transferable utility from leisure. In section 3.2, I will extend
the analysis to the case where b is transferable and can be interpreted as home production or
unemployment benefit.
Trading frictions in the labor market are modeled through random matching and can be
thought of as coordination frictions, as in Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001). Employers and work-
ers know that their matching probabilities will depend on the contract that they respectively
post and seek for. Each type of contract C is associated with a labor submarket, where a mass
v(C) of employers posts contracts of type C and a mass u(C) of unemployed workers applies for
jobs at firms offering that type of contract. I assume that each submarket is characterized by
a constant returns to scale matching function m (v(C), u(C)) and by an associated "tightness"
y(C) = v(C)/U(C). 12 Hence, for each contract C, I can define the function () m (, 1),
which represents the probability of a worker applying for C meeting an employer posting it.
On the other hand, the probability of a firm posting C meeting a worker applying for it is
represented by the non-increasing function 1L (y) /y.
Assumption Al. The function / (-y) [0, oo), [0, 1] satisfies the following conditions:
(i) / (y) < min y, 1; 13
(ii) for any y such that (iy) < min {y, 1}, (y) is twice differentiable with t' (y) > 0 and
'2In order to simplify the notation, from now on I am going to drop the dependence of u, v and y on the
contract C, whenever it does not cause any confusion.
13With discrete time, this condition ensures that both (^y) and t (y) /-y are proper probabilities.
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/ (Y) < o.
This assumption allows me to consider matching functions that either are everywhere differen-
tiable or have one or two kinks. The standard matching functions considered in the literature
are covered by one of these two classes. The first category includes the exponential case, while
the properly modified4 linear and Cobb Douglas case falls into the second one.
In a decentralized economy the consumption of employed workers is given by the wage.
Moreover, the consumption of unemployed workers must be equal to the value of leisure b,
where unemployed workers are both unmatched workers and workers who have been matched
but have not been hired. Assume that y > b + 0 in order to make the problem interesting. 15
Employment Contracts. Without loss of generality, by invoking the Revelation Princi-
ple, I can restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms, corresponding to a mapping
C : O - [O, 1] x R+, specifying for each matched worker who reports type , the hiring prob-
ability e (0) E [0, 1] and the wage w (0) E R+. The contract must be incentive compatible
and individually rational, that is, it has to ensure that the worker reveals truthfully his type
and chooses to participate in the employment relationship after the draw has been realized.
Individual rationality can be interpreted as a "no-commitment" assumption on the side of the
worker. The no-commitment constraint on the worker's side can represent the typical at will
employment contracts widespread in the United States. Instead, firms can fully commit to the
posted contract.
Let v(0, 9) denote the ad interim utility for worker of type revealing , associated with a
contract C,16 with
v(9, 9) w(9) - e(0)0 + [1 - e(9)]b. (1.1)
An employment contract is incentive-compatible whenever it satisfies
v (0, ) > v(O, ) for all 0, e Oe (IC)
14 From now on I define the modified version of a function A (y), the function it (y) = min { (y) ,, 1}.
15Notice that if y < b + 0 then even with full information the equilibrium would be characterized by zero
trade.
16In order to simplify the notation, I am going to drop the dependence of v(.,.) on the contract C, since it does
not cause any confusion.
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and individually rational whenever
v (0,0 ) b for all 0 E e. (IR)
I define C the set of incentive compatible and individually rational direct mechanisms.
Following a standard result in the mechanism design literature,17 I can reduce the dimen-
sionality of the constraints. In particular, I can state the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Conditions IC and IR are equivalent to e (.) non-increasing and
v(O, ) = v (, ) + f e (y) dy for all e e, (IC')
v (, ) > b. (IR')
Proof. The proof that IC is equivalent to IC' and e (9) non-increasing is standard and
hence omitted.18 Then, using the monotonicity of e (0), the individual rationality constraints
IR can be reduced to the one for the worst type 0, completing the proof. 
This Lemma allows me to separate the problem of finding an optimal allocation from the
problem of finding a wage schedule that implements it.
Define v(0, 9) - v (, 0) as the informational rent of a worker of type 0 < , that is, the
additional utility that such a worker must receive in order to reveal his own type. Condition
IC' ensures that no worker would gain by pretending to have a higher disutility from working
than the realized one. Moreover, condition IR' ensures that the worse type does not expect an
utility level lower than the one he could get by staying in autarky.
Finally, the large number of potential firms ensures free entry, imposing that the value of
an open vacancy must be zero in equilibrium, that is,
(7) [e (0) y -w()] dF() = k (1.2)
'
7Among others, Mirlees (1971), Myerson (1981), Myerson and Satterthwaite (1981), Laffont and Maskin
(1980).
18See Mas-Colell, Winston and Green (1995), Proposition 23.D.2, p. 888.
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1.2.1 Static Competitive Search Equilibrium
I now define the concept of competitive search equilibrium in this economy, I prove that it
always exists, is unique and I show how to characterize it.
Definition 2 A static symmetric Competitive Search Equilibrium (CSE) is a set of incentive-
compatible and individually rational contracts C* together with a function r* C C, R+ U c
and a utility level U* E R+ satisfying
(i) employers' profit maximization and free-entry: VC _ [e (), w (0)]oEe,
r* (c) [e () y -w ()] dF (0) - k < 
subject to incentive compatibility IC and individual rationality IR, with equality if C EC*;
(ii) workers' optimal job application: VC _ [e (0) ,w (0)]0e
U* >. (r* (C)) [w (0) - e (0) ( + b)] dF (0) + b
and rF* (C) > 0 with complementarity slackness, where U* is given by
U* = max ( (C')) j [w' () -e' () ( + b)] dF ()+ b
or U* = b if C* is empty.
In equilibrium, both firms and workers know which market tightness is associated with each
contract, that is, they know the function r* (). Given that, profit maximization ensures that
firms post the incentive compatible and individually rational contract that maximizes their
profits, anticipating the tightness associated even to contracts not offered in equilibrium. This
ensures that there are no profitable deviations for the firm and free entry drives profits to
zero. Moreover, optimal job application ensures that workers choose which type of contracts
to look for, so as to maximize their ex-ante utility. In particular, notice that the tightness
associated with contracts that are not optimal is zero, since firms will never post those contracts
anticipating that they will not be able to attract workers.
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It follows that the equilibrium unemployment rate of workers applying to firms posting a
contract of type C is given by
u (C) = 1 -u (r* ()) e () dF ()
and is affected by both matching and informational frictions. In fact job creation depends not
only on the equilibrium matching probability, through (r* (C)), but also on the equilibrium
hiring decision, once the match is realized, through fo e (0) dF (0).
Generalizing the standard result in the search literature, l' I can show that the symmetric
competitive search equilibrium is such that the utility of an unemployed worker is maximized
subject to the zero profit condition for the employer, the incentive and the participation con-
straint for the worker.
Proposition 3 If {C*, r*, U*} is an equilibrium, then any C*EC* and y* = r* (C*) solves
r0
U= max () y [w ()- e () ( + b)] dF () + b (P1)(),w(),-y
subject to e (0) E [0, 1], non-negative consumption, the incentive constraint IC', together with the
monotonicity of e (.), the participation constraint IR' and the free-entry condition (1.2). Con-
versely, if a pair {C*, y*} solves the program P1, then there exists an equilibrium {C*, r*, U*}
such that C*EC* and y* = r* (C*).
Proof. See Appendix. 
Proposition 3 shows how a CSE must solve Problem P1. The next Proposition shows how
it can be equivalently described by a tightness 7 and a hiring function e (0) solving a simplified
program P2 and by an associated wage function w (0) which can be constructed such that the
incentive and the participation constraints are satisfied.
19Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer(1999a) analyze a competitive search equilibirum when information
is complete. Shimer and Wright (2004) define a competitive search equilibrium with bilateral asymmetric
information.
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Proposition 4 Any function [e ()],0E and y which solve Problem P1 solves also
U max () e (0) [y - -b] dF () + b - 'yk (P2)
s.t.
(7y) je (0) y0 b () dF (0) > k (1.3)
and e (.) non-increasing.
Furthermore, for any function [e (0)]e and y solving problem P2, there exists a function
[w (0)]OEe such that the contract C = [e (0), w ()]Oe and y solve problem PI.
Proof. See Appendix. ·
Free-entry implies that the entire surplus of the economy accrues to workers. Hence, the
competitive search equilibrium maximizes the net surplus of the economy, subject to the con-
straint that the net output must cover both the ex-ante cost of vacancy creation, that is, yk,
and the informational rents of all the workers that are hired, that is, f e () F (0) dO.20 Un-
der full information, the maximization problem is unconstrained and the equilibrium coincides
immediately with the social optimum.
Finally, the following Proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of a CSE. The
argument relies on the result of Proposition 4, that the existence of a solution to problem P2
is sufficient to prove the existence of a solution for problem P1.
Proposition 5 A Competitive Search Equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof. See Appendix. ·
The proof proceeds by showing the existence of a solution for the relaxed version of problem
P2 without assuming that e () is monotone and, then, by checking that the optimal e () is
effectively monotone, implying that it is also the solution to the original problem.
2 0From condition IC', using integration by parts, it follows that the average information rents are:
j [v(O, )-v(S.)] dF () = e () F () d.
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Equilibrium Characterization. Proposition 4 allows me to characterize the competitive
search equilibrium of the static economy in a simple way. Proposition 5 proves that Problem
P2 has a unique solution and that the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient to char-
acterize it. The analysis proceeds by focusing on the relaxed problem without the monotonicity
assumption on e (0). Then, using pointwise maximization for e (0), I show that the trading area
can be fully described by a cut-off value such that
1 if <0
e () = if 0if0>0
implying that the optimal e (0) is in fact monotone. When the constraint is binding21 and
() is everywhere differentiable, the equilibrium can be characterized by an array 9, y and A
satisfying the conditions
F(O)
=y-b- A (), (1.4)
y (by O[y 0 - b - (]dF (O) = k (1.5)
and the binding constraint
/~ fo[ (') ] dF (0) = k[ (1.6)
The variable A represents a normalized version of the shadow value of the informational rents. I
define A - A/(1 +A), where A is the Lagrangian multiplier attached to the constraint of problem
P2. From equation (3.43) it follows that the trading cut-off is decreasing in A, that is, as
the constraint is tighter, the shadow value that workers have to receive in order to reveal their
information increases and the equilibrium is characterized by less trade. Notice that, when
P1 (y) is not differentiable at some point, as I describe in the Appendix, equation (2.6) will be
replaced by inequalities involving the left and right derivatives of / () when the solution will
be at the points of non differentiability.
21When the constraint is not binding, the informational problem is irrelevant and the competitive search
equilibrium is standard.
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Notice that when A = 0, the constraint (1.3) is slack and y is simply determined by (2.6).
Then, the full information allocation is achieved. This is possible only when the ex-ante cost
k is zero. As shown in the next Lemma, incentive compatibility would drive employers to
zero profits ex-post, if the full information allocation would be implemented, contradicting the
possibility of an equilibrium where they have to pay a positive cost ex-ante.
Lemma 6 If k > 0, then the solution to problem P2 requires A > O, where A = A/(1 - A) and
A is the Lagrangian multiplier attached to the constraint.
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Let assume that the solution to problem P2
is an array , y and A with A = 0. Then, Proposition 5 implies that and 'y have to satisfy
equations (3.43), (3.44) and (2.6) with A = 0. Using (3.43), equation (3.44) can be rewritten as
(a) 0 F (0)1 dF () k.
'y _ [ f ()J
Integration by parts implies that
j0 [ - ] dF () = F () dO.
It follows that it must be k = 0 yielding a contradiction and completing the proof. 0
This argument highlights the main channel driving the misalignment between e-ante and
ez-post efficiency, which keeps the economy away from the full information allocation. Ex-post
allocative distortions are necessary to induce employers to open vacancies ez-ante and make
the economy productive. From now on, I focus on k > 0 such that the constraint is binding
and the informational problem interesting.
From incentive compatibility it follows that the optimal wage schedule must take the fol-
lowing form:
w(O)= w()+9+b if <9
w(O) if > 
Notice that when k > 0 and A > 0, then w(O) = 0. Then, a constant wage is paid only to
workers who are effectively hired and is equal to the disutility of the marginal hired worker plus
the outside option. In fact, if two hired workers with different types receive different wages,
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then the worse type would always pretend to be the best in order to get a higher compensation.
Moreover, the marginal hired worker would have no incentive to lie if he is indifferent about
being unemployed, that is, if he is compensated exactly for his disutility and for the working
opportunity cost b. It follows that the wage is increasing in the trading cut-off 9. The more
trade is generated, the higher the wage must be in order to induce the marginal hired worker
to reveal his type.
Remark 7 The static economy is equivalent to a reduced form economy where firms post a
constant wage and workers apply for jobs.
1.3 Static Efficiency
It is an established result that competitive search correctly internalizes the externality generated
by matching frictions. This section investigates the efficiency properties of a static equilibrium
when there are both matching frictions and informational imperfections. Does competitive
search equilibrium still achieve efficiency?
In the benchmark environment, the workers' outside option b is assumed to be leisure, which
is non-transferable and cannot be wastefully destroyed. Consumption must be non negative.
The worker's disutility from a match 0 is his own private information. Hence, the relevant Social
Planning problem must be constrained by incentive compatibility and individual rationality on
the workers' side and ends up being very similar to problem P2. The only difference is that
the planner could potentially transfer resources to the unemployed workers. However, I show
that such a transfer is not desirable and the competitive search equilibrium reaches constrained
efficiency in the static setting.
Before turning to the dynamic set-up I also study two variations on the original environment
by relaxing the assumption on b: in the first one the social planner can destroy wastefully b,
but cannot transfer it, and in the second one b can be freely transferred.
Social Planner. In the static economy, the social planner controls the matching process by
deciding how many vacancies to open at the beginning of the period. He does not observe the
types of the matched workers and has to induce them to truthfully reveal their match-specific
disutility. Moreover, the planning problem is also subject to a participation constraint on the
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side of the workers, who can decide not to produce and enjoy b. Remember that b is leisure and
cannot be destroyed or transferred and that negative consumption is not allowed. Given these
environmental constraints, together with the resource constraint of the economy, the social
planner decides how to allocate consumption among employed and unemployed workers.
An allocation is a pair of functions [c(O), e ()],,eee representing the consumption and the
hiring probability for a matched worker who reports type 0, a value for consumption of un-
matched workers C,, and a value y denoting the tightness of the market.
As in the case of private contracts, also here, the Revelation Principle allows me to restrict
attention to direct revelation mechanisms, without loss of generality. Following the analysis
of the previous section, an allocation is incentive-compatible when, for all 0 E ), e (.) is non-
increasing and
vSP (, ) = vSP (9, 0) + e (y) dy. (1.7)
where the ad-interim utility for a worker of type 0 reporting type 0, in the centralized economy,
is given by
vSP(9, 9) = c() - e(b)9.
Moreover there is a participation constraint coming from a lack of commitment on the worker's
side together with the assumption that b cannot be destroyed or transferred and that negative
consumption is not allowed. It requires that all workers who participate in the society, both if
matched and unmatched, consume more than the private utility b that they can appropriate by
not participating, that is,
Cu > b and c(0) > b for all 0 e . (1.8)
Finally, the resource constraint for the static economy ensures that aggregate consumption is
covered by aggregate net production, that is,
/i (Y) j c(O)dF () + (1- p ()) Cu < A (7) (y -b) je () dF () + b - k. (1.9)
I can now define a feasible and a constrained efficient allocation.
Definition 8 An allocation is feasible iff it (i) is incentive-compatible, that is, satisfies (1.7)
25
together with the monotonicity of e (.), (ii) satisfies the participation constraint (1.8) and (iii)
satisfies the resource constraint (1.9).
Definition 9 A constrained efficient allocation maximizes workers' ex-ante utility
f (y) [c(8) - e () ] dF (9) + (1- i (y)) Cu
subject to feasibility.
The maximization problem defining a constrained efficient allocation can be expressed, after
some algebra, as
U(b)= max () y [ - -b] dF () + b -yk (P3)
e(),c,, ~y
s.t.
e() [y-0-b- F () ]dF(8) ( 1- (y) )(C )+ 7
Cu > b.
The next proposition shows that the competitive search equilibrium is constrained efficient
in the static setting
Proposition 10 Assume that b cannot be destroyed or transferred and that negative consump-
tion is not allowed, then a static Competitive Search Equilibrium is constrained efficient.
Proof. First, notice that Cu does not appear in the objective function so that the social
planner cannot do worse by choosing C, = b. Then problem P3 becomes equivalent to problem
P2 and competitive search is constrained efficient. 
It is interesting to notice that, as in the decentralized equilibrium, the social optimum does
not reach the full information allocation, that is, A > 0. The result is driven by the binding
participation constraint for the workers. The proof shows clearly that the Planner could do
better by reducing the consumption of unemployed workers, which does not affect the objective
function, below the level of leisure b. Hence, in the next two subsections, I explore two variations
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of the main environment: in the first one the social planner can destroy wastefully b, but cannot
transfer it, and in the second one b can be freely transferred.
1.3.1 Money Burning can be Desirable.
I now show how reducing b wastefully, what I refer to as money burning, can generate a Pareto
improvement. For simplicity, assume that all the workers are unemployed ex-ante. Employers
get zero profits in expectation due to the free entry assumption. Then, the social welfare
coincides with the ex-ante value of being unemployed U (b), as defined in problem P3. A
Pareto improvement is feasible when U' (b) < 0. Considering this alternative environment
is useful to highlight, in a simple way, the crucial mechanism of the paper. The source of
dynamic constrained inefficiency will come from the fact that it can be socially optimal to
reduce ex-ante the workers' outside option, which here is exogenously given by b. In the dynamic
economy, the workers' outside option is endogenous and corresponds to the continuation value
of being unemployed, generating an externality that is not internalized by the competitive
search equilibrium. As I will show in section 1.5, the externality comes from the fact that firms
who post contracts at time t + 1 do not internalize the informational cost that they impose on
contracts designed by other firms at time t.
I show that for an interesting class of functions p (y), there always exists an open set of
parameters such that money burning is Pareto improving. Suppose U (b) is differentiable2 2 and
define
g = 1 - () F() -.
Notice that g has the same sign of U' (b), which represents the effect of the workers' outside
option on welfare. There is a direct positive effect coming from the fact that, as the outside
option is higher, workers who end up being unemployed will be better off. This force is sum-
marized by 1 - (-y) F(b), which represents the ex-ante probability of being unemployed at the
end of the period. However, there is a negative indirect effect coming from the tightness of the
informational constraint, represented by A. As the outside option increases, the shadow cost of
22It is easy to show that when y, and A are uniquely defined, then U (b) is differentiable. In fact this is
always the case in the rest of the analysis.
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revealing information is higher, since workers have a higher opportunity cost of remaining in
the employment relationship. When the indirect effect dominates making g negative, a Pareto
improvement can be implemented by reducing ex-ante the workers' outside option.
Proposition 11 Whenever g < 0, the competitive search equilibrium allocation can be Pareto
improved by reducing b.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Notice that the last constraint of problem P3 will
be always binding and then can be eliminated by substituting for Cu = b. Then, from the
Envelope condition dU/db = 1- (1 -A)-1l (y) F(O) where A = /(1 + A) and A is the multiplier
attached to the constraint, which implies that dU/db < 0 iff g < 0. 
There are two extreme cases that can lead to g being negative: first, if the constraint is
extremely tight, that is, A -- 1 and second, if the probability of staying unemployed is extremely
small, that is, (y) F((A)) - 1. The next two Propositions show that for an interesting class
of functions (y), there exists a set of the parameter space (y, k) such that g is negative. My
intent is not to fully characterize the set of parameters generating optimal money burning, but
to deliver sufficient conditions for this set to exist. Then, I will deliver some insights on its
characterization, using the Cobb-Douglas case.
First, I consider two general families of functions A (y), which include the specifications com-
monly used in the search literature: the family of functions everywhere differentiable satisfying
a particular restriction on the elasticity stated in assumption A2, and the family of functions
reaching 1 with a kink and possibly exhibiting an additional kink when (y) = y at > 0,
as specified in assumption A3. Proposition 12 shows that g can be negative for each of these
families of functions ().
The first class of functions p (y) includes the exponential case. Functions belonging to this class
have to satisfy assumption Al and A2, where the latter is defined as follows.
Assumption A2. Assume Ij (y) is strictly concave and everywhere differentiable. Further-
more, limy-.o A' (y) = jL' (0) > 0 and lim-Ho 71' () > -' (0) f () foJ F () dO where l (y)
y7u' (Y) // () denotes the elasticity of . (y) and 7r' (y) < 0.
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The second class of functions (y) that I consider includes for example the Leontief specification,
Pt (y) = min {y, 1}, and the properly modified Cobb-Douglas case, A (y) = min {A a, -y, 1} with
a E (0, 1] and A > 0. Functions that belong to this class have to satisfy assumptions Al and
A3, where the latter is defined below.
Assumption A3. Assume there exist two cutoffs 7 < y < oo such that
(y) = yfor < 
/(-y) = 1fory > y
with lim,. / () < 1 and lim,?7 /I (y) > 0. Furthermore, assume (y) is strictly concave
and exhibits non increasing elasticity for any y E (y, y).
The following Proposition shows that money burning can Pareto improve the competitive search
equilibrium for functions tu (y) that belong to one of these families of functions, that is, that
satisfy Al and either A2 or A3.
Proposition 12 Consider any i (.) satisfying Assumption Al and either A2 or A3. For given
F (.) and b, there exists an open set of the parameter space (k, y) such that g < 0 at the
competitive search equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix. ·
The proof highlights the two forces potentially driving money burning. On one hand,
inefficiency can arise when the shadow cost of revealing information is high enough, that is,
for A -* 1, as I show as being a possibility for the first class of functions and for a subfamily
of the second class.23 On the other hand, inefficiency can arise when (y) F(0(A)) - 1 and
the mass of unemployed workers enjoying b at the end of the period is infinitesimal. This can
happen if y is big enough, for the subfamily of functions of the second class for which -y < y
and ,' (y) < (y) /y for any y E (y, ).
23This subfamily of the class of functions satisfying assumptions Al and A3 reduce to the Leontief case
ts(y) = min {-y, 1}.
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In order to give a flavor of the impact of k on money burning, in the next Proposition,
I analyze the modified Cobb Douglas case24 and characterize how g depends on k. Intuition
suggests that k has two first-order opposite effects on inefficiency: it reduces the number of
vacancies posted and it increases the shadow cost of information revelation, that is, A. On
the top of these, there is an indirect effect of k on A. This effect is shut down in the Cobb
Douglas case, making it analytically tractable. I show that g behaves as in the picture below,
highlighting the opposite effects that k can have on money burning. For y big enough, g can
be negative both when k is big enough to make the cost of revealing information extremely
high, that is, A - 1, and when k is small enough to make the market very tight so that the
probability of staying unemployed is extremely small, that is, t (y) F(0(A)) -, 1.
k
Proposition 13 Assume (y) = min {Aya, y, 1} with A E (0, 1] and a E [0,1].25 Further-
more, assume y > b + 0 + AF()/f (0), where A aD/[1 - a(1 - D)] with D f (0) f2j F () dO.
Then, either g is always negative, or there exist kL and kH such that 0 < kL < kH < k
and at the competitive search equilibrium g < 0 for k E [0, kL] and k E [kH, k], where
k- () l[y-0 -b- - 0] dF () with (1) = b + (1) + F((l))/f((1l)).
24 This is a special case of the functions satisfying Assumption A2, so that the previous Proposition has already
shown that there exists a parameter subspace for which g < 0.
2 5Note that the Leontief case is a particular case of this modified Cobb Douglas with a = 1.
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Proof. See the Appendix. 
1.3.2 Transferability can Restore Full Information
Now I explore a second alternative environment in which the worker's outside option b is freely
transferable. In this case, I interpret b as home production. If b is high enough, the social
planner can achieve the full information allocation, by transferring utility between unemployed
and employed workers. In particular, given risk neutrality, the social planner could tax, at
no social cost, the unemployed workers in order to finance the informational rents of matched
workers. Similarly, the full information allocation could be achieved if the planner had access
to enough external resources.
Allowing for the possibility of transferring resources is basically equivalent to reducing the
participation constraint to the constraint of non-negative consumption. From problem P3,
it appears that, if b is big enough, the Social planner can make a negative net transfer to
the unemployed, C - b, so as to achieve the full information efficient allocation, which is
characterized by the cut-off value BFI such that
9FI = y - b (1.10)
and 7FI implicitly defined by
-F1
(FI) | [y - -b] dF () = k. (1.11)
What allows the planner to achieve the first best is the reduction of the relative value of being
unemployed with respect to the one of being employed, that is, the sum of the outside option
and the opportunity cost of being employed for the marginal hired worker. In particular, next
Proposition shows that subsidizing job creation can restore the full information outcome.
Proposition 14 Suppose that b is transferable and the following inequality holds
b > kyFI.
Then the full information allocation can be decentralized by subsidizing job creation with a
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lump-sum tax on workers, both employed and unemployed.
Proof. Assume that the social planner gives a subsidy r to the firms, by taxing lump-sum
employed and unemployed workers. Budget balance imposes that the subsidy -r is covered by
a tax equal to ru (y) fJ e (0) dF (0). Then, the social planning problem maximizes
/ (y) e () (y - - b) dF (0) + b -yk
subject to
l(a) e (0) y-0-B -+ - () (0) > k.
I guess that FI, yFI, r and A = 0 are a solution and then I verify it. The social planner can
choose the minimal transfer - which makes the constraint satisfied with equality at the full
information allocation, that is, the r such that
-FI(7FI) (-8-b + -f (0) ) dF()= 
yielding A = 0. Once A = 0, the first order conditions with respect to e (.) and y are equivalent
to equations (1.10) and (1.11), yielding 0 = 0FI and y = yFI . Finally, notice that such a r is
feasible only when b > T/ (y) F(0), that is, when b is high enough to cover the informational
rents. In fact the minimal b sufficient to restore the full information allocation is such that
('Yde FI) ( -0- ()) dF (0) = 7 k
which, using the first order condition with respect to e (0) and integration by parts, yields
b > kyFI
completing the proof. 
The proof of the previous Proposition suggests that the full information allocation can be
restored also if there are enough resources to finance both the optimal vacancy creation and
the informational rents necessary to sustain the optimal job creation. The next remark follows
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naturally.
Remark 15 If the social planner has access to enough external resources, then he achieves the
full information allocation.
These results beg the question wether the competitive search equilibrium can achieve the
full information allocation when b is transferable. Indeed, in the next proposition I show that
this is the case when b is high enough.
Proposition 16 Suppose that b is transferable and the following inequality holds
b> kyFI
then the competitive search equilibrium achieves the full information allocation.
Proof. The competitive search equilibrium can be now defined exactly as in section 1.2,
except for the participation constraints IR which now become
v (, ) > 0 for all 0 E e.
Hence, the constraint in problem P2 can be replaced by
() e (0) y- 0 - - F () ]dF () + (a) b > ak.f ()
Substituting the full information values for y and e (0) and integrating by parts as in the proof
of Lemma 6 it follows that
(,FI) b > k FI,
completing the proof. 
Notice that
k7 FI FI(FI) -> k
This implies that the social planner can restore the full information allocation for a larger set of
parameters than competitive search can. The difference comes from the fact that firms cannot
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extract resources from workers who are unmatched, while the social planner can impose an
ex-ante entry cost for the search market.2 6
When b is transferable, as in the benchmark case, the optimal wage schedule takes the form
w()+b+b if9<b
W (0) = (
w(0) if 0 >
However, now firms can set a negative value for w(0) as long as
w() > -b. (1.12)
This contract has a natural interpretation as bond posting. The firms ask workers to sign
a contingent promise, after the match and before they observe the realization of the shock.
Matched workers sign a promise that they will pay an application fee of value -w(0). On top
of that, if they are hired, they will receive a wage of value 0 + b. The constraint (1.12) means
that workers can credibly promise to pay ex-post a value not greater than the value of the home
production they obtain when unemployed.
1.4 Dynamic economy.
This section introduces the dynamic environment of this economy leading to the main result
of the paper: the dynamic competitive search equilibrium can be constrained inefficient. The
crucial difference between the static and the dynamic environment is that the worker's outside
option is exogenously given in the former, while in the latter, it is endogenously determined
as the equilibrium continuation utility of unemployed workers. Inefficiency arises because the
worker's outside option affects the ex-ante cost of information revelation, generating a novel
externality. The social planner can improve upon the decentralized economy by internalizing
this informational externality.
26Though, allowing for a broader interpretation of competitive search, I could think of market makers who
impose an application fee to all the workers who search for a match. This delivers a problem that is isomorphic
to the one of the social planner I have described above. In this case, the competitive search equilibrium will be
able to restore the full information allocation exactly for the same set of parameters, that is for b > kyF .
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Environment. Consider an economy with infinite horizon and discrete time. Both workers
and employers have linear preferences and discount factor /. The search and production tech-
nologies are natural generalizations of the static setting. At the beginning of each period t
employers can be either productive or not. Workers can be either employed or unemployed.
Non-productive employers can open a vacancy at a cost k which entitles them to post an em-
ployment contract Ct E C where C is the set of ad interim incentive compatible and individually
rational mechanisms. As I describe below, a contract Ct: e - [0, 1] x R+ specifies the hiring
probability and the wage for each matched worker at time t, who reports type 0. Therefore at
each time t, a non-productive firm chooses a pair (at,Ct) E 0, 1} x C where at denotes the
decision of posting a vacancy. Next, each unemployed worker observes all the contracts posted
and decides where to apply. He chooses a contract Ct E CPc C, where C P denotes the set of
contracts posted by active firms at time t. As in the static environment, each contract Ct, is
associated to a specific yt so that employers and workers know that their matching probabilities
will depend on the contract that they respectively post and seek for. After workers start to
search for a specific contract, matching takes place and, for each match, the draw 0 is realized
and is private information of the worker. The behavior of a worker who is matched at time t
is described by a map (at, st) : E- e x 0, 1)} that for each type 0 specifies a report t = s ()
and a participation decision at (0). After he sees his type, the worker can either implement
the contract, that is choose at (0) = 1, or walk away, that is choose at (0) = 0. If he walks
away, he stays in autarky for one period, gets a non-transferable utility from leisure b, enters an
anonymous pool of unemployed workers and look for another match next period. If the worker
is effectively hired, the parties are productive until separation, which happens according to a
Poisson process with parameter s. The worker's disutility 0 is constant for the duration of the
match.
In a decentralized economy, as in the static setting, the consumption of employed workers
is given by the contracted wage, which is fixed at the time of the match. Moreover, the
consumption of unemployed workers, that is, both unmatched workers and workers who matched
but have not been hired, is equal to the value of leisure b.
Employment Contracts and Bellman Values. Invoking the Revelation Principle, without
loss of generality, I can again restrict attention to incentive-compatible and individually rational
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direct revelation mechanisms, corresponding to a mapping Ct : - [0, 1] x R+, specifying for
each matched worker at time t who reports type 0, the hiring probability et (0) E [0, 1] and
the wage wt () E R+ which is paid at the beginning of the productive relationship. Notice
that I can restrict attention to the set C of ad interim incentive compatible and individually
rational mechanisms described above, due to the unemployed anonymity assumption. All the
unemployed workers searching for a job cannot be distinguished, so that contracts cannot be
conditioned on the past employment history.
Linear preferences, together with the fact that types are fixed over time within a match,
imply that the wage profile over the life of the relationship is irrelevant for the analysis. There-
fore, I can assume, without loss of generality, that the wage is fully paid at the moment of the
match. Analogously I assume that the whole disutility generated over the life of the match, a,
takes place at the beginning of the relationship. It follows that the continuation value of being
employed net of wages and disutility at time t, Vt, which from now on I will refer to simply as
the continuation utility of employed workers, represents just the discounted expected value of
being separated and becoming unemployed, that is,
t = psUt+1 + (1 - s) Vt+l. (1.13)
Moreover the continuation value of an unemployed worker at time t is given by
Ut = b + (yt+l) e [wt+l (0) - et+1 (0) ((ao - Vt+i + Ut+l)] dF (0) + PUt+l (1.14)
where a - [1 - (1- s)]- .
The ad interim utility of a worker of type 0, who reports to be of type 0 at time t, is given
by
vt(O, 0) = [t() - et(O) (o0 - Vt)] + [1 - et(O)]Ut (1.15)
and the expected revenues of the firm, after a match, is given by
l[et (0) ay - wt (0)] dF (0)
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The large number of potential firms ensures free entry and implies that the value of an open
vacancy will be zero at each time, that is,
(t) [et () y-wt ()] dF () = k. (1.16)
A natural generalization of the static analysis, gives that a contract Ct is incentive-compatible
and individually rational whenever et (.) is non-increasing and the following conditions hold:
vt(, ) = vt (, ) + a et (y) dy for all 0 e e (IC')
and
vt ( k, ) Ž Ut-l. (IR')
Following the static analysis, the informational rents for a worker of type who meets a firm
at time t are vt(, ) - vt (, -), as define by equation IC'.
1.4.1 Dynamic Competitive Search Equilibrium
This section defines the dynamic version of the Competitive Search Equilibrium. Generalizing
the static definition, a dynamic Competitive Search Equilibrium, in sequential terms, is a
sequence of sets of incentive-compatible and individually rational contracts {Ct } and a sequence
of tightness functions {r }, where Fr : C| ,* R+ U oo, such that, at any t employers maximize
profits and workers apply optimally for jobs, taking as given the future sequence of sets of
contracts, {Ct+l}, {Ct+2}, ..., and tightness functions, {Fr}, {r } ....
In order to simplify the analytical treatment, we can introduce an equivalent definition of
the dynamic competitive search equilibrium in recursive terms.
The first thing to notice is that the pair of continuation utilities for unemployed and em-
ployed workers, U and V, are a sufficient statistic for future sets of C's and Frs. This allows
me to describe the dynamic competitive search equilibrium in a recursive way, as shown by the
following Definition.
Definition 17 A dynamic Competitive Search Equilibrium (CSE) is a sequence of sets of
incentive-compatible and individually rational contracts {Ct }, a sequence of functions {F },YluVvvuVVYI~UIYYVC~VI YVWVYUIWUYIUUVUIUYLVIYIL~Y Y~llU O~YL~rlL~, JJUCCL~VIO t
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where r · t* C - R+ U oo, and a sequence of pairs of continuation utility levels Ut*, Vt*),
where (Ut*, Vt*) E R+ for any t, satisfying
(i) employers' profit maximization and free-entry at each time t: VCt _ [et (0), wt (0)]Eoe,
rF( [ let () ay - wt ()] dF (0) - k < 
subject to incentive compatibility IC and individual rationality IR, with equality if CeE {C'};
(ii) workers' optimal job application at each time t: VCt [et (0) ,wt ()]oeE, for given Vt
and Ut
Ut*-I > b + o (r (t)) | [t (0) - et (0) (a - V + Ut)] dF (0) + Ut
and r (Ct) > O, with complementarity slackness, where
t = maxb +/ ( ( r ) (W)-e () (aO - t + Ut)] dF () + Ut
or Utl = b + 3Ut if {Cr} is empty, and
Vt*1 =, sUt + P(1 - s)Vt.
The definition of the dynamic equilibrium is a natural generalization of the static version.
At each point in time employers maximize profits and workers apply optimally for jobs, both
taking as given the future values of being employed and unemployed and aware that a market
tightness is associated with each contract, even if not offered in equilibrium, according to the
function r* (Ct). Moreover, profits are driven to zero at each point in time by free entry.
It follows that the unemployment rate of workers applying to firms posting a contract of
type Ct at time t is given by
Ut+l (Ct+l) = ut (Ct) [1 - (rt* (Ct)) et () dF ()] + (1 - ut (Ct)) s. (1.17)
Generalizing the static result, the next Proposition states a dynamic characterization of a
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symmetric competitive search equilibrium in recursive terms.
Proposition 18 If {Ct, rt, Ut, Vt}°°o is a Competitive Search Equilibrium, then any pair (Ct, Yt )
with CtECt and yt = t (Ct ) satisfy the following
(i) for given pair Ut and Vt, for any time t, Ct = [et (0), Wt ()]Oee and yt solve
max b + 3r (t) w [t ()-et () (a - Vt + Ut)] dF () + Ut (P4)
et(.),w(.),Vt Q
subject to et (0) E [0, 1], non-negative consumption, the incentive compatibility constraint
IC' together with the monotonicity assumption on et (0), the individual rationality con-
straint IR' and the free-entry condition (1.16);
(ii) for given {Ctt}t=O, then {Ut, Vt}t=o evolve according to (1.13) and (1.14).
Conversely, if a sequence {Ct, y })o solves the program P4, then there exists an equilibrium
c*t r*, Vt t*- such that Ct*eCt and at = Fr (C ).
In the rest of the analysis I adopt a recursive notation, dropping the t whenever this causes
no confusion, and denoting a variable at time t - 1 with a - sign.
Proposition 18 shows that for given U and V, a (symmetric) equilibrium incentive-compatible
and individually-rational contract C and tightness y must solve Problem P4. The next Propo-
sition shows that the equilibrium can be equivalently described by a hiring function e (0) and a
tightness y that solve a simplified program P5. Given e (0) and 7, an associated wage function
w (0) can be constructed so that the constraints IC' and IR' are satisfied.
Proposition 19 For given U and V, any function [e (0)]Oee and y which solve Problem P4,
solve also
U(U, V) = max/,s (y) je () [ (y-0)+V-U]dF () (P5)
+b - yk + U
s.t.
(7) e(O) a[ y- - F () )- dF ) (1.18)
~0~ [ ( -- (+>T
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Furthermore, for any function [e (0)]oe and y which solve problem P5, there exists a func-
tion [w (0)]oEe such that the contract C = [e (0), w (0)]eE and y solve problem P4.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 4 and is therefore omitted. m
Equilibrium Characterization. The characterization of the equilibrium allocation for a given
continuation utility gap between unemployed and employed workers, U - V, is very similar to
the static one. In fact, in the dynamic setting, U - V represents the effective outside option of
the workers. A generalization of Proposition 5 proves that Problem P5 has a unique solution
and that the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize it. I proceed
by studying the relaxed problem without the monotonicity assumption on e (). Then, using
pointwise maximization with respect to e (0) I show that the trading area can be fully described
by a cut-off value 0 such that
i 1 if <
e(O) 0if >
implying that the optimal e(8) is effectively non-increasing. When the constraint (1.18) is
binding2 7 and p (y) is everywhere differentiable the equilibrium can be characterized, for given
U - V, by an array 9, y and A satisfying the first order conditions, respectively, for 9 and y( f(°B) (1.19)
a[ ( -9F- A( ) (U - V)] dF() = k (1.20)f ((7) be~ (1.20)
4' ()r_ ~ [a y-O-A-- (U- V) dF () = k (1.20
and the condition
f () 0- )) (U-V)] dF (0) (1.21)
The variable A represents a normalized version of the shadow value of the informational rents.28
Notice that when A = 0, the constraint (1.18) is slack and y is simply determined by (1.20).
27When the constraint is not binding, the informational problem is irrelevant and the competitive search
equilibrium is constrained efficient as in the standard result.
28Similarly to the static setting, A A/(i + A), where A is the Lagrangian multiplier attached to the constraint
(1.18).
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Then, the full information allocation is achieved. Clearly, asymmetric information reduces job
creation, as the surplus of the economy must cover not only the cost of vacancy creation but also
the rents needed to extract information from the workers. As intuition suggests, decreases
with A. When p (y) is not differentiable at some points, equation (1.20) will be replaced by
inequalities involving the left and right derivatives of ,u (y) at the points of non differentiability.
Similarly to the static setting, whenever the cost of posting a vacancy k is positive, then
A > 0 and the equilibrium is away from the full information allocation.
Lemma 20 If k > O, then the solution to problem P5 requires A > O, where A = A/(1 - A) and
A is the Lagrangian multiplier attached to constraint (1.18).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 6 and therefore omitted. ·
Proposition 19 shows that at each point in time the competitive search equilibrium y and
e () are functions only of the expected values of V and U, which evolve according to the law of
motions (1.13) and (1.14). Hence, the equilibrium UCE and VCE corresponds to a fixed point,
given by
(rCE)S CE [y - dF () + b - yCEkuCE = - (1.22)
(1 -) [ + a (CE) F(CE)]
vCE OS UCE (1.23)
- (1 - s)
where, the equilibrium 9CE and yCE solve Problem P5, for U = UCE and V = VCE, that is,
satisfy equations (1.19), (1.20) and (1.21). The unemployment rate u, which is the only state
variable of the economy, does not affect this problem. This implies that 'y and e () (and w (8)
as well) together with V and U, achieve the steady state values directly in the first period and
stay constant over time.29 The transitional dynamics of the competitive search equilibrium will
then be characterized uniquely by the transition of the unemployment rate.
Steady State. Denote the steady state competitive search equilibrium by
SS= { [eCE ()] , CE, UCE, VCE, USS}
29Note that in equilibrium the continuation utility of the employed turns out to be smaller than the continuation
utility of the unemployed. This is natural if one thinks that I define the continuation value of the employed net
from wage and disutility.
41
In steady state not only e (0), y, V and U are constant, but also the unemployment rate u is.
The steady state equilibrium is given by equations (1.19), (1.21) and (1.20) with U = UCE and
V = VCE, (1.22), (1.23) and
S
= S Is + I (7CE) F(CE)] (1.24)
In the analysis of the static economy, I have shown how decreasing the worker's outside op-
tion b can generate a Pareto improvement. In the dynamic environment, the effective worker's
outside option corresponds to UCE - VCE and is endogenously determined in equilibrium. In a
decentralized economy agents' decisions determine the continuation utility of unemployed work-
ers, without internalizing the cost in terms of efficient creation imposed by the informational
rents.
1.5 Dynamic Efficiency
In this section I explore the efficiency properties of the dynamic competitive search equilibrium
when matching frictions interact with informational asymmetry.
The static analysis shows that in the benchmark environment, where b cannot be transferred
or destroyed, the competitive search equilibrium is constrained efficient. On the contrary, in the
analogous dynamic environment, the social planner can improve the decentralized equilibrium
allocation, because of an extra instrument to provide incentives. The planner can reward or
punish workers reporting a low type, not only through the instantaneous consumption level,
but also through continuation utilities. This allows the planner to internalize the externality
coming from informational imperfections.
First, I analyze a simple example of inefficiency, driven by the same mechanism described
in section 1.3 as money burning: changing the worker's outside option can lead to a Pareto
Improvement. In the benchmark static environment b is exogenously given and cannot be
reduced. However, in a dynamic setting, the social planner can improve the e-ante welfare by
affecting the workers' expected continuation utility, through future allocations.
Then, I characterize the social planning problem and show that the competitive equilibrium
is constrained inefficient whenever the unemployment rate is away from the steady state level.
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Moreover, I show that the steady state competitive search equilibrium, although it satisfies the
necessary conditions for constrained efficiency, is not socially optimal according to the utilitarian
welfare criterion. In particular, the informational asymmetry makes employed people, who enjoy
the informational rents, better off than an utilitarian planner would prescribe.
Finally, I show that in the alternative environment where b is transferable and high enough
the social planner can achieve the full information allocation, as it was the case in the static
economy.
Social Planner. Analogously to the static setting, the social planner controls the matching
process by deciding how many vacancies to open at the beginning of each period. He does
not observe the types of the matched workers and has to induce them to truthfully reveal
them. Moreover, there is lack of commitment from the side of the workers, who can always
decide not to produce and to consume their private non-transferable utility b. I impose on the
planner the same anonymity restriction that I impose on the decentralized economy: the pool
of unemployed workers is anonymous. Once workers decide to consume b at time t, they can
always join back the pool of unemployed at time t+ 1. Given these constraints, together with the
resource constraint of the economy, the social planner decides how to allocate intertemporally
non-negative consumption among employed and unemployed workers.
An allocation is a sequence of functions [et (0 )]0Ee representing the hiring probability for
a worker who meets an employer at time t and reports type 0 and a sequence of functions
[t(0, s)],,,,,>t denoting the consumption at time s of the worker hired at time t reporting type
0, a sequence of consumption values for unmatched workers CtU, a sequence of consumption
values CV for employed workers who matched at time < t, and a sequence of tightness values
at 30
Given that agents have linear utility, the path of consumption does not matter and I can
restrict attention to the case in which ct(0, s) = ct(0). Moreover, given that types are fixed over
time within a match and there is no commitment problem after the match is implemented, the
consumption profile over time is irrelevant for the analysis as in the competitive equilibrium.
Thus, without loss of generality, I can characterize the efficient allocation as if the whole con-
3 0Without loss of generality, because of linear preferences, I assume that matched workers who are not hired
at time t get the same consumption , Cu, of the unmatched ones.
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sumption act (0) and disutility a0 took place at the beginning of the relationship. This implies
that the net continuation value of being employed V, which I will refer to as the employed
continuation utility, represents just the value of a current transfer plus the discounted expected
value of being separated and becoming unemployed in the future, that is,
Vt = CV + sUt+l + (1 - s) Vt+l.
The value of being unemployed at time t is instead
Ut = Ct + 1 (t+1) et+l (0)[o [[ct+l (0) - ] + Vt+ - Ut+l] dF (0) + Ut+l.
The ad interim utility of a matched worker of type , who reports to be of type 0 at time t is
given by
v (0, ) =et(0) [[ct(0)- +0 -U] + t]  U for all , 0 E e.
A straightforward generalization of the static analysis gives that an allocation is incentive-
compatible when e (.) is non-increasing and
vtS(0, 9) = vtSP (, ) + a et (y) dy for all 0E e. (IC')
Unemployed workers can choose at any point in time to stay in autarky, enjoy an instanta-
neous utility from leisure of value b and go back to the anonymous pool of unemployed at the
beginning of the following period. Hence, an allocation satisfies the participation constraint,
whenever
(i) Ctu > b
(ii) v P (0, 0) > b- CU + Ut for any 0.
Notice that when an allocation is incentive compatible condition (ii) reduces to
vSP () > b-CF + Ut.
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Hence, next lemma follows.
Lemma 21 An incentive compatible allocation that satisfies the participation constraint must
satisfy e (.) non-increasing, CtU > b and
| et(0) a t(O) -O- F (0)) +Vt-Ut dF (O)+CtU - b > . (1.25)
The intertemporal resource constraint ensures that aggregate consumption is covered by
aggregate output, that is,
00E t ut (+) et+l(0) t+l (0) dF (0) + ct + (1-ut) CtV
< Zf tut [ (Yt+i) Jet+ () |ydF () + b- t+lk ,
t=O
where ut follows the law of motion
Ut+l = t 1- () et (0) dF (0) + (1 - ut) (1.26)
Assume that the social planner can transfer resources intertemporally at the fixed interest rate
r = -1 - 1, by borrowing at the beginning of time t at price /l and by paying back at the
beginning of time t + 1. I assume that the economy does not have external resources so that
the intertemporal resource constraint has to hold. Define Pt as the net resources of the planner
at time t, that is,
Pt = Et {ut A[8 (Yt+) et+ (o) [y-ct+ (0)]dF(o)-c -(1- ut)Ct 
Then, the resource constraint can be written in recursive terms by using the state variable Pt
as
Pt < ut I (Yt+l) et+l () (y - ct+l ())dF () + b- t+lk -C
-(1 - ut) CV + BPt+l (RC)
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for any t.
Definition 22 An allocation is feasible iff it (i) is incentive-compatible, (ii) satisfies the par-
ticipation constraint and (iii) satisfies the resource constraint for any t.
1.5.1 An Example of a Feasible Pareto Improvement.
I now show, with a simple example, that in a dynamic economy the competitive search equilib-
rium can be constrained inefficient. In this example, the mechanism driving inefficiency is the
natural generalization of the static money burning result described in section 1.3. When all the
workers are ex-ante unemployed, the economy can achieve a Pareto Improvement by reducing
the worker's effective outside option.
Let assume that the economy is at the competitive search equilibrium. From the previous
section it means that et (0), yt, Ut and Vt are equal to the steady state competitive equilibrium
level, CE, for any t = 0, 1,....
Define the analogous of g for the dynamic economy:
g9- 1- (yCE)F(OCE) - ACE (1.27)
The value g represents a monotonic transformation of the effect of the workers' outside option
on the ex-ante value of being unemployed at the competitive search equilibrium. There is
a direct positive effect coming from the probability of being unemployed at the end of the
period, 1 - ('yCE)F(CE ), and a negative effect coming from the tightness of the informational
constraint, represented by ACE, since, as the outside option increases, it is more costly to reveal
information.
Assume that all the workers start out as unemployed, so that the ex-ante welfare coincides
with the ex-ante value of being unemployed, that is, W = Uo. Thus, when g is negative it
would be Pareto improving to reduce the workers' outside option.
Proposition 23 Whenever g < 0, the competitive search equilibrium allocation is Pareto inef-
ficient.
Proof. The proof proceeds by construction. Consider the feasible allocation where Vt* =
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QCE for any t =1,2, 8t =c =
=CE for any t = 1 2 ...,  E and U* = UCE for any t = 2, 3, ..; = E for any
t = 3, 4, ... and - = CE + , U is given by
-CE
L* = t (y) J [ ( _ 0) + CE _ UCE] dF (0) + b - yk + UCE
g; and y solve problem P2 at time 0 and W* is given by
w = ()/: (y- 0) + a _-U ]uF (0) + b- k + uf.
First, the Envelope Condition shows that welfare ex-ante can be improved by reducing U1
whenever g < O0. It follows that if in period 2, I perturb the competitive equilibrium level of -y,
choosing 7y = y + e, leaving everything else at the level of competitive equilibrium, then, by
definition, U will be marginally lower than the competitive equilibrium level, thus increasing
ex-ante welfare W*, so that for any 1l and yl the allocation proposed in the proposition is
Pareto improving. Finally, g~ and 7y solve problem P2 for given CE and U', so that the
allocation is also feasible, completing the proof. ·
An equilibrium is constrained inefficient if there exists a feasible allocation that Pareto
dominates it. It follows that a dynamic competitive search equilibrium is constrained inefficient
whenever g is negative at the equilibrium. I naturally extend the static analysis and show that
the dynamic competitive search equilibrium can be constrained inefficient for an interesting
class of functions (.). In Section 2, I have shown that for '4 (.) satisfying assumptions Al
and A2 or A3, for a given b there exists a set of the parameter space (k, y) such that the
static version of g is negative. Now, I show that varying b for any pair (k, y), I can adjust the
equilibrium value of unemployed workers, UCE, so that there exists a set of the parameter space
(b, k, y) such that the dynamic version of g is negative. The next proposition is the counterpart
of Proposition 12 in the static analysis.
Proposition 24 For any IL (.) satisfying Assumption Al and either A2 or A3 and given F (.),
there exists an open set of the parameter space (b, k, y) such that the dynamic competitive search
equilibrium is constrained inefficient.
Proof. See Appendix. ·
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1.5.2 The Social Planning Problem
I now characterize the constrained efficient allocation. The social planner, for a given initial
rate of unemployment uo, chooses a Pareto optimal pair Uo and V. The problem can be written
in a recursive form, by maximizing at a given t
Ot+1
Ctu + ,1 (-Yt+l) 1 [a(ct+ () - ) + Vt+l - Ut+l]dF (0) +/ Ut+l
subject to feasibility as described in Definition 22, the law of motion of ut given by (1.26) and
the promise-keeping constraint
t = CtV + svUt+ + 03(1 - s) Vt+.
In order to analyze the constrained efficient allocation, it is convenient to approach the
social planner problem from a dual perspective. The social planner Bellman equation is a
function of three state variables: the promised utility to employed workers, V, the promised
utility to unemployed workers, U, and the unemployment rate, u. The planner maximizes the
net resources of the economy, subject to two promise-keeping constraints for V and U, the law
of motion of u and incentive compatibility and individual rationality, as summarized by Lemma
21. I study a relaxed version of the problem, where I do not impose the monotonicity of e (.)
and then I verify that the result of the optimization gives a monotone e (.). Indeed, pointwise
maximization, as in the competitive equilibrium analysis, implies that there exists a threshold
6 such that e () = 1 iff 0 < . Moreover, when k > 0 the constraint (1.25) is binding for any
U and V,31 so that I can solve for the optimal allocation substituting for c (0) and recovering
it from the binding constraint at the optimum.
The Bellman equation can be written as:
P (V-, U-, u-) max uf[a (y)j (aV0 ) + V-U] dF() (P6)
o,Y,u',V',U'
+u- [(1 - tilt (Y)) (b - CU) - yk] - (1 - u-) Cv + 6P (V, U, u)
31The proof of this statement is very similar to the proof of Lemma 6.
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s.t.
[v] V- = v + sU + (1 - s)V
r7] LU- = U F+l (/ ) a ) dF (0) + t (y) (b - CU) + U
[r] u = u- [1 - (7) F(0)] + ( - u-)s
[X] c u > b
I assume that the social planner, as the market economy, does not have access to any external
resources. Therefore, for a given uo, Uo and V0 are on the Pareto frontier iff P (Vo, Uo, uo) = 0.
Next, I show the main result of the paper: away from the steady state, a competitive
equilibrium is always constrained inefficient. Recall that the competitive equilibrium allocation,
CE CE, VrCE and UCE, achieves immediately the steady state level, while the unemployment
rate evolves slowly to the steady state, starting at a given uo.
Proposition 25 If uo 54 uSS, then the competitive search equilibrium allocation is constrained
inefficient.
Proof. See Appendix. ·
The proof proceeds by contradiction. I assume that the competitive allocation solves the
social planning problem and then I show that the necessary first order conditions are violated.
In particular, the optimality condition that is violated is the one determining the level of the
promised utility for the unemployed workers. The proof highlights the mechanism driving the
inefficiency. The direction of the inefficiency depends on the dynamics of the unemployment
rate. Constrained efficiency requires to set the optimal promised utility to unemployed workers,
Ut+l, so that the marginal benefit of increasing it in terms of social surplus at time t equates
the marginal cost at time t + 1. In particular, the planner needs to satisfy the following Euler
equation
-Ut+ = {it (1 -t) + t[1-t (t) F(Ot))]ut}- (1 - t) Utp (yt) F() (1.28)
where rt represents the shadow cost of increasing Ut, t the shadow cost of increasing Vt and
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from the Envelope condition
Put+ -- t+lUt·
The right-hand side of equation (1.28) represents the net benefit at time t of a one unit
increase of Ut+l for the social planner. The direct effect is to increase by 77t the utility of
unemployed workers who will not be hired at the end of the period, [1 - u (Tyt) F(t)]ut, and
by vt the utility of employed workers who will be separated, (1 - ut) s. Moreover there is
an indirect effect coming from the fact that an increase of Ut+l makes tighter the incentive
constraint of the workers hired at time t, that is, ut (y) F(Ot). The latter effect imposes a
cost of 1 - 7t per worker hired.
The left-hand side of the equation represents, instead, the cost of a one unit increase of Ut+l
in terms of resources at time t + 1. The cost of giving one additional unit of promised utility to
each unemployed worker at time t + 1 is smaller than one because increasing that utility allows
the planner to increase the informational rents of workers who are hired at time t + 1 and, thus,
increase the social surplus in the future.
The Euler condition (1.28), by equating the right and the left-hand sides, implies that the
evolution of ut affects the dynamics of the shadow cost of informational extraction. In particular,
when the unemployment rate is decreasing, the social planner wants to reduce the worker's
effective outside option because he wants to extract information from the unemployed workers
who match today who are relatively more abundant. On the contrary, when the unemployment
rate is rising, then there is a gain from increasing the worker's effective outside option because
it makes it less costly to extract information from unemployed workers who match tomorrow.
The planner can indeed manipulate the continuation utilities by changing the future choices of
vacancy creation and hiring margins. In steady state the flows in and out of unemployment are
equal and the cost of extracting information is invariant over time. Recall that in competitive
equilibrium the allocation 6 and 7 and the continuation utilities U and V are constant over time.
Hence, the equilibrium dynamics are characterized only by the evolution of the unemployment
rate. It follows that the competitive equilibrium cannot meet this optimality condition away
from the steady state. Denote with £ the Lagrangian associated to P6. Then, we can write:
C a0 Oif (UCE _ UCE) ACE 0.
,9Ut+ f + 
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The steady state competitive search equilibrium satisfies the necessary conditions of the
social planning problem. In fact, when the mass of unemployed workers is constant over time
the externality is muted. When the unemployment rate is at the steady state level, the flow of
workers out of unemployment, who enjoy the informational gain from a reduction of the outside
option, are offset by the flow of workers into unemployment, who are damaged by a future lower
expected value.3 2
Proposition 25 generalizes the "money burning" example of Pareto improvement discussed
in subsection 5.1. That example relies on the extreme case of all the workers being unemployed
ex ante, which, by construction, implies that the unemployment rate is decreasing to the steady
state level.3 3 Hence, it focuses only on one direction of the inefficiency. If we assume by
contradiction that the competitive equilibrium is constrained efficient, equation (1.28) could be
rewritten as
Ut+1 (1 - ACE) = Utg + (1 - Ut) S
where g is expression (1.27) in subsection 5.1. Recall that g represents the impact of an increase
of the promised utility to unemployed workers tomorrow. There are two reasons why the general
dynamic analysis differs from the simple "money burning" in the example, where ut = 1 and
g < 0. First, even though the impact of an increase of the promised utility tomorrow on workers
today is overall positive, that is, g > 0, the relatively high mass of potential matches today
would make the social planner decrease the promised utility Ut+l. Second, if there is a mass of
employed workers today, that is, ut < 1, then it is possible that the direction of the inefficiency
is reversed and in particular it will be the case exactly when ut < ut+l.
1.5.3 Utilitarian welfare
Now I want to consider a particular welfare criterion commonly used in the literature: the util-
itarian criterion. It is interesting to notice that the steady state competitive search equilibrium
does not maximize the utilitarian welfare function. When utility is perfectly transferable the
Pareto frontier is linear and this criterion can be used without loss of generality in order to
3 2Notice that unfortunately problem P6 is not concave so that I cannot state that the first order conditions
are also sufficient to characterize the constrained efficient allocation.
3 3The Pareto improvement built on the money burning mechanism works more generally for a high enough
ex-ante unemployment rate.
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determine the efficient allocation. However, in the context of this environment where b is not
transferable, the Pareto frontier is typically not linear. Nevertheless, the utilitarian welfare
represents the long run expected welfare of a worker ex-ante. For this reason, it is interesting to
note that the steady state competitive search equilibrium does not maximize welfare according
to this criterion due to the informational asymmetry which makes unemployed people worse off
than what the utilitarian planner would prescribe.
Corollary 26 If P is differentiable, then the competitive search steady state equilibrium does
not maximize the utilitarian welfare function.
Proof. The proof of the previous Proposition shows that the competitive search steady
state equilibrium satisfies the first order condition of the social planner problem. Then, either
it is not an optimum, since the problem is not concave, and then it cannot maximize the
utilitarian welfare function, or it is a point on the Pareto frontier. If this is the case, from the
Envelope conditions, given that P is assumed differentiable, then
P = uCE (1 - ACE)
P = - (1 - uCE).
It follows directly that the allocation does not maximize the total output of the economy, equal
to uU + (1 - u) V, as long as ACE > O, given that
dU 1 -uCE 1 -u CE
dV UCE(1- ACE) uC E
completing the proof. 
1.5.4 Transferability restores Full Information.
Finally, I consider the alternative environment in which b is freely transferable. As in the static
setting, under this relaxed assumption, a net lump-sum transfer from unemployed workers to
employed workers, rt at time t, makes the competitive equilibrium reach the full information
allocation, yFI and eFI (.), if b is high enough. Budget balance requires that employed workers
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receive a transfer of (1 - ut) - l uttt at time t. Notice that this policy can be interpreted, as in
the static section, as a subsidy to job creation financed by a lump-sum tax on workers both
employed and unemployed.
Proposition 27 When b is transferable and high enough, lump-sum transfers from unemployed
to employed workers can make the competitive search equilibrium achieve the full information
allocation.
Proof. From the informational constraint, there must exist an H such that
(FI) FI (]0))+H- Ff () dF () = yFk
so that a competitive equilibrium allocation reaching the full information outcome requires
Vt - Ut > H Vt. The equilibrium has to satisfy
Ut = fl (7F I) j eFI (0) [a (y - 0) + Vt+l - Ut+l] dF (9) + b - t - yFIk + PUt+1
t = (_ t 't + sUt+ + (1 - ) t+l
t+l = Ut 1- (aFI ) eF (0) dF ()] + (1-ut) s
Then, imposing that Vt - Ut = H for any t and combining the equations above it follows that
H = - t= (1-ut )rt-a (y ) 1/ (7FI) eFI(0) dF () b FIk
-OBH- _O (FI) eFI (0) dF (0) H + PH
so that the full information allocation is achievable in competitive equilibrium by imposing the
following tax
t = (1-ut) (y- 0) (YFI) eF (0)dF (0)+b-yFk) H
+ (1 -ut) ( -+ /s (FI) eF I (0) dF () H
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When b > rt the policy is feasible completing the proof. 
1.6 Conclusions
In this paper, I have modeled the interaction between informational imperfections and matching
frictions in labor markets. My focus has been to analyze the ability of labor markets with these
features to decentralize the efficient allocation of resources.
The two crucial assumptions of my setup are: the presence of asymmetric information and
the fact that workers' always have the option to quit and go back to the unemployed pool.
In this setup a new type of externality arises, which can lead to inefficient job creation. In
order to highlight the role of this externality, I have used the equilibrium notion of competitive
search, which correctly internalizes the search externality generated by matching frictions. I
have shown that, under asymmetric information, the efficiency property of competitive search
may fail. All along, I have framed the efficiency analysis in terms of constrained efficiency, by
defining a social planning problem subject to the same constraints faced by the decentralized
economy.
My model shows that the competitive search equilibrium is constrained inefficient whenever
the unemployment rate is away from the steady state level. A natural business cycle inter-
pretation would suggest that decentralized economies may react inefficiently to booms and to
recessions. In particular, there is insufficient creation in recessions and excessive creation in
booms. An interesting area for future research is to add aggregate shocks and to study explicitly
the business cycle implications of the model. In particular, it would be interesting to design
optimal policies to restore efficiency, for example in terms of optimal subsidies to job creation.
The model suggests that countercyclical subsidies may be an optimal response to business cycle
shocks.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof follows closely Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a) and proceeds
in two steps: step 1 shows that any equilibrium solves problem P1 and step 2 shows that any
solution to P1 is part of an equilibrium.
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Step 1. Let {C,r, U} be an equilibrium with C* E C and y* = r (*). I show that {C*, y*},
where C* = [e* (0) , w* ()]ee, solves P1. First, profit maximization ensures that {C*, 7*} solves
constraint (1.2) together with IC and IR.
Suppose now that another pair C,y} satisfies IC, IR and achieves an higher value of the
objective, that is,
(7e [w () - e (0) ( + b)] dF (0) +b > U,
I show that it must violates constraint (1.2). Since {C, r, U} is an equilibrium, optimal job
application implies
(r (C))l [ (0) - e (0) ( + b)] dF (0) + b < U
and given IR this implies that , (r (C)) < p (y) and so r (C) > y. Then, combining this with
profit maximization, it follows that
r ( [c ) y[ -( ) ) -k < j () )] dF () -k < 0.
This implies that {C, y} violates (1.2), completing the proof of the first step.
Step 2. This step shows that for any solution {C*, y*} to problem P1, there is an equilibrium
{C, r, U} with C = {C*} and r (C*) = y'. Set
U = (*)-) e* (0)  (0) ( + b)] dF (0) + b
and let r (C) satisfy
U = (r (c)) [W (0) - e (0) ( + b)] dF (0) + b,
or r (C) = 0 if either IC or IR are not satisfied. It follows that {C, , , } satisfies the optimal
application for jobs.
To complete the proof I now show that it also satisfies firms' profit maximization. Suppose by
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contradiction that it is violated by a pair {C', y'} which satisfies IC and IR, but such that
r(,) [e' ( ) y - w' (a)] dF () - k > 0.
Then, I can choose y' > F (C') such that
/, () J| [e' (0) y - w' (0)] dF () - k = 0.
Then, by the construction of F, 'y' > (C') and IR imply
U < p (') [' () - e' (0) ( + b)] dF (0) + b,
so that the pair C', y'} satisfies all the constraints, but generates an higher value for the
objective function, yielding to a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof proceeds in two steps. First I show that any pair {e (0), -}
solving problem P1 is also a solution to problem P2 and then I show that for any such a pair,
I can construct a wage function w (0) which solves problem P1.
Step 1. First, from constraints IC' and IR'
v (0, ) dF (0) = v (,) + [ e (y) dy] dF (0) (1.29)
v (S, ) > b. (1.30)
From integration by parts it follows
l [ e (y) dy] dF () = e (0) F () d,
which combined with (2.24) gives
|[w (0)-e(0)(0 + b) dF(0) += e (0) () dF (0) + v (, ) .
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Using (2.25) I get
| [ -(0)-e (0) +b+ (0) J dF (0) > 0.
Then, a relaxed version of problem P1, where I leave to check the monotonicity of e (0) for the
end, can be rewritten as
m ia (y) 0 [a (0)-e (0) ( + b)] dF (0) + b
e(0),w(0), Y
s.t.
(7y) [e (0) y - w(0)l dF (0) = yk
j [ws()-e (o) o ++ f (0) )] dF (0) > 0
where I can eliminate the wage from the program by using the free-entry condition, ending up
with problem P2 exactly.
Step 2. Now I show that for any {e (0), 7} solving problem P2, I can construct a wage which,
together with the same {e () , y}, satisfies problem P1. In particular pointwise maximization
gives that at the optimum
1 if 0<
e (0) =
0 if 0>0
where 0 is implicitly defined by
= y-b-A F() .
I can construct the wage schedule
{ 0+b if 0<0
w (0) = 
0 if >0
which satisfies the IC constraints, completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Step 1. Existence.
First, notice that Proposition 4 shows that for any solution e* (0) and y* of problem P2 there
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exists a function w* (0) such that w* (0) , e* (0) and y* are a solution of problem P1. Then the
existence of a solution of problem P2 is sufficient for the existence of a solution to problem P1.
Next, to show existence of a solution to problem P2, I first show that there exists a solution
to the relaxed version of P2, without assuming the monotonicity condition on e (0), and then I
show that e () is in fact monotone, implying that there exists a solution to the original problem
P2.
Pointwise maximization, together with the monotone hazard rate assumption, implies that there
exists a threshold 0 such that e () = 1 if 0 < and e (0) = 0 otherwise. This shows directly
that e (0) is in fact non-increasing and that a solution to the relaxed version of problem P2 is
also a solution of the original problem. This allows me to reduce the control variables to 0 and
y. The relaxed problem can be written as
U = max (-y) [y --b]dF(0) +b-yk
0,7 J
s.t.
F(0, )- (7) y - b- f ( dF ()--k > 0.
It is straightforward to see that the objective function is continuous in 0 and y and that the
constraint set is compact, since F(0, 7) is continuous in both its arguments and is not empty,
since, for example, y = 0 and any satisfies it. Existence follows directly.
Step 1. Uniqueness.
Proposition 4 shows that an equilibrium can be characterized by and array 0, y and A that
must satisfy equations (3.43), (2.6) and (3.44). Notice that equation (3.43) defines implicitly 
as a function of A with 0/ax < 0 which can be substituted for into equations (2.6) and (3.44).
Now there are two equations in two unknown, 0 and A:
Al (a, A) = A' () j [y - - Ab - ]dF (0) - k
Notice that fi (, ) and f2 (, ) define implicitly -two functions, which I name ) and ().
Notice that f (y, A) and f2 (, A) define implicitly two functions, which I name 7~ (A) and 72 (A)-
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Then, the implicit function theorem implies that
d'h 1 .9h (A) 'A) d-2d (A) > 0 and 2 (A) 0dA fl(,A) dA f2(yA)
since
y-O-b- F(a) <y-9-b-AF(O) -.
--- y-b-b-- = f(9) f( )
It follows that the two curves must intersect at most once. Moreover, given that I have proved
existence in the previous step, they must intersect exactly at one point, completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 12. The proof separately analyzes the case of 4 (y) satisfying assump-
tions Al and A2 and (y) satisfying Al and A3.
Case 1. (-y) satisfies Al and A2.
Recall that for any given y and k, the equilibrium , y and A must satisfy equations (3.43),
(3.44) and (2.6). Notice that using equation (3.43) and integration by parts yields
fob ( [ F(0)]F(b) 2
y--b- f - -dF (0) = (1-A) F (0) d + A f()
Moreover,
[y - -b f (0) dF ()= f(
Then, I can rewrite equations (3.44) and (2.6) as
: () [F(O) 2A ( [F(G)] = k, (1.31)
7 f(9)
A' () [(1 - A) F () dO + fAF(()] ] = k (1.32)
and, when y is an interior solution, by combining them it follows
1-A [1 F (-() [F ]2  )d, (1.33) A  - V7 (7) F(b2 _
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where i () denotes the elasticity of i (y), that is,
77(7) = ?A'() (
Equations (3.43), (1.31) and (1.33) define an equilibrium 0, y and A.
Consider a family of economies parametrized by a pair (, 6) for (, 6) belonging to a (one-sided)
neighborhood of (0, 0) such as Z - (0, ) x (0, ) with E and strictly positive. For each pair
(e, 6), set the parameters k and y such that
k (e, 6) = A(e, 6) ( ) [F(- 6)](1.34)f(9- 6)
and
y (, 6) = b + - 6 + A(, 6) F( - ) (1.35)f(o - 5) 
where A(e, 6) solves
A(_,6) [ (6) f( - 6) -6 F(0) d
__-_A__ = i1 -,7 (E) JF()]2 F(0)d
and 77(E) = ep' () // (E). Notice that (1.34) and (1.35) make y = e and 0 = 0-6 an equilibrium
solution, given that Proposition 5 shows that the first order conditions have a unique solution.
Notice that, as we assumed, given that e > 0, 7 is an interior solution.
Next I show that equations (1.34) and (1.35) define a continuous and invertible mapping between
the space (, 6) and the space (k, y). The determinant of the Jacobian of the bidimensional
function f (e, 6), where fl - k (e, 6) and f2 y (e, 6), is
detJ(e, ) = (e,6) A / (] f(0-6)J
( -o ha(, 6) F( -5))+ A(E,5)la )( -6) 0(°-5)- )f[( - 6) )96 f(O - 6)
/(e) a(E, 6) [F(O- 5 1)]2 ,
c O6E f(O - )
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where
8(E, 6) _ () (1 -7 ()) (F( - 6) -
05 [1 - 7 () (1 - D (6))] V f( - 6) 
[D(6)(1- dF( - )/ f () - 6) +]
and
aX(e, 6) _ 7' ()D(6)
e [1-(e) (1-D ())]
since 7it (E) < 0, with
D (6) = (O- ) F(O - 6)- 1 F () d.
Notice that det J (, ) > 0 for any (e, 6) E , where Z is small enough. This is easy to
see. In fact A(e,6)/aE < 0, given that '(E) < 0 and /i'(E) < (E)/e for any e > 0,
given that L (.) is strictly concave. Moreover either OA(e, 6)/6a is positive, or, if negative,
lim(e ,)(,) aA(e, 6)/06 = 0 so that we can choose I small enough so that 0A(e, 6)/a6 is suf-
ficiently close to zero for (e, 6) E Z, completing the argument. Notice that this is where the
assumption of strict concavity of i (.) is required.
Then, think of g as a function of (e, 6), that is,
g (, 6) - 1 -p (e) F( - 6) - A(e, 6).
Thus, if for a small enough neighborhood 2, g (e, 6) < 0 for any (, 6) E Z, then there exists an
open set of the space (k, y) for which g < 0.
Next, I show that limeo0g (e, 6) = 0 for any 6 < 0- 6. Given that p (0) = 0 and / (y) is
everywhere differentiable it follows that
() = lim ' (E) lim 7(e) = 1.
e-0 e-+O
Then, equation (1.33) yields
lim A(e, 6) = 1 V6 < -a,
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given that, by construction, equation (1.35) implies 9 = - 6 > 0 for 6 < 0 - , completing the
argument. It follows that
lim g (, 6) = 0 V6 < 0 -9.
Then, to show that g (, 6) < 0 for any (e, 6) E Z where Z is small enough, it is sufficient to
show that ag (, 6) /ae < 0 for any (e, 6) E I.
Notice that
& (E -= --I ( ) F(0 ,6)E -E(,6)EZ (e,)EZ
Equation (1.33) yields
lim (,) = lim 
(E,6)-(o,) ae e -0 f(9) fX F (0) dO
Moreover lims 0 F(9-6) = 1 and, by assumption, lime-o j' (E) = A' (0) > 0 and lim-o 7r' (e) >
-p/ (0) f(0) fo F (9) dS. It follows that I can choose £ and a small enough such that g (, 6) /aI (e,5)EI <
0, completing the proof.
Case 2. (y) satisfies Al and A3.
The proof of this case proceeds in two steps. First I show that there exists a k such that either
k > k and y = 0 or k < k and y E [y, y], which is the interesting case. Then, focusing on
this case, I divide the family of functions (y), satisfying assumptions Al and A3 into two
subfamilies and I show that in both cases, there exists a parameter set such that g is negative.
Step 1.
In order to analyze the competitive search equilibrium allocation with two points of non-
differentiability y and , first notice that, when the constraint is binding, for given y and
k, the equilibrium still has to satisfy equations (3.43) and (3.44).
Define 9 such that
y-b-0- 0 )=.f(0)
From equation (3.43), it follows that 9 > 9. Moreover notice that
= arg max y - F- b - dF ()0 f ()
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and I can define k the maximum value
0c [y B- r ()- dF (0) > 0,
since y > b + . For any k > k, given that (y) /y < 1, the only feasible equilibrium is
characterized by zero vacancy, because the total surplus is not enough to cover the cost of
information revelation and the cost of creating a vacancy. So, from now on, let k < k.
It is, then, straightforward to see that the optimal y E [y, ]. In fact, y < 7y cannot be an
equilibrium given that it' (-y) = it (y) /-y = 1 and
y--b-^ e dF (0) > y -0-b- dF (0) = k.
Moreover, y > 7y cannot be an equilibrium since /z' (y) = O, p (y) /y = 1/j' and
<7 1 - - b ()]dF(0) = k.0 f (0)
It follows that the equilibrium can be characterized by a tuple , -y and A solving equations
(3.43), (3.44) and
<k ify=
A' (7) | [- 0-b-A ^ f-- dr (0) i = k if y E (y , ) (1.36)
> k if7=5
where AL' (y) = lim%_\.y u' (y) when y = 2 and ' (y) = lime/ A' (y) when 7 = y.
Step 2.
The family of functions () satisfying Assumptions Al and A2 can be divided into two sub-
families: the family of functions for which y = y, that is, the Leontief case (y) = min {y, 1},
and the family of function for which y < y and ' (y) < (7) / for any y E (y, y).
Subfamily I: () = min {y, 1}.34
3 4Note that r7 = 1 represents the extreme case of frictionless labor market. The Proposition can be easily
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It follows from the previous analysis that, when 7 = i = 1 as in the Leontief case and k < k,
then in equilibrium y = (y) = 1 and (2.6) is not binding. Then, equations (3.43) and (3.44)
complete the equilibrium characterization.
Think of g as a function of A
g(A) 1- (y) F((A)) - A,
where, for this first case, I think of 0 as a function of A implicitly defined by equation (3.43),
that is,
() = y - bA ( )) (1.37)
Notice that
g (1) = -F(O (1)) < 0,
since y > b + 0 implies 0 (1) > 0. Given that g(A) is a continuous function, then there exists a
set of A < 1 such that g(A) is negative. For each A in this set, I can set the parameter k such
that
k : y -O0-b f () ]dF (0) (1.38)
Observe that
dk = [y - (A) -b F(O((A)) dO(A)dA f(0(A)) dA
since from equation (1.37) it follows that
F(-A )) [F((A))] =0
- (X) - b F(( y-(A) - b- f(f(O(A)) [f((A))
and, given the monotone hazard rate assumption, that db(A)/dA < 0. Thus, for any y > b + 0,
there exists a k < k such that g < 0 for any k E (k, k], completing the proof for the Leontief
case. 35
extended to the more general Leontief case where p (y) = min {7y, 1} with '1 E (0, 1] and the labor market is
frictional for any 7 < 1.
35 In particular, g (0) > 0 and g' (.) < 0 so that, for any y > y, there exists a k such that g < 0 for any k E (k, k]
and g > 0 for any k E [0, k]. The Leontief case is a special case of Proposition 13 that I discuss below.
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Subfamily II: y < y and ' (7) < 1 () / VY E (, Y).
Assume that the equilibrium is characterized by an interior solution for y E (y, ry). Then, as
derived in the proof of Proposition 12, the equilibrium y, 9 and A must satisfy
F=y-b- A (o (1.39)
f(0)'
A[F()] 2 ( ) = k, (1.40)
f(9) 'y
A1-x [ r(Y) f(0)o F ()dO, (1.41)
i- A = 1 - (3`)J [F--)12
where 7r (y) denotes the elasticity of p (y), that is,
(()= y)T () = ()
Consider a family of economies parametrized by a pair (, 6) for (e, 3) belonging to a (one-sided)
neighborhood of (0, 0) such as I _ (0, e) x (0, ) with E and 6 strictly positive.
Think of A as a function of e and 6, A(e, 6), defined implicitly by equation (1.41) with y = y -E
and 0 = 0 - 6. Notice that A(e, 6) is increasing in e, given the monotone elasticity assumption.
The Proposition assumes that there exists a < oo such that , () = 1 and limy/ r7 (3y) > 0,
which implies A(e, 6) > 0 for any E > 0, since lim,,o A(e, 6) > 0 and OA(e, 6)/ae > 0 for any
< 0 - .
For each pair (e, ), set the parameters k and y such that
k = A(e, 6)/? - [F( - )]2 (1.42)y-e f( - 6)
and
F( - 6)y=b+ 0-6 + (e,6) f( )' (1.43)
which make y = y - e and 0 = 6 - 6 an equilibrium solution. Notice that, as we have assumed,
y is an interior solution given that e > 0.
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Then, think of g as a function of (e, 6), that is,
Since equations (1.42) and (1.43) define a continuous and invertible3 6 mapping between the
space (e, 6) and the space (k, y), if for a small enough neighborhood I, g (e, 6) < 0 for any
(e, 6) E 2, then there exists an open set of the space (k, y) for which g < 0.
I can choose e and 6 small enough such that g (e, 6) < 0 for any (, 6) E X, given that
lim g (, 6) = -A(E, ) < 0,(Cj)-.(0,0)
completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 13.The proof proceeds in two steps. First I characterize the equilibrium
solution. Then, I describe a set of the parameter space such that g is negative.
Step 1.
First of all, notice that
/ (Y) = Ace
1
if 'y < Y
if y < y < y
if > y
where
1 1
7. A -- k and -= A- a.
Moreover, as described in the proof of Proposition 12, given that y > b + 0, there exists a k > 0
defined as
k- y-0-b- F dF (),
where 9 solves y - b - - F(b)/f () = O. I assume k < k37, so that the equilibrium allocation
must satisfy equations (3.43), (3.44) and (1.36) for y E [y, ].
36The proof of invertibility is analogous to the one in the proof of Proposition 12 and thus requires strict
concavity of (.) and non-increasing elasticity.
37Excluding equilibria with zero vacancy, that is such that k > k, ensures that y = 0 is never optimal.
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(, 6) =_ 1 - ( - ) F( - ) - (E, 5).
Think of y as a function of k. Next, I show that there exist two cut-off values kl and k2 such
that y (k) = a for any k < kl, y (k) = y for any k > k 2 and y (k) E (y, ) for any k E (kl, k2 ).
When k E (ki, k2), there is an interior solution with -y E (y, ) such that, as derived in the proof
of Proposition 12, the equilibrium 6, -y and A must satisfy
f(O)
A [F()] 2 () k,
f() 7
l-A 1 - [F- ]2 F(F)dO,
since the elasticity of , 7(.), ((k)) = 7/' (7) /p (y) = a for any 7
Notice that, from equations (1.44)-(1.46) it follows that when k
while A and are constant. More precisely, using the implicit
(1.44) defines 0 as a continuous increasing function of A and, using
implicitly A = A for any k E (kl, k2 ). Then, A is implicitly defined
(1.44)
(1.45)
(1.46)
e (, a).
E (kl, k2) y depends on k,
function theorem, equation
that, equation (1.46) defines
by
a D(O(A))
1 - a(1 - D(0(,)))
where D(0(A)) = f ((A)) fo() F (0) d0/[F(O(A))]2. Notice that the monotone hazard rate as-
sumption implies
E [F (0)/f () I o < a] < F(O)lf(a).
so that D(0(A)) < 1 and A < 1 as well. Thus, using A = A and 0(A), equation (1.45) defines
implicitly -y (k).
Now, define
k 1 | [y b F ()] dF(6 
`'- / (0)J
and
From equation (3.43), (3.44) and (1.36), it follows that an equilibrium for any k < k is
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(A), () ~L \I
characterized by y = -- and A(k) implicitly defined by
1(A"k)y [- 0 - b-f (0) dF () = ,k,
so that by definition A(k1) = A. Instead, an equilibrium for any k > k2 is characterized by
-y = -y and A(k) implicitly defined by
jO(A(k)) [ 99) dF(9=
1 [_, f ()
so that by definition A(k2 ) = A.
Notice that for any k < kl
dX(k) = d((A)) -() -b F(O(X)) f((A)) > (1.47)
dk dA Y f( (A))
since equation (3.43) implies
y - b(A) - b - < y - F()  - b - F(()) = 0f(0(x)) f(9(A))
and using the implicit function theorem and the monotone hazard rate assumption, it follows
directly that d(b(A))/dA < O. An analogous argument shows that dA(k)/dk > 0 for any k > k2.
Notice that the assumption y > b + 0 yields k > k2.
It follows that we can think of A(k), as a non decreasing function of k with A(k) = 0 for k = 0
and A(k) = 1 for k = k. Moreover it is strictly increasing for k < kl and k > k2 and is constant
at A for kl k < k2.
Step 2.
Think of g as a function of k, that is,
g (k) - 1- (7(k)) F(O()(k)))- (k)
Then,
g (0) = 1 - F(0(O)) = 0 and g (k) = -yF(0(1)) < 0,
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where g (0) = 0 since 9(0) = 0, given that by assumption y > b + 0 + AF(O)/f (0) > b + 9.
Moreover g' (k) < 0 for 0 < k < kl, since = , i, (y) = 1 and
g'(k) -[1 + f (0(A(k))) d-(A(k)) d(k)< 0,dA(k) dk
where dO(A(k))/dA(k) < 0 and dA(k)/dk > 0 by equation (1.47). With a similar argument we
can show that g' (k) < 0 for k2 < k < k. Instead, for k < k < k2 , dA(k)/dk = 0 but is
interior and strict concavity of u (y) implies
j.~(X (k))
g'(k) = (y(k)) /2 (7(k)) F(0(A(k)) F (0) dO > 0.
Then, g (k) has a minimum in kl and a maximum in k2. Notice that g (kl) = 1 - F(0(A))- A,
so that
g (kl) < 0 K F(0(~)) > 1- .
Thus, y > b + 0 + A/f(a) implies (A) = 0, so that F(0(A)) = 1 > 1 - A given that A < 1.
Moreover g (k2) = 1- yF(0()) - yielding
g (k2) < -- < 1.
Thus, if > 1 - A then g (k2) < 0 leading g (k) < 0 for any k < k. If, otherwise, y < 1- A, then
g (k2) > 0. In the latter case, it follows, by a continuity argument, that there exist kL and kH
such that k1 < kL < k 2 < kH < k so that in equilibrium g < 0 for k E [0, kL] and k E [kH, k],
completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition24. The proof analyzes separately the two cases of functions pL (y)
satisfying assumptions Al and, respectively, A2 and A3.
Case 1. , (y) satisfies Al and A2.
First, notice that at the competitive equilibrium, (1.23) implies that TJCE-UCE = - (1 - ) aUCE
For now, fix (1 - ) UCE = b. Then, equations (1.19), (1.21) and (1.20) define an equilibrium
CE, ACE and ACE for b given, and, for a = 1, are equivalent to equations (3.43), (3.44) and
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(2.6) that define a static equilibrium where b = b. Thus, an argument analogous to the case 1
of the proof of Proposition 12, adjusted for a < 1, shows that for each b and a given F (.) and
lZ (.) satisfying Assumption Al and A2, there exists an open set of the parameter space (k, y)
such that g = 1 - (ryCE)F( BCE) _ AC E < O. In particular such a set of (k, y) is characterized
by 7 CE + 0 and bCE -S . Notice that, from equation (1.22), there exists a continuous and
invertible mapping between b and b such that (1 - i) aUCE = b, so that for any open set of b,
there exists a correspondent open set of b. The last thing left to check is that b > 0, which is
the case whenever
-CE
> a2 l (rCE) [y - 8] dF () - CEk. (1.48)
CE -
Notice that when 7 CE - 0 and 0 -t 9 the right-hand side of the equation is zero, competing
the proof.
Case 2. (y) satisfies Al and A3.
An analogous argument to the proof of the previous case, using the case 2 of Proposition 12,
shows that for given b, F (.) and L (.) satisfying Assumption Al and A3, there exists an open
set of the parameter space (k, y) such that g < 0. Now such a set of (k, y) is characterized by
yC E --- and CE - . Moreover, given the expressions for (k, y) in the proof of Proposition
12, I can choose an open set of b such that
a2 (b > 1) [0 d  dF ()] f(on (Eb- c(o,o) (E,),
where A(E, ) does not depend on b, competing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 25. The Proof proceeds by contradiction: assume that the competitive
equilibrium is constrained efficient and then show that it is impossible. Note that if the com-
petitive equilibrium allocation 0 CE, oyCE VCE, UCE is constrained efficient for a given initial
value of unemployment rate uo, then it must solve the social planner problem, that is, it must
satisfy the first order conditions:
o(y - ) + V' - U' - a (1 - ) - 7r = 0, (1.49)f(0)
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(1.50)p' () [ ( - o) +V'- U' -a (1 -) F (0)-i] dF (0)
=k + Ot' (y) (1 - 1) (b - CU),
(1.51)
v < 1 when CV > 0, (1.52)
Pv + uL () F(0) + v (1 - u) (1 - s) = 0,
/P{u - u () F(0) + v (1 - u) ps + up = 0,
(1.53)
(1.54)
(1.55)
where the multipliers r, ir, X, v must be such that
V = CV + sU' + (1 - s) V' (1.56)
U = CU + /A (y) I () dF (0) + U',a (9) (1.57)
(1.58)
(1.59)
Moreover, recall that when k > 0 the informational constraint is binding, that is, it must be
true that
(c 0) - 0 - +V'-U'] dF() +C b = 0 (1.60)
and at the optimum
P=u /p(c) o(y-c(O))dF(O)+b- tk-CU -(1-u)CV +IP. (1.61)
Finally, the Envelope conditions are
(1.62)P= -7l,
Pv = - (1 -u) v, (1.63)
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u' = u [1 - p (y) F()] + (1 - u) s,
CU > b.
Je (0) [a F (0)
Pu = P () (y -O)+vv -V' f (8) )(1.64)J_ f ~(90) F(1.64)
+ [(1 - O (y)) (b - CU) - yk] + CV + /3r [1- (y) F(b) -s].
Now guess that the steady state competitive search equilibrium CE, CE, UCE, VCE, UCE,
CU = b, CV = 0 and B = 0 is a solution to this problem.
Moreover, recall that oCE, 7CE, UCE, VCE, utE and the normalized multiplier ACE must
satisfy CU = b, Cv = P = 0 and solve the system of equations
(y CE) + VCE) _ UCE _ ac CE ) = , (1.65)
f(bCE )
_, (CE) G [(y 0 (1 -) UCE) - aCEiF () dF (0) =k, (1.66)
aP (7CE) f [y - 0] dF (0) + b - yCEkuC^ cE , (1.68)
(1 -) [1 + aP (yCE) F(0CE)]
VCE a S uCE, (1.69)
and
Ut+ = Ut [1 - (7CE) F(OCE)] + (1 - Ut) S.
First, combining equations (1.49) and (1.50) with equations (1.65) and (1.66), it follows
CE
a (1 - - ACE) (]r ) + = o
{c(1 ? E - ) F (8)+r OcE| +aU1 -pn_ 'O) dF (o)_ + ^ , - dF (0) =
Given that
F(C0 ) X (re F I> 1d
f (CE) L fCE F ()
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it must be that
7 = 1- ACE and r = 0.
It follows that X > 0 and CU = b as we assumed.
Notice that, using the Envelope condition (1.62), I can rewrite equation (1.53) as
vt+l (1 - t+l) = ut1 (y) F(b) + t (1 - ut) (1 - s),
which for vt+l = vt = v CE and = CE, 0 = 0E, using the law of motion for u, yields
(1 - VC E) [Ut+l - Ut - (1 - Ut) si = 0,
implying VCE = 1, as long as job creation is different from zero. Moreover, using the Envelope
condition (1.63), I can rewrite equation (1.54) as
(1 - t+i ) Ut+1 = (1 - t) Ut + (1 - Vt) (1 - Ut) S,
which, when CE = 1, y = {CE, = bCE, 1- _ t+l = 1 - 77t = ACE, using the law of motion of
u, yields
(U CE _ UC) CE = (ut- Ut+l) A 0.
A contradiction follows immediately as long as the unemployment rate is not at the steady
state value and ACE is different from zero, which is the case whenever k > 0, as we assumed.
This implies that, away from the steady state, the competitive search equilibrium is constrained
inefficient completing the proof.
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Chapter 2
Heterogeneity and Unemployment
Volatility
2.1 Introduction
Whether search models can match the cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies in
the U.S. economy is an issue that has recently received new attention. Shimer (2005) has
opened the debate by showing that the conventional search model, built on Diamond (1982),
Mortensen (1982a, 1982b) and Pissarides (1984, 1985), which combines random matching and
Nash bargaining, cannot account for the high responsiveness of unemployment to productivity
shocks. The main idea is that wages absorb the shocks reducing the responsiveness of firms'
profits and hence of job creation.
In this paper, I explore a search model with ex-post heterogeneous workers with both full and
asymmetric information. The main difference with the standard model is that the finding rate is
now coming from the combination of the standard matching margin and of the endogenous hiring
margin generated by heterogeneity. Matched workers are hit by a match-specific training cost
that they have to sustain to become productive. When the productivity shock hits the economy,
both the expected cost for a matched worker and the expected value of being unemployed
increase and wages with them. However, the hiring margin becomes looser and firms' profits
can increase because of that. When the information is asymmetric, in the sense that the workers
know privately their type, there is an additional potential source of volatility. The firm has
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to pay the workers some rents in order to give them the incentive to reveal their information.
When there is an high productivity shock, then there is more surplus to cover the rents and
the distortion becomes smaller, generating a boost in job creation. On the other side, when the
hiring margin increases, the rents that need to be paid to the workers are higher and asymmetric
information could dampen the responsiveness of vacancies.
I construct a competitive search model, where workers are hit by match-specific idiosyncratic
shocks, which can be interpreted as the training costs a worker has to pay in order to be
productive in the match. The model is a generalization of the one described in Chapter 1 to
a stochastic environment with an aggregate productivity shock.1 Employers and workers are
both risk-neutral and ex-ante homogeneous. Employers post contracts and workers direct their
search towards them. When a match is formed, the training cost is drawn randomly. I consider
both the case of this cost being public information and the case of it being privately observed
by the worker. An employment contract is a mechanism that is incentive compatible, when the
information is private, and always satisfies a participation constraint on the worker's side. A
worker cannot be forced to work, he can always quit and join the ranks of the unemployed.
First, I introduce the model with full information and I show the main analytical result:
in steady state heterogeneity does not amplify the responsiveness of market tightness to pro-
ductivity. Once one tries to calibrate the model to match two main facts, the finding rate and
the finding rate elasticity to market tightness, then, on the opposite, heterogeneity dampens
the response of market tightness to productivity. Next, I go to the model with asymmetric
information and show that in steady state there is an additional effect on the response of mar-
ket tightness to productivity shocks. This additional effect comes from the binding incentive
compatibility constraint. However, the sign of this effect is ambiguous.
Then, I show the results of the main calibrations. I describe how I parametrize the model
to match the U.S. labor market facts, documented in Shimer (2005), in order to investigate the
role of heterogeneity and asymmetric information in explaining the U.S. unemployment and
vacancies volatility. I explore two family of distributions for the idiosyncratic shocks: Pareto
1As I explain in Section 2 the only difference in the basic environment described in Chapter 1 is that the
worker's type is now represented by a sunk cost that the worker has to pay at the moment of hiring, such as
a training or a mobility cost, instead of a flow cost, such as work effort. This change makes the model with
aggregate shocks more tractable becuase avoids endogenous separation.
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and Uniform. For each distribution I compare the limit case of the degenerate distribution,
which reduces to the standard model studied by Shimer (2005), to the model with proper
heterogeneity and full information and to the model with asymmetric information. I show
that neither heterogeneity nor asymmetric information help to increase the response of market
tightness and unemployment to productivity. In fact, I show that with the proper calibration,
the model with full information can dampen the volatility of market tightness as the steady
state analysis suggests.
Related Literature. The most related paper to my work is Shimer (2005), who shows that
the standard search model with random matching and Nash Bargaining fails to match U.S.
data in terms of unemployment and vacancies volatility in response to productivity shocks.
Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005a) highlight that Nash Bargaining makes wages very responsive
to productivity shocks, reducing the volatility of firms profits and hence of job creation.
A growing group of papers react to Shimer (2005) by introducing some form of wage rigidity
into the picture. Among others, Hall (2005b) constructs a model exhibiting wage rigidity,
Menzio (2004) assume employers have private information about productivity and contracts
are not-binding, Nagypal (2004) combines workers' heterogeneity, asymmetric information and
on-the-job search.
Another paper related to my work is Brugemann and Moscarini (2005). They investigate the
properties of wage determination in search models which limit the responsiveness of unemploy-
ment and vacancies to productivity shocks. Moreover they show that asymmetric information
does not typically help in violating those properties and does not allow search models to gen-
erate reasonable high level of unemployment volatility. My paper put more structure on the
model and focus more on the role of heterogeneity, with both full and asymmetric information.
On a different ground, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) show a calibration where the value
of non-market activity is much higher than Shimer2, generating an higher elasticity of market
tightness to productivity. In my calibration I am careful to keep the value of non-market activity
being less than half than labor income, in order to shut down that explanation and highlight
the role of heterogeneity and information.
2They calibrate the worker's bargaining power and the non-market activity to match elasticity of wages and
average firms' profits.
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My model is also very related to Shimer and Wright (2004) and Moen and Rosen (2004) who
both model asymmetric information in competitive search model. Their environment is very
close to mine, once I introduce asymmetric information. However, Shimer and Wright (2004)
study a static environment and Moen and Rosen (2004) focus on the steady state analysis.
The model presented in this paper is the stochastic version of the dynamic model in Chapter
1. In fact, Chapter 1 explores the dynamic efficiency properties of asymmetric information in
competitive search models, without modeling explicitly the aggregate productivity shock.
This Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model with ex-post het-
erogeneous workers and full information, defines and characterizes the competitive search equi-
librium, illustrates some comparative statics result in the extreme case of no aggregate shock.
Section 2.3 extends the model to the case of asymmetric information, defines and characterizes
the competitive search equilibrium. Section 2.4 describes the calibration exercises and show the
results of the main specifications. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The model with Full Information
I first consider the full information version of the dynamic model in the first Chapter augmented
with an aggregate shock to productivity. I show that when the distribution of the idiosyncratic
shocks is degenerate the model boils down to the discrete version of Shimer (2005), where the
Hosios condition is satisfied. When, instead, the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is non-
degenerate, then the reaction of market tightness to productivity shocks cannot be amplified.
Environment. Consider an economy with infinite horizon and discrete time, populated by a
continuum of measure 1 of workers and a large continuum of potential employers. Both work-
ers and employers have linear preferences with discount factor and are ex-ante homogeneous.
Workers can search freely, while employers need to pay an entry cost k to post a vacancy. When
a match is formed, the worker has to face some training cost , where 0 is drawn randomly
from the cumulative distribution function F (.), with support e -- [, ]. I assume that the
cumulative distribution function F (.) is differentiable, with f (.) being the associated density
function, and that it satisfies a monotone hazard rate condition, that is, d [F () /f (0)] /dO > 0.
Any worker-employer match produces yt units of output at any time t in which it is productive.
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Productivity yt3 follows a first order Markov process in discrete time, according to some distri-
bution G (y', y) = Pr (yt+l < y'lYt = y) with finite support Y [Y,..., yN]. The net surplus of
the match is given by Yt - 0 at time t, when the match is created, and ys at any future time
s > t in which the match is still productive. Both and y's are common knowledge.
At the beginning of each period t employers can be either productive or not. Workers can
be either employed or unemployed. Non-productive employers can open a vacancy at a cost k
which entitles them to post an employment contract Ct E C where C is the set of individually
rational mechanisms. As I describe below, a contract Ct: e x Y - [0, 1] x R+ specifies the
hiring probability and the expected net present value of wages for each worker of type 0 matched
at time t when productivity is yt. Therefore at each time t, a non-productive firm chooses a
pair (at,Ct) E 0, 1 x C where at denotes the decision of posting a vacancy. Next, each
unemployed worker observes all the contracts posted and decides where to apply. He chooses a
contract Ct E CPc C, where CP denotes the set of contracts posted by active firms at time t.
Each contract Ct, is associated to a specific at so that employers and workers know that their
matching probabilities will depend on the contract that they respectively post and seek for.
After workers start to search for a specific contract, matching takes place and, for each match,
the draw is realized. At the same time the aggregate productivity shock t is realized. The
behavior of a worker who is matched at time t is described by a function at : E x Y - (0, 1}
that for each type and productivity yt, specifies participation decision at (0, yt). The worker
can either implement the contract, that is choose at (, Yt) = 1, or walk away, that is choose
at (, Yt) = 0. If he walks away, he is unemployed for one period, gets a non-transferable utility
from leisure b and looks for another match next period. If the worker is hired, the parties
are productive until separation, which happens according to a Poisson process with parameter
s. Note that at any point in time r > t, it is never optimal to end the match created at
time t, as long as y, > 0. The main difference with the environment of the model presented
in the first chapter is about the idiosyncratic shock 0. In this chapter, 0 is a sunk cost that
the worker suffers at the moment of the match, which I interpret as cost of training. In the
previous chapter it is a disutility that the worker suffers each period in which he is productive,
3Note that productivity yt is common to all the matches existing at time t even though created at different
times t - s, for s = 0, 1, .., t.
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which I interpret as work effort. This change is crucial to make the model tractable once I
introduce the aggregate shock. If 9 was was per-period work effort, when there are bad times
the firm would like to fire workers with an high enough 0, generating an additional endogenous
separation mechanism.
Trading frictions in the labor market are modeled through random matching. Employers
and workers know that their matching probabilities will depend on the contract that they
respectively post and seek for. Each type of contract C is associated with a labor submarket,
where a mass v(C) of employers posts contracts of type C and a mass u(C) of unemployed
workers applies for jobs at firms offering that type of contract. I assume that each submarket
is characterized by a constant returns to scale matching function m (v(C), u(C)) and by an
associated "tightness" y(C) = v(C)/u(C).4 Hence, for each contract C, I can define the function
/ () m (y, 1), which represents the probability of a worker applying for C meeting an employer
posting it. On the other hand, the probability of a firm posting C meeting a worker applying
for it is represented by the non-increasing function (y) /7y.
Assumption Al. The function p (y) : [0, oo) - [0, 1] satisfies the following conditions:
(i) () < min {, 1};5
(ii) for any y such that ,i (y) < min {y, 1}, (y) is twice differentiable with ' (y) > 0 and
I" () < 0.
Employment Contracts and Bellman Values. A contract Ct : E xY - [0, 1] x R+, specifies
for each worker of type matched at time t when productivity is yt, the hiring probability
et (9, yt) E [0, 1] and the expected net present value of wages wt (, yt) E R+. Notice that linear
preferences, together with the fact that types are fixed over time within a match, imply that the
wage profile over the life of the relationship is irrelevant for the analysis. Therefore, I can define
the continuation value of being employed net of wages and training cost at time t, Vt, which
4In order to simplify the notation, from now on I am going to drop the dependence of u, v and -y on the
contract C, whenever it does not cause any confusion.
5 With discrete time, this condition ensures that both p (y) and A (y) /- are proper probabilities.
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from now on I will refer to simply as the continuation utility of employed workers, represents
just the discounted expected value of being separated and becoming unemployed, that is,
Vt (yt) = PEt [sUt+l (Yt+l) + (1 - s) Vt+1 (Yt+l) lYt].
Moreover the continuation value of an unemployed worker at time t is given by
Ut (t) = fEt [ ('Yt+i (t)) [t+l (0, Yt+ )-et+l (, t+l) [0- Vt+1 (yt+l)] dF () lyt]
+b + BE 1i- et+ (, yt+,) dF (0) Ut+ (t+l) Yt]
The utility of a worker of type 0 who meets an employer at time t when productivity is Yt,
is given by
vt(0, Yt) = [t(0, yt) - et(0, Yt) ( - Vt (yt))] + [1 - et(0, yt)]Ut (yt)
and the expected revenues of the firm, after a match, is given by
j [et (, yt) ay - Wt (, yt)] dF (0),
where a- [1 -3 (1 - s)]-1 .
The large number of potential firms ensures free entry and implies that the value of an open
vacancy will be zero at each time, that is,
t) let (, Yt) ayt - t (, yt)] dF () = k. (2.1)
In order to make every type 0 to participate, it must be that
vt(0, yt) Ut (yt) for any , yt. (2.2)
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2.2.1 Competitive Search Equilibrium
This section generalizes the standard definition of the Competitive Search Equilibrium to an
environment with aggregate shock. In order to simplify the analytical treatment, we adopt a
definition in recursive terms, following Chapter 1.
It is possible to show that a recursive Competitive Search Equilibrium takes the following
simple form. It is a set of contracts contingent on the aggregate shock only C* (y), a tightness
function * (y), where * (y) : C* (y) - , R+ U oo and a pair of continuation utility functions
{U* (y), V* (y)} such that, given y, employers maximize profits and workers apply optimally
for jobs, taking as given the future values of being employed V (y) and unemployed U (y) and
aware that a market tightness is associated with each contract, even if not offered in equilibrium.
Moreover, profits are driven to zero by free entry. I define more formally a recursive CSE in
Appendix A.
Following similar steps Next Proposition states the characterization of a stochastic sym-
metric competitive search equilibrium in recursive terms. In the rest of the analysis I adopt a
recursive notation, dropping the t whenever this causes no confusion, and denoting a variable
at time t + 1 with a prime.
Proposition 28 If {C (y), r (y), U (y), V (y)} is a Recursive Competitive Search Equilibrium,
then any pair (C* (y) , y* (y)) with C* (y) EC (y) and 7* (y) = r* (* (y)) satisfy the following
(i) for given pair of functions {U (y), V (y)}, C (y) = [e (, y) , w (, Y)l]e,yey and -y (y) solve
W(U(y)V(y),y) max (?Y())j [w (,y) -e(9, y) (aot-V(y))JdF ()e(e,),w(e,y) _
t(y)
: (y)) e (0, ) dF (0) U (y) (P1)
subject to e (0, y) [0, 1], the individual rationality constraints (2.2) and the free-entry
condition (2.1);
(ii) for given pair {C (y) , y (y)}, then {U (y) , V (y)} evolve according to
U (y) = b + W(U (y), V (y'), y')dG (y'y)
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and
V (y) = J [sU (y') + (1 -s) V (y')] dG (y'y).
Conversely, if a pair of functions {C* (y) , y* (y)} solves the program P4, then there exists
an equilibrium {C* (y), * (y), U* (y), V* (y)} such that C* (y) EC* (y) and Py* (y) = F* (C* (y)).
It follows that the unemployment rate of workers applying to firms posting a contract of
type C (y) is given by
u' (C (y')) = u(C(y)) [1 - (rI* (C(y))) e (0, y)dF (0) + (1-u(C(y)))s. (2.3)
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 10 in Chapter 1. 
Equilibrium Characterization. Using pointwise maximization with respect to e (0) I show
that the trading area can be fully described by a cut-off value 0 (y) such that
e (, y)= 1 if < (y)
0 if 0 > 0 ()
Then, when (y) is everywhere differentiable the equilibrium can be characterized for given y
and given continuation utilities U (y) and V (y), by a pair of functions 0 (y) and y (y) satisfying
the first order conditions of the maximization problem P1, that is,
ay )- [U (y) - (y)] = 0 (2.4)
@(Y)
Ott' ( ()) [ay - 0 - [U (y) - V (y)]] dF (0) = k. (2.5)
2.2.2 Comparative Statics
In this section I look at some comparative statics to get a sense of the volatility of job creation
implied by the model. Following Shimer (2005), I derive the elasticity of market tightness
with respect to productivity, when there are no aggregate shocks. I first consider the case of a
degenerate distribution for the idiosyncratic shocks and I show that in this case my model is
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isomorphic to the one analyzed by Shimer (2005) with random matching and Nash bargaining,
where the Hosios condition is met. Next, I show that when the distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks becomes non-degenerate, the effective finding rate depends not only on the equilibrium
matching probability p (y (y)), but also on the equilibrium hiring decision F(0 (y)) which may
amplify the impact of productivity shocks on market tightness and unemployment rate. How-
ever, I show that, in the deterministic case, the response of market tightness to productivity
does not change, while the hiring margin magnifies the impact of productivity on unemployment
rate.
Let assume that the distribution of the productivity shock is degenerate and y is fixed.
Then, from the fixed point problem described in the second part of Proposition (28) we get the
equilibrium values of U (y) and V (y)
U (y) = ( y (y)) f [ay - ] dF (0) + b - y(y) k (2.6)
(1 - ) [1 + od (y (Y)) F(b (y))]
() 1- (1-s) , (2.7)
where the equilibrium 0 (y) and y (y) solve Problem P1. Combining equations (2.6) and (3.46)
with the first order conditions (3.43) and (3.44) and after some algebra, the equilibrium can be
characterized by the following two conditions
(y) = a (y - b) - a () k, (2.8)
oF() I 1 + ]k. (2.9)
F(O) aO6 () F(b) 
First, notice that if we assume that the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks is also
degenerate, then for 0 low enough, matches become always productive and the equilibrium can
be characterized simply by
- / -b + k1- 
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which is exactly the discrete time version of the equilibrium equation of the model described
in Shimer (2005) and gives elasticity of market tightness with respect to productivity Ey given
by the following expression
y (1 - ) / () + (1 - (1 - s))
eYJ -y - O/a - b (1 - 6) [t () + (1 - p3(1 - s))]'
Next, I show that when the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks becomes non-degenerate,
then there is an extra term in the expression for ey coming from the responsiveness of the
hiring margin to productivity which does not help in making market tightness more elastic to
productivity.
Let start by keeping 0 fixed. Notice that the finding rate and the unemployment are identical
to an economy with degenerate distribution of idiosyncratic shocks (denoted by D) with 0 equal
to 0, as in Shimer (2005), with the same y, /, s and with parameters:
T D = 71F(0) (2.10)
bD = E [/a+bi bO ] (2.11)
6D = 6 (2.12)
kD = k (2.13)
where the response of the market tightness to productivity, y'D (y), satisfies
1 -/ (1 - ) +/ () (1 - 6)
- bD [1 - /3 (1 - ) - D ()] (1 - 6)'
Then, notice that we can write equation (2.9) as the following implicit function
h(O (y), a (y), y) f)[y- /a- b]dF) () 1- 6(1-) -]
In appendix A I show that y' (y) satisfies
7' ()
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Next Lemma shows that h (9 (y), y (y), y) = 0 and the derivative of the market tightness with
respect to productivity in the model with idiosyncratic shocks coincides with the degenerate
case.
Lemma 29 Suppose conditions (2.10)-(2.13) are satisfied, then y' (y) = y'D (y).
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The Lemma shows that keeping constant the elasticity of the matching function, the response
of the hiring margin to productivity does not change the response of the market tightness. On
the one hand, when the hiring margin increases, firms have an incentive to post more vacancies
because the return for vacancy posted is higher. On the other hand, firms have an higher cost
for vacancy posted because of two effects: a direct one, that is, the expected learning cost
for a matched worker has increased, and and indirect one, that is, the outside option of the
matched worker has increased as well. The Lemma shows that in equilibrium the increase of
the benefit of a posted vacancy coincides exactly with the increase of its cost. This implies
that the response of the market tightness to productivity is not affected by the response of the
hiring margin.
Next, I show that when the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks 0 is degenerate and there
is no aggregate shock, then the response to productivity of the cut-off 0 (y), that is, the hiring
margin, is always positive. By differentiating condition (3.43), I obtain
' (y) = oy - a ( ) k'(y)
and plugging that together with 7' (y), given conditions (2.10)-(2.13), the previous Lemma gives
=' ()  [1- (1-s) + I () F(b)]> 0. (2.14)
This immediately implies that the model with idiosyncratic shocks generate a bigger impact
of productivity on the job creation rate and, hence, on the unemployment rate. Let define
the job creation rate j (y) = /i (y (y)) F(b (y)). In the degenerate version of the model simply
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jD (Y) = /D ( ()). Notice that we can write the steady state equation for unemployment as
u(y) = )' (2.15)
The next Lemma shows that the response of unemployment to productivity is always higher in
the model with heterogeneity.
Lemma 30 Suppose conditions (2.10)-(2.13) are satisfied, then u' (y) > uD (y).
Proof. From equation (2.14) and the definition of j (y) and jD (), it follows that
j' (y) = j () + r1Y (y)' f(O (y))O () > jD (Y).
Using that and differentiating equation (2.15) gives
· '(Y > jl y) Y - Y y() = (y) + (y) D () S + D (Y) (Y)
s + jD (Y)
completing the proof. 
Notice that the parametrization of the previous analysis allows both the models to match
the finding rate coming from the data, but not the finding rate elasticity to market tightness. As
Shimer (2005) shows, there exists a loglinear relationship between market tightness and finding
rate which can be estimated in the data. In the degenerate model the finding rate elasticity to
market tightness is represented by which can be estimated in the data, while in the model
with a non-degenerate distribution for idiosyncratic shocks where j = ry6F(O), then
dlogj f(a) dlog d log y
dlogy F(b) dlogy dlogy
so that the object that can be estimated corresponds to
dlogj _ f() d logy -
dlog - F(6) dlog7d log y
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Hence, consider the alternative parametrization
N77DD = 77yF(6) (2.16)
bD = E [/c+bI -O ] (2.17)
f() dlog y=-- + (2.18)
F() 1-
kD = -- s) k (2.19)
where againt  finding r tnd thu employment of a on-degenerate economy are identical
where again the finding rate and the unemployment of a non-degenerate economy are identical
to the ones of an economy with degenerate distribution of 0 equal to 0, with those parameters
and the same y, A, s.
Proposition 31 Suppose conditions (2.16)-(2.19) are satisfied, then y' (y) < 7yD () .
Proof. See Appendix A. ·
I will show in Chapter 2.4 that the dynamics of the stochastic model follow closely these
analytical steady state results. In fact, when I calibrate the model with Pareto distribution
of idiosyncratic shocks, then 6 - D and the first parametrization exercise is approximately
correct, implying that the market tightness volatility in the model with heterogeneity is approx-
imately equal to the one in the standard model with a degenerate distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks. When, instead, I calibrate the model with Uniform distribution, I show that it must be
that < 6 D and in fact the market tightness volatility results even lower than the degenerate
case.
2.3 Asymmetric information
In this chapter, I introduce asymmetric information, following tightly the model of Chapter 1
augmented with an aggregate shock on productivity, together with the difference that 0 is now
a sunk cost (such as learning cost) instead of a flow cost (such as work effort) as explained
in the full information case. In chapter 2.4, I show that asymmetric information can generate
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further amplification or dampening in the volatility of the unemployment rate, depending on
the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks.
Environment. The economy is exactly the same described in section 2.2, with the only
difference that the training cost is now private information of the worker. An employer who
opens a vacancy, pays a cost k and post a contract Ct E C where C is the set of incentive
compatible and individually rational mechanisms. As I describe below, a contract Ct: x Y 
[0, 1] x R+ specifies the hiring probability and the expected net present value of wages for each
worker matched at time t when productivity is Yt, reporting type 0. Therefore at each time t, a
non-productive firm chooses a pair (at, Ct) E {0, 1} x C where at denotes the decision of posting
a vacancy. Next, each unemployed worker observes all the contracts posted and decides where
to apply. He chooses a contract Ct CtPc C, where CtP denotes the set of contracts posted
by active firms at time t. After workers start to search for a specific contract, matching takes
place and, for each match, the draw 0 is realized. At the same time the aggregate productivity
shock yt is realized. The behavior of a worker who is matched at time t is described by a
map (at, st): e x Y x 0, 1 that for each type 0 and productivity t specifies a report
Ot (t) = s (, y) and a participation decision at (, yt). After he sees his type, the worker
can either implement the contract, that is choose at (, yt) = 1, or walk away, that is choose
at (, Yt) = 0. As in the case of full information, if he walks away, he is unemployed for one
period, gets a non-transferable utility from leisure b and looks for another match next period.
If the worker is hired, the parties are productive until separation, which happens according to
a Poisson process with parameter s.
Employment Contracts and Bellman Values. Invoking the Revelation Principle, without
loss of generality, I can again restrict attention to incentive-compatible and individually rational
direct revelation mechanisms, corresponding to a mapping Ct: e x Y - [0, 1] x R+, specifying
for each matched worker at time t who reports type 0, the hiring probability et (0, yt) E [0, 1]
and the expected net present value of wages Wt (, Yt) E R+. Notice that I can restrict attention
to the set C of ad interim incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms described
above, due to the unemployed anonymity assumption. All the unemployed workers searching for
a job cannot be distinguished, so that contracts cannot be conditioned on the past employment
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history. Moreover, as in the full information case, linear preferences, together with the fact
that types are fixed over time within a match, imply that the wage profile over the life of the
relationship is irrelevant for the analysis. Therefore, I can define the continuation value of being
employed net of wages and training cost at time t conditional on the productivity shock is Yt
as
Vt (t) = PEt [sUt+l (yt+l) + (1 - s) Vt+l (yt+l) lYt].
and the continuation value of an unemployed worker at time t conditional on yt as
Ut(yt) = BEt (yt+l (Yt)) +, Y+)-et+l (0, Yt+l) [ - t+l (t+l) + Ut+ (t+l)]] dF () lYt
+b + OE [Ut+l (t+l) lyt] .
The expected utility of a worker of type 0 reporting type 0 at time t, is given by
vt(0, 0, yt) = [wt(0, Yt) - et(0, yt) ( - Vt (yt))] + [1 - et(0, yt)]Ut (yt) 
An employment contract is incentive-compatible (IC) whenever it satisfies
v (, , y) > v(O, , y) for all 0,0 E e (IC)
and individually rational (IR) whenever
v (, , y) > Ut (yt) for all 0 E e. (IR)
I define C the set of incentive compatible and individually rational direct mechanisms. Following
Myerson (1981), as stated in Lemma 1 of Chapter 1, I can reduce IC and IR to a monotonicity
condition es (0, y) < 0 for all 0, the IR binding for the worse type
v (, e, y) > Ut (yt) (2.20)
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and the following condition
v (0, 0, y) =v ( , y) + e (x, ay) d Vt e. (2.21)
The expected revenues of the firm, after a match, are given by
l [et (, Yt) ay - wt (, Yt)I dF ().
The large number of potential firms ensures free entry and implies that the value of an open
vacancy will be zero at each time, that is,
(t) / let (0, yt) ayt -wt (0, y,)] dF (0) = k. (2.22)
2.3.1 Competitive Search Equilibrium
This section generalizes the definition of the Competitive Search Equilibrium introduced in
section 2.2.1 to an environment with asymmetric information.
As in the case of full information, it is possible to show that a recursive Competitive Search
Equilibrium takes the following simple form. It is a set of incentive-compatible and individually-
rational contracts contingent on the aggregate shock only C* (y), a tightness function F* (y),
where F* (y): C* (y) l-, R+ U oc and a pair of continuation utility functions U* (y), V* (y)}
such that, given y, employers maximize profits and workers apply optimally for jobs, taking as
given the future values of being employed V (y) and unemployed U (y) and aware that a market
tightness is associated with each contract, even if not offered in equilibrium. Moreover, profits
are driven to zero by free entry.
Next Proposition is the analogous of Proposition 28 and states the characterization of a
stochastic symmetric competitive search equilibrium under asymmetric information in recursive
terms.
Proposition 32 If (C (y), r (y), U (y), V (y)} is a Recursive Competitive Search Equilibrium,
then any pair (C* (y), y* (y)) with C* (y) eC (y) and y* (y) = r* (* (y)) satisfy the following
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(i) for given pair of functions {U (y), V (y)}, C (y) = [e (, y) , w (, Y)loee,yey and 7 (y) solve
W(U (y), V (y) ,y) = ,,(max,) ( ()) [w ( y)-e(, y) (a-V (y))] dF ()
e (O,)W(Oy )
+- [1-,uI (7 ()) e (0, y) dF () U (y) (P2)
subject to e (8, y) E [0, 1], the free-entry condition (2.22), the constraints IC and IR reduced
to the conditions (2.20), (2.21) and eo (8, y) < 0;
(ii) for given pair {C (y) , y (y)}, then {U (y), V (y)} evolve according to
U (y) = b + W(U (y'), V (,y')dG (y'Iy)
and
V (y) = [sU (y') + (1 - s) V (y')] dG (y'y).
Conversely, if a pair of functions {C* (y) ,y* (y)} solves the program P4, then there exists
an equilibrium {C* (y), r* (y) ,U* (y), V* (y)} such that C* (y) EC* (y) and y* (y)= r* (* (y)).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 10 in Chapter 1. 
Proposition 32 shows that for given U (y) and V (y), a recursive symmetric equilibrium
incentive-compatible and individually-rational contract C (y) and tightness y (y) must solve
Problem P2. The next Proposition shows that the equilibrium can be equivalently described by
a hiring function e (8, y) and a tightness y (y) that solve a simplified program P3. Given e (8, y)
and 7 (y), an associated wage function w (8, y) can be constructed so that the constraints IC
and IR are satisfied.
Proposition 33 For given U (y) and V (y), any couple of functions e (, y) and y (y) which
solve Problem P2, solve also
W(U (y) V(y),y) = max /)p (? (y)) e (, y)[ay-a + V (y) -U (y) dF ()(P3)
+,3U (y) - y (y) k
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s.t.
/ ( |(y) ) e( y) Uy- 0- f(0y(y)
Furthermore, for any pair of functions e (, y) and y (y) which solve problem P3, there
exists a function w (0, y) such that the contract C (y) = [e (0, y) , w (0, Y)]eee,yey and y (y) solve
problem P2.
Proof. Similar to Proposition 11 in Chapter 1. 
Equilibrium Characterization. I proceed by studying the relaxed problem without the
monotonicity assumption on e (0, y). Then, using pointwise maximization with respect to e (0, y)
I show that the trading area can be fully described by a cut-off value 0 (y) such that
, if < 8(y)
{ if > (y)
implying that the optimal e (0) is effectively non-increasing. When the constraint of problem
P3 is binding6 and p (y) is everywhere differentiable7 the equilibrium can be characterized,
for given U (y) - V (y), by a set of functions 0 (y), y (y) and A (y) satisfying the first order
conditions, respectively, for 0 (y) and y (y)
ay- (y)-A AF( (U (y) - V (y)) = 0, (2.23)f( F (y))
/3' ( (y))b) [ ) () (U (y) -V y))] dF () = k (2.24)
and the constraint
3m ( (y)) a [ y- ( U (y) - V (y)) dF () = -y (y) k. (2.25)
The variable A (y) represents a normalized versions of the shadow value of the informational
6A generalization of Lemma 2 in Chapter 1 gives that the constraint is binding if and only if the cost of
posting a vacancy k is strictly positive.
7When p (y ()) is not differentiable at some points, equation (2.25) will be replaced by inequalities involving
the left and right derivatives of (y (y)) at the points of non differentiability.
8 Similarly to Chapter 1, A _ /(1 + A), where A is the Lagrangian multiplier attached to the constraint of
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rents.9 Notice that when A (y) = 0, the constraint is slack and the full information allocation
described in section (2.2) is achieved. Clearly, asymmetric information reduces job creation, as
the surplus of the economy must cover not only the cost of vacancy creation but also the rents
needed to extract information from the workers. As intuition suggests, 0 (y) decreases with
A (y).
2.3.2 Steady state with no aggregate shocks
In order to give some intuition of the role of asymmetric information, let consider the case of
a degenerate distribution of the productivity shock, that is, keeping y fixed. Then, from the
fixed point problem described in the second part of Proposition (32) we get the steady state
equilibrium values of U (y) and V (y)
= (vy (y)) fo [y- 0] dF (0) + b- (y) k
(1 - ) [1 + a0/p (y (y)) F( ())]
v (y)= v (y, (2.27)1- (1-s) (2.27)
where the equilibrium 0 (y) and y (y) solve Problem P3. Combining these equations with the
first order conditions (2.23)-(2.25) and after some algebra, the equilibrium can be characterized
by the following three conditions
0 AF(O) _f(.y - e b+yk = p (y) -0 + A- () dF (0),
0, f(0) _ f(0)
A=1- [ (bJb F (] 1
problem P3.
9As in Chapter 1, define v(0, 0, y) - v (, O, y) as the informational rent of a worker of type 0 < , that is, the
additional utility that such a worker must receive in order to reveal his own type.
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Notice that, when A = 0, they boil down to (3.43) and (3.44). The third equation shows that at
a first order approximation A decreases with y, since the more vacancies are posted the higher
becomes the expected surplus created per vacancy which cover the workers' rents, and increases
with 0, because as the hiring margin increases more rents need to be paid to the workers and
the distortion get worse. On the other hand, the first two equations show that as A changes,
market tightness and hiring margin are changing endogenously. The responsiveness of market
tightness to productivity seems ambiguous. The calibration in Section 2.4 show that in fact
asymmetric information can either amplify or dampen the market tightness volatility.
2.4 Unemployment volatility
In this section I analyze the cyclical behavior of unemployment and market tightness generated
by the model described, with and without full information. I also compare these results to the
benchmark model with no idiosyncratic shocks. First I describe how I calibrate the different
versions of the model. Then I show two sets of results, using two different family of distribution
for the idiosyncratic shocks: Pareto and Uniform.
2.4.1 Calibration
I now describe how I parametrize the model to match the U.S. facts, documented in Shimer
(2005), in order to investigate the role of heterogeneity and asymmetric information in explain-
ing the U.S. unemployment rate volatility.
I normalize a time period to be one quarter and then I set the discount factor , to .988,
consistent with an annual discount factor of .953.
I choose a separation rate s of .034, consistent with jobs lasting about 2.5 years on average,
as in Shimer (2005).
I set the instantaneous utility of unemployed workers b such that the b + E [0/al0 < 0 (y)]
is approximately equal to .4 of the labor income. In my model the effective opportunity cost
of being employed for a matched worker of type 0 is b + 0/a so that to calibrate b equal to .4
of the labor income, would be equivalent to choose an effective higher value of leisure, in the
direction of Hagerdon and Manovskii (2005). I want to shut down their mechanism to highlight
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the role of heterogeneity and information.
For the job-finding rate, jt, I use the series constructed by Shimer (2005)0°. He constructs
the series for the job-finding rate from 1951 to 2003, using the series for the behavior of unem-
ployment level and the short-term unemployment level constructed by the BLS from the CPS.
In particular, it is such that the number of unemployed next month is equal to the number of
unemployed last month who did not find a job, that is, (1 - it) ut, and workers who have lost
the job between the beginning of this month and the end of it, denoted by u'+ 111, that is,
t 1 - Ut+l - Ut++
Ut
Using this series the monthly finding rate is .45, corresponding to a quarterly finding rate of
.8336. As explained in section 2.2, in the model with idiosyncratic shocks 0, the finding rate
corresponds to p (y (y)) F(O (y)) because unemployed workers in order to get a job have both
to match an employer and being hired from him. The hiring margin is trivial in the standard
model, because it is optimal to hire any matched worker and the finding rate reduces simply to
I (y). Hence, I am going to match
E [ ( (y)) F( (y))] = .8336. (2.28)
I use the standard Cobb-Douglas matching function 1i (y) = 77ay. Shimer (2005) estimates the
elasticity parameter 6 = .28 with a first-order autoregressive residual using detrended data
on the job-finding rate and the v/u ratio for the U.S. between 1951 and 2003. In fact, when
the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks is degenerate, the finding rate coincides with the
matching function. However, when the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks is not degenerate,
10I thank Rob Shimer for making available the series.
"Notice that u+l1 represents the number of workers unemployed for less than a month.
98
the finding rate coincides with it = I (t) F(bt) andl2
Cov (log jt, log Yt) .28 (2.29)
Var (log yt)
I am going to perform two different types of exercises: quasi-calibration and full-calibration.
In the quasi-calibration I am keeping the elasticity of the finding rate to the market tightness
'y equal to .28, and calibrate 71 in order to match the expression (2.28). In the full calibration,
instead, I am calibrating 6 and 7r in order to match simultaneously expressions (2.28) and (2.29).
Moreover, in both the exercises, I fix k = .213, as in Shimer (2005), adjusting the normal-
ization for the equilibrium y, which is meaningless in the model.l3
I choose a simple stochastic process for labor productivity as a two-state Markov process
with the transition matrix estimated by Hamilton (1981), that is lrhh = .9049 and 7rl = .7550,
where 7rhh is the probability of staying in the high productivity state once you are there and rill
is the equivalent for the low productivity state. Moreover I choose the gap in the state levels
in order to have a standard deviation approximately equal to .02, as in Shimer (2005).
Finally, I analyze two different distributions for the idiosyncratic shocks. First I use a Pareto
with lower bound 0 equal to .4 and parameter po equal to 3 and then a Uniform distribution
with range between 1.25 and 2 as I will explain below.
12 Consider the following loglinear approximation:
log jt = 8 log t+ log a
log t = r logyt
log yt = a, log yt
Given that log jt = (Tr + 6) a, log yt, the estimate of the finding rate elasticity to market tightness corresponds
to
Coy (log it, log y) (er + 6) a Var [log yt]
= B + 6 .28,Var (log -y) a2 Var [log yt]
since
log jt = (r + 6) a log yt.
Notice that
Var [log jt] = ( + 6)2
Var log yt]
so that the ratio of the volatility of job creation with respect to market tightness is in fact pinned down from
the data.
'
3 As in Shimer (2005), it is the case that if I double k and multiply 7r by 26, then y is reduced by 1/2 and the
rate at which firms find workers is doubled, but the worker's finding rate is not affected.
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2.4.2 Results
In this section, I report the main results coming from my calibration exercises. I use the cali-
brated parameter values to simulate the model and create artificial time series of unemployment
and vacancy rates, market tightness and finding rate. Then, I compare the volatility of the sim-
ulated series across the three main variants of the model: the case of degenerate distribution of
the idiosyncratic shocks (D), that is, the benchmark model, the case of heterogenous workers
with full information (FI) and the case of heterogeneous workers with asymmetric information
(AI). I focus on two family of distributions for the idiosyncratic shocks: Pareto and Uniform. In
both cases I analyze the results from the quasi-calibration exercise and from the full-calibration
one and I find that, when I consider the proper calibration, heterogeneity does not help much in
amplifying the volatility of unemployment and vacancy rates in comparison with the benchmark
model, even with asymmetric information.
I start by analyzing the case of the Pareto distribution. Table 1 and 2 report the standard
deviation for unemployment, vacancy, market tightness and finding rate in logs for respectively
the quasi-calibration exercise and the full-calibration one.
I u Vu -Y I j I
D .0416 .1264 .1678 .0470
FI .0507 .1170 .1674 .0569
AI .0553 .1193 .1741 .0629
Table 2.1: Quasi-Calibration with Pareto Distribution and 6 = .28.
As table 1 shows, the quasi-calibration exercise is interesting because it highlight that,
mechanically, the introduction of heterogeneity generates more volatility in the unemployment
rate due to the movements in the endogenous hiring margin, as Lemma 30 suggests. Moreover,
since we keep 6 constant, Lemma 29 applies locally at a first approximation. As one can
notice, the market tightness volatility is approximately the same in the degenerate model and
in the model with full information. When asymmetric information jumps into the picture,
there is an extra source of volatility both for unemployment rate and market tightness. This
amplification effect comes from the fact that the distortion generated by the informational rents
that the employers have to pay to the workers is also responsive to productivity. However, the
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increase in volatility is minuscule. Moreover, once one considers the proper calibration exercise
the increase in volatility virtually disappears. Moreover, as Lemma 3 suggests, the market
tightness volatility reduces slightly. Table 2 shows the results of the full-calibration exercise,
where 6 is properly calibrated.
I I I v I I J I
D .0416 .1264 .1678 .0470
FI .0414 .1254 .1665 .0468
AI .0417 .1281 .1694 .0475
Table 2.2: Full-Calibration with Pareto Distribution and 6 = .28.
Next, let; analyze the case of the Uniform distribution. Following the Pareto case, I report
the results from both quasi-calibration exercises and full-calibration ones. First, it is interesting
to notice that a proper calibration exercise imposes some restrictions on the parameters of the
Uniform distribution. In this version of the paper, the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks
is not pinned down by the data. However this example shows that not all the distributions
are consistent with the model. In fact, the range of the Uniform imposes a lower bound on
the response of the finding rate to the business cycle fluctuations, that is, on the matching
parameter 6 D for the degenerate distribution. Given that the data impose to fix 6 D = .28, the
set of the possible distributions consistent with the model is restricted. For the model with
full information, a proper calibration imposes a lower bound on the range of 1.5244. Once
asymmetric information is introduced, the range needs to be at least 1.25. I am reporting
separately the results for the full information case with A = 1.5244 and for the asymmetric
information case with A = 1.25, in order to make interesting the comparisonl4
Tables 3 and 4 show the comparison of the results for the model with a degenerate dis-
tribution of the idiosyncratic shocks and the model with a Uniform distribution with range
A = 1.5244, respectively for the quasi-calibration and the full-calibration.
14 The uniform distribution with range A = 1.25 is consistent also with the full information case, but would
generate a corner solution (the hiring margin would be irrelevant) making the results coincide with the ones for
the degenerate case.
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I U I 1 v i1
D .0386 .1291 .1514 .0424
FI .0386 .1291 .1514 .0424
Table 2.3: Quasi-Calibration with Uniform Distribution, A = 1.5244 and 6 D = .28.
I I I V 7 I I
D .0386 .1291 .1514 .0424
FI .0392 .1309 .1536 .0430
Table 2.4: Full Calibration with Uniform Distribution, A = 1.5244 and 3 D = .28.
Tables 5 and 6 show the comparison of the results for the model with a degenerate distribu-
tion of the idiosyncratic shocks and the model with a Uniform distribution with range A = 1.25
under asymmetric information, respectively for the quasi-calibration and the full-calibration.
U v I
D .0386 .1291 .1514 .0424
AI .0618 .1316 .1642 .0672
Table 2.5: Quasi-Calibration with Uniform Distribution, A = 1.25 and 6 D = .28.
As in the case of the Pareto, from the quasi-calibrations, it seems that heterogeneity boosts
the volatility of unemployment rate. Asymmetric information seems to exacerbate this amplifi-
cation. On the other hand, once one matches the finding rate elasticity as in the full-calibrations,
both unemployment rates and market tightness volatilities do not move significantly.
Finally, tables 7 and 8 report the results from the quasi- and the full-calibration for a Uniform
distribution with range parameter A = .5 where I fix the finding rate elasticity 6D = .55. In
this case the hiring margin does not achieves a corner solution and I can calibrate both the
cases of full and asymmetric information with the same distribution of idiosyncratic shocks.
Once again, the results show that the boost in the volatility that asymmetric information
seems to generate with the quasi-calibration, is, in fact, more than offset with the proper
full-calibration. Notice that once one matches the finding rate elasticity, then heterogeneity
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I I I v I I J I
D .0386 .1291 .1514 .0424
AI .0402 .1340 .1572 .0440
Table 2.6: Full-Calibration with Uniform Distribution, A = 1.25 and D = .28.
E I U . I . I
D .0808 .1212 .1586 .0872
FI .0807 .1210 .1584 .0871
AI .1343 .1380 .1830 .1419
Table 2.7: Quasi-Calibration with Uniform Distribution and 6 = .55.
dampens both the responsiveness of market tightness and unemployment to productivity, as
the analytical steady state result suggests. In this case, asymmetric information boosts these
volatilities in comparison with the full information case, but not enough to offset the degenerate
standard model.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper explores the role of heterogeneity and of asymmetric information on the responsive-
ness of market tightness and unemployment to productivity shocks.
First, I derive some steady state comparative statics. I show that locally the response to
productivity shocks is not affected by heterogeneity or can be dampened by it. Then, I show
how I choose the parameter values in order to match some statistics for the U.S. economy in
the last 50 years. I consider idiosyncratic shocks distributed according to Uniform and Pareto
distributions and show that in both cases there is no significant amplification in the volatility
of unemployment and vacancies. The analysis of other distribution functions is left for future
research.
The main result of the paper is a negative one: match-specific heterogeneity, either with full
or asymmetric information, does not amplify significantly the responsiveness of unemployment
rate to productivity shocks in comparison with the standard model. This result is very close
to Brugemann and Moscarini (2005) who show that asymmetric information does not typically
help in violating the properties of wage determination that limit unemployment and vacancies
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I I u I v I I i I
D .0808 .1212 .1586 .0872
FI .0767 .1152 .1507 .0829
AI .0782 .1175 .1537 .0845
Table 2.8: Full-Calibration with Uniform Distribution and 6 = .55.
volatility. Further investigations will be needed to understand how my model relates to the
general formulation of Brugemann and Moscarini (2005).
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, rewrite equation (2.9) as the following implicit function
f(Z) [y - O/a - b] dF ()h(O (y) , (y) , y) -
F(O)
+ 1- ] k= 0.
5
By total differentiating it, I get
hb(0 (y), (y), y)l' (y) + ht-(O (y), , (y), y)l' (y) + hy(b (y), (y), y) = 0.
Then,
'y (y)
hy(O (y), (),y)
h(~ (y), y (y), y)
h ( (y), (),y)
h- ( (y) , (Y) , Y)
ho(O (Y), () ,) ,
h ( (), (Y), Y)
Y)a (.A1
Y) \ fl I
where
(y)
-b-E [yE 0a - + 1-/ (1- s) k]
-< () F(b)k
f(o (y))
F(e)
Using equation (2.9) we can rewrite
h( (Y), v (y), y) = y ()b-b- ) k
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05pL (y) F(b)
I'l I ,.. 
hy (O Y) , - (Y) 
hb (O(y) ,-t (y , y
which is equal to zero from the first equilibrium condition equation (2.8), implying that
() = h y( (y),(y), y)
ha( (y), (y), )
Next, consider the case of a fixed 0 = 0, then the equilibrium condition becomes
+ - 6 ky = 0.
and by total differentiating it
hD ( (y), y)y' (y) + h (y (y), y) = 0
so that
hD(y (y),y )Conditions 2.10)-(2.13) give that, 
Conditions 2.10)-(2.13) give that
= h D(7 (y), y) = 1
1 - (1 - ) + D (7-Y) ( - )
so that
YD ()
completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 31. Following the first steps of the previous proof we can show that
y' () hy( (), 7 (y) y)
ha ( (y) 7 (y),y)
and
hD () - (y) y)hD ( (y),y)'
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h'(-y(y), y) =- y bD 1 -0 - S
hyO (Y , -Y Y) , Y
h-Y O Y) , 'Y(Y) , Y)
Now, conditions (2.16)-(2.19) give that
hyD ( (y), y) = 
_ 1-0(1 i yk -
-Cf () F(b)
1 - (1 -) kD
06D77DY D
(1 -(1 - s)
f~g () F()
_ 1-p(1- s) +1 - ) kD
Hence, using (2.19), I obtain
1 1a' () 'D (y)- 1 / (I 8) (ks - k) > 0,/ () F()
completing the proof.
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h( (y), (y), y)
h ( (y), (), )
hD ( (y) , y)
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Chapter 3
Capital Deepening and
Non-Balanced Economic Growth
3.1 Introduction
Most models of economic growth strive to be consistent with the Kaldor facts, i.e., the relative
constancy of the growth rate, the capital-output ratio, the share of capital income in GDP
and the real interest rate (see Kaldor, 1963, and also Denison, 1974, Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
2004). Beneath this balanced picture, however, are the patterns that Kongsamut, Rebelo
and Xie (2001) refer to as the Kuznets facts, which concern the systematic change in the
relative importance of various sectors, in particular, agriculture, manufacturing and services
(see Kuznets, 1957, 1973, Chenery, 1960, Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie, 2001). While the Kaldor
facts emphasize the balanced nature of economic growth, the Kuznets facts highlight its non-
balanced nature.
The Kuznets facts have motivated a small literature, which typically starts by positing
non-homothetic preferences consistent with Engel's law. With these preferences, the marginal
rate of substitution in consumption changes as an economy grows, directly leading to a pattern
of non-balanced growth (e.g., Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989, Matsuyama, 1992, 2005,
'This Chapter is the product of work joint with Daron Acemoglu. Acemoglu acknowledges
financial support from the Russell Sage Foundation and the NSF. An early version of this work
was circulated under the title "Non-Balanced Endogenous Growth".
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Echevarria, 1997, Laitner, 2000, Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie, 2001, Caselli and Coleman, 2001,
Gollin, Parente and Rogerson, 2002). An alternative perspective, proposed by Baumol (1967),
emphasizes the potential non-balanced nature of economic growth resulting from differential
productivity growth across sectors, but has received less attention in the literature. 2
This paper has two aims. First, it shows that there is another, and very natural, reason to
expect economic growth to be non-balanced. Differences in factor proportions across sectors
(i.e., different shares of capital) combined with capital deepening will lead to non-balanced
growth. The reason is simple: an increase in capital-labor ratio will raise output more in the
sector with greater capital intensity. More specifically, we prove that "balanced technological
progress" (in the sense of equal rates of Hicks-neutral technological progress across sectors),3
capital deepening and differences in factor proportions necessarily cause non-balanced growth.
This result holds irrespective of the exact source of economic growth or the process of accumu-
lation.
The second objective of the paper is to present and analyze a tractable two-sector growth
model featuring non-balanced growth, and investigate under what circumstances non-balanced
growth can be consistent with aggregate Kaldor facts. We do this by constructing a class
of economies with constant elasticity of substitution between two sectors and Cobb-Douglas
production functions within each sector. We characterize the equilibria in this class of economies
with both exogenous and endogenous technological change. We show that equilibrium takes a
simple form, and the limiting (asymptotics) equilibrium features constant but different growth
rates in each sector, constant interest rate and constant share of capital in national income.
Other properties of the limiting equilibrium of this class of economies depend on whether
the products of the two sectors are gross substitutes or complements (meaning whether the
elasticity of substitution between these products is greater than or less than one). When they
are gross substitutes, the sector that is more "capital intensive" (in the sense of having a greater
2Two exceptions are the two recent independent papers by Ngai and Pissarides (2006) and Zuleta and Young
(2006). Ngai and Pissarides (2006), for example, construct a model of multi-sector economic growth inspired
by Baumol. In Ngai and Pissarides's model, there are exogenous TFP differences across sectors, but all sectors
have identical Cobb-Douglas production functions. While both of these papers are potentially consistent with
the Kuznets and Kaldor facts, they do not contain the main contribution of our paper, non-balanced growth
resulting from factor proportion differences and capital deepening.
3Hicks-neutral technological progress is both a natural benchmark and also the type of technological progress
that the more microfounded models considered later in the paper will generate.
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capital share) dominates the economy. The form of the equilibrium is more interesting when the
elasticity of substitution between these products is less than one. In this case, the growth rate of
the economy is determined by the more slowly growing (less capital-intensive sector). Despite
the change in the terms of trade against the faster growing sector, in equilibrium sufficient
amounts of capital and labor (and technological progress when this is endogenous) are deployed
in this sector to ensure a faster rate of growth.
One interesting feature is that, especially when the elasticity of substitution is less than
one,4 the resulting pattern of economic growth is consistent with the Kuznets facts, without
substantially deviating from the Kaldor facts. In particular, even in the limiting equilibrium
both sectors grow with positive (and unequal) rates, and more importantly, we show that
convergence to this limiting equilibrium may be slow, and along the transition path, growth
is non-balanced, while capital share and interest rate vary only by relatively small amounts.
Therefore, the equilibrium with an elasticity of substitution less than one may be able to
rationalize both the Kuznets and the Kaldor facts.
Naturally, whether or not this is the empirically relevant explanation for the observed
Kuznets and Kaldor facts is not answered by this theoretical result. As a preliminary at-
tempt to investigate this question, we undertake a simple calibration of our economy based on
US data and look at the medium-run traditional dynamics. This calibration exercise shows that
the economy can grow in a non-balanced manner (i.e., with one sector expanding relative to
the other) for an extended period of time, while also remaining approximately consistent with
the Kaldor facts.
Finally, we present and analyze a model of "non-balanced endogenous growth," which shows
4As we will see below, the elasticity of substitution between products will be less than one if and only if the
(short-run) elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is less than one. In view of the time-series and
cross-industry evidence, a short-run elasticity of substitution between labor and capital less than one appears
reasonable.
For example, Hamermesh (1993), Nadiri (1970) and Nerlove (1967) survey a range of early estimates of the
elasticity of substitution, which are generally between 0.3 and 0.7. David and Van de Klundert (1965) similarly
estimate this elasticity to be in the neighborhood of 0.3. Using the translog production function, Griffin and
Gregory (1976) estimate elasticities of substitution for nine OECD economies between 0.06 and 0.52. Berndt
(1976), on the other hand, estimates an elasticity of substitution equal to 1, but does not control for a time trend,
creating a strong bias towards 1. Using more recent data, and various different specifications, Krusell, Ohanian,
Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) and Antras (2001) also find estimates of the elasticity significantly less than 1.
Estimates implied by the response of investment to the user cost of capital also typically imply an elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor significantly less than 1 (see, e.g., Chirinko, 1993, Chirinko, Fazzari and
Mayer, 1999, or Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay, 1999).
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the robustness of our results to endogenous technological progress, and demonstrates how, in
the presence of factor proportion differences, the pattern of technological progress itself will be
non-balanced. To the best of our knowledge, despite the large literature on endogenous growth,
there are no previous studies that combine endogenous technological progress and non-balanced
growth. 5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 shows how the combination of factor
proportions differences and capital deepening lead to non-balanced growth using a general two-
sector growth model. Section 3.3 constructs a more specific model with a constant elasticity
of substitution between two sectors and Cobb-Douglas production functions, but exogenous
technological progress. It characterizes the full dynamic equilibrium of this economy, and shows
how with an elasticity of substitution less than one, the model may generate an equilibrium path
that is consistent both with the Kuznets and the Kaldor facts. Section ?? undertakes a simple
calibration of the economy outlined in Section 3.3 to investigate whether, for realistic parameter
values, the medium-run transitional dynamics generated by the model are consistent with the
Kuznets and Kaldor facts. Section 3.4 introduces endogenous technological progress and shows
that the results are robust to differential rates of technological progress across sectors. Section
3.5 concludes, and the Appendix contains proofs that are not presented in the text.
3.2 Capital Deepening and Non-Balanced Growth
We first illustrate how differences in factor proportions across sectors combined with capital
deepening lead to non-balanced economic growth. To do this, we use a standard two-sector
competitive model with constant returns to scale in both sectors, and two factors of production,
capital, K, and labor, L. To highlight that the exact nature of the accumulation process is
not essential for the results, in this section we take the sequence (process) of capital and labor
supplies, [K (t) , L (t)]t' 0, as given (and assume that labor is supplied inelastically). In addition,
5 See, among others, Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988), Rebelo (1991), Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Jones (1995), Young (1993). Aghion
and Howitt (1998) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) provide excellent introductions to endogenous growth
theory. See also Acemoglu (2002) on models of directed technical change that feature endogenous, but balanced
technological progress in different sectors. Acemoglu (2003) presents a model with non-balanced technological
progress between two sectors, but in the limiting equilibrium both sectors grow at the same rate.
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we omit explicit time dependence when this will cause no confusion.
Final output, Y, is produced as an aggregate of the output of two sectors, Yl and Y2,
Y=F(Y, Y2),
and we assume that F exhibits constant returns to scale and is continuously differentiable.
Output in both sectors is produced with the production functions
Y = A 1G 1 (K1, L 1) (3.1)
and
Y2 = A 2G 2 (K 2, L2 ). (3.2)
G1 and G2 also exhibit constant returns to scale and are twice differentiable. A 1 and A2 denote
Hicks-neutral technology terms.6 We also assume that the functions F, G1 and G2 satisfy Inada-
type conditions, e.g., limy,.o F (Y1,Y 2) /Y 1 = oo for all Y2 > 0, etc. These assumptions
ensure interior solutions and simplify the exposition, though they are not necessary for the
results presented in this section.
Market clearing implies
K1l+K2 = K, (3.3)
L +L2 = L,
where K and L are the (potentially time-varying) supplies of capital and labor, given by the
exogenous sequence [K (t) , L (t)]t-0 , which we take to be continuosly differentiable functions of
time. Without loss of any generality, we also ignore capital depreciation.
We normalize the price of the final good to 1 in every period, and denote the prices of Y1
and Y2 by Pl and P2, and wage and rental rate of capital (interest rate) by w and r. We assume
6 Hicks-neutral technological progress is convenient to work with, and is also relevant since it is the type of
technological progress that the models in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 will generate.
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that product and factor markets are competitive, so product prices satisfy
pl OF (Y 1, Y2 )/aY 1
P2 OF (Y, Y 2 ) /9Y 2 '
and the wage and the interest rate satisfy7
A1G 1 (K 1, L1 ) A 2G 2 (K 2 , L 2) (3.
aL1 aL=
A 1G1 (K 1, L1) _A 2G 2 (K 2, L 2)
OK 1 OK2
Definition 34 An equilibrium, given factor supply sequences, [K (t) , L (t)]o o, is a sequence
of product and factor prices, [Pl (t) ,P2 (t), w (t), r (t)]t=0 and factor allocations,
[K1 (t), K2 (t) , L (t) , L2 (t)]t°°0o, such that (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) are satisfied.
Also define the share of capital in the two sectors
rK1 rK2
sl and- P2Y
plUl -P 2Y 2
the capital to labor ratio in the two sectors,
K 1 K2kl -_ 1 and k2 =L1 L2
and the "per capita production functions" (without the Hicks-neutral technology term),
- G 1(K 1, L1) G2 (K 2, L2)gl (kl) L and g2 (k2) 
Definition 35 There is capital deepening at time t if K (t) /K (t) > L (t) /L (t).
There are factor proportion differences at time t if sl (t) s2 (t).
In this definition, sl (t) s2 (t) refers to the equilibrium factor proportions in the two
sectors at time t. It does not necessarily mean that these will not be equal at some future date.
7Without the Inada-type assumptions, these would have to be written as
w > A1G1 (K1, L1) /OL1 and L1 > 0,
with complementary slackness, etc.
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The next theorem shows that if there is capital deepening and factor proportion differences,
then balanced technological progress is not consistent with balanced growth.
Theorem 36 Suppose that at time t, there are factor proportion differences between the two
sectors, i.e., sl (t) $ s2 (t), technological progress is balanced, i.e., A1 (t) /A1 (t) = A 2 (t) /A 2 (t)
and there is capital deepening, i.e., K (t) /K (t) > L (t)/L (t), then growth is not balanced,
that is, Y1 (t) /Y1 (t) # Y2 (t) /Y 2 (t).
Proof. Differentiating the production function for the two sectors,
Y1 Al K 1 L 1
and
Y2 A2 K2 L2
Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that Yl/Yl = Y2/Y2. Since A1/A1 = A 2/A 2 and sl $ s2,
this implies kl/k l # k2/k 2 (otherwise, kl/kl = k2/k 2 > 0 because of capital deepening and if,
for example, sl < s2, then Y1 /Yl < Y2/Y 2 ).
Since F exhibits constant returns to scale, (3.4) implies
/1 =P2
P1 P2 = 0. (3.6)
P' P2
Equation (3.5) yields the following interest rate and wage conditions
r = plAlg (kl) (3.7)
= P2A29 (k2),
and
w = plA 1 (gl (kl)- g (kl)k l ) (3.8)
= p2 A2 (k 2 ) - g9 (k 2 ) k2).
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Differentiating the interest rate condition, (3.7), with respect to time and using (3.6), we have
A 1 k1 A2 k2
where
_- gt i' (k2) k2Eg~_j (l) and e 2-
Since A 1/A 1 = A 2/A 2, we must have
kl k2 (3 9)(3.9)
Differentiating the wage condition, (3.8), with respect to time, using (3.6) and some algebra
gives
A l s1 k1 A 2 s2 k2
_-~- F- -- - = I -Al 1- sl 1k' A2 1- s2 '9k2'
Since A1/A1 = A 2/A2 and sl s2, this equation is inconsistent with (3.9), yielding a contra-
diction and proving the claim. 
The intuition for this result can be obtained as follows. Suppose there is capital deepening
and that both capital and labor are allocated to the two sectors with constant proportions.
Because factor proportions differ between the two sectors, say sl < s2, such an allocation will
generate faster growth in sector 2 than in sector 1 and induce a non-balanced pattern of growth
(since there is capital deepening). In equilibrium, the faster growth in sector 2 will naturally
change equilibrium prices, and the decline in the relative price of sector 2 will cause some of
the labor and capital to be reallocated to sector 1. However, this reallocation cannot entirely
offset the greater increase in the output of sector 2, since, if it did, the relative price change
that stimulated the reallocation would not take place. Consequently, equilibrium growth will
be non-balanced.
It is also useful to relate the results in Theorem 36 to two different strands of the existing
literature. First, the pattern of non-balanced growth in Theorem 36 is related to Rybczynski's
theorem in international trade (Rybczynski, 1950), which states that for an open economy
within the "cone of diversification" (where factor prices do not depend on factor endowments),
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changes in factor endowments will be absorbed by changes in output mix. Our result can
be viewed as a closed-economy equivalent of Rybczynski's theorem; it shows that changes in
factor endowments (capital deepening) will be absorbed by faster growth in one sector than
the other, even though relative prices of goods and factors will change in response to the
change in factor endowments. Second, if the result in Theorem 36 holds also asymptotically
(i.e., as t --, oc), it may appear to contradict the celebrated "Turnpike theorems" in the
optimal growth literature (e.g., Radner, 1961, Scheinkman, 1976, Bewley, 1982, McKenzie,
1998). These theorems establish convergence to a steady state in multi-sector models with
sufficiently high discount factors. The different result in Theorem 36 stems from the presence of
"capital deepening." The non-balanced growth result in this theorem would hold asymptotically
only if capital deepening continues asymptotically, which is ruled out in the standard Turnpike
theorems. The model in the next section will show more explicitly how asymptotic capital
deepening can take place.
Finally, the proof of Theorem 36 makes it clear that the two-sector structure is not necessary
for this result. In light of this, we also state a generalization for N > 2 sectors, where aggregate
output is given by the constant returns to scale production function
Y = F (Y1,Y2, ... , YN).
The definitions for s, k and g and the other assumptions above naturally generalize to this
setting. We have:
Theorem 37 Suppose that at time t, there are factor proportion differences among the N
sectors in the sense that there exists i and j N such that si (t) $7 sj (t), technological
progress is balanced, i.e., Ai (t) /Ai (t) = Aj (t) /Aj (t) for all i and j < N, and there is capital
deepening, i.e., K (t) /K (t) > L (t) /L (t), then growth is not balanced, that is, there exists i
and j < N such that Yi (t) /Y (t) $ Yj (t) /Yj (t).
The proof of this theorem parallels that of Theorem 36 and is omitted.
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3.3 Two-Sector Growth with Exogenous Technology
The previous section demonstrated that differences in factor proportions across sectors and
capital deepening will lead to non-balanced growth. This result was proved for a given (ar-
bitrary) sequence of capital and labor supplies, [K (t) , L (t)]tO, but this level of generality
does not allow us to fully characterize the equilibrium path and its limiting properties. We
now wish to analyze the equilibrium behavior of such an economy fully, which necessitates at
least the sequence of capital stocks to be endogenized, and capital deepening to emerge as an
equilibrium phenomenon. We will accomplish this by imposing more structure both in terms of
specifying preferences and in terms of the production functions. Capital deepening will result
from exogenous technological progress, which will in turn be endogenized in Section 3.4.
3.3.1 Demographics, Preferences and Technology
The economy consists of L (t) workers at time t, supplying their labor inelastically. There is
exponential population growth,
L (t) = exp (nt) L (0) . (3.10)
We assume that all households have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences over
total household consumption (rather than per capita consumption), and all population growth
takes place within existing households (thus there is no growth in the number of households).8
This implies that the economy admits a representative agent with CRRA preferences (see, for
example, Caselli and Ventura, 2000):
00 C(t)l- - lePtdt
C(t)1 - 0
where C (t) is aggregate consumption at time t, p is the rate of time preferences and 0 > 0
is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (or the coefficient of relative risk
aversion). We again drop time arguments to simplify the notation whenever this causes no
confusion, and continue to assume that there is no depreciation of capital. The flow budget
8 The alternative would be to specify population growth taking place at the extensive margin, in which case
the discount rate of the representative agent would be p - n rather than p, without any substantive changes in
the analysis.
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constraint for the representative consumer is:
K=rK+wL+ I -C, (3.11)
where K and L denote the total capital stock and the total labor force in the economy, II is
total net corporate profits received by the consumers, w is the equilibrium wage rate and r is
the equilibrium interest rate.
The unique final good is produced by combining the output of two sectors with elasticity of
substitution e E [0, co):
£-1 E-1 E-
Y= 7Y1 + (1 -7) Y2 (3.12)
where y is a distribution parameter which determines the relative importance of the two goods
in the aggregate production.
The resource constraint of the economy, in turn, requires that consumption and investment
are less than total output, Y = rK + wL + II, thus
K+C < Y. (3.13)
The two goods Y1 and Y2 are produced competitively using constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production functions with elasticity of substitution between intermediates equal to v > 1:
ml (fM2
Y= (j (i) - di) and Y2 = ( y2(i) di) , (3.14)
where yl (i)'s and y2(i)'s denote the intermediates in the sectors that have different capital/labor
ratios, and M1 and M2 represent the technology terms. In particular M1 denotes the number
of intermediates in sector 1 and M2 the number of intermediate goods in sector 2.
Intermediate goods are supplied by monopolists that hold the relevant patent, 9 and are
9Monopoly power over intermediates is introduced to create continuity with the next section, where monopoly
profits will motivate the creation of new intermediates. Since equilibrium markups will be constant, this monopoly
power does not have any substantive effect on the form of equilibrium.
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produced with the following Cobb-Douglas technologies
yl(i) = li(i) l'kl(i)l-l and Y2 (i) = 12 (i)a2 k2 (i)l-a2, (3.15)
where 11(i) and kl(i) are labor and capital used in the production of good i of sector 1 and
12 (i) and k2 (i) are labor and capital used in the production of good i of sector 2.10
The parameters al and a2 determine which sector is more "capital intensive". ll When
al > a2, sector 1 is less capital intensive, while the converse applies when al < a2. In the rest
of the analysis, we assume that
al > a2, (Al)
which only rules out the case where al = a2, since the two sectors are otherwise identical and
the labeling the sector with the greater capital share is without loss of any generality.
All factor markets are competitive, and market clearing for the two factors imply
fM 1 M 2
j 1 l l(i)di + j 12 (i) di L1 + L2 = L, (3.16)
and
ki(i)di + f k2 (i) di K1 + K 2 = K, (3.17)
where the first set of equalities in these equations define K 1, L1 and K2, L2 as the levels of capital
and labor used in the two sectors, and the second set of equalities impose market clearing.
The number of intermediate goods in the two sectors evolve at the exogenous rates
Ml = ml and = m2, (3.18)
and each new intermediate is assigned to a monopolist, so that all intermediate goods are owned
and produced by monopolists throughout. Since M1 and M2 determine productivity in their
respective sectors, we will refer to them as "technology".
1'Strictly speaking, we should have two indices, ii E [0, Ml] and i2 E [0, M 2a], but we simplify the notation by
using a generic i to denote both indices, and let the context determine which index is being referred to.
1 We use the term "capital intensive" as corresponding to a greater share of capital in value added, i.e., meaning
for example that sl > s2 in terms of the notation of the previous section. While this share is constant because
of the Cobb-Douglas technologies, the equilibrium ratios of capital to labor in the two sectors depend on prices.
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3.3.2 Equilibrium
Recall that w and r denote the wage and the capital rental rate, and P1 and P2 denote the
prices of the Y1 and Y2 goods, with the price of the final good normalized to one. Let [qi(i)]\
and [q2(i)]M2l be the prices for labor-intensive and capital-intensive intermediates.
An equilibrium in this economy is given by paths for factor, intermediate and final goods
prices r, w, [qj(i=l, [q2 (i)]i=l, Pl and P2, employment and capital allocation [li(i)]i=l,
[12 (i)]i21 , [ki(i)]1, [k2 (i)Ml such that firms maximize profits and markets clear, and con-
sumption and savings decisions, C and K, maximize consumer utility.
It is useful to break the characterization of equilibrium into two pieces: static and dynamic.
The static part takes the state variables of the economy, which are the capital stock, the labor
supply and the technology, K, L, M1 and M2, as given, and determines the allocation of capital
and labor across sectors and factor and good prices. The dynamic part of the equilibrium
determines the evolution of the endogenous state variable, K (the dynamic behavior of L is
given by (3.10) and the one of M1 and M2 by (3.18)).
First, our choice of numeraire implies that the price of the final good, P, satisfies:
1
1 - P = [Pl - + (1 - Y)E p-E] 1e
Next, since Y1 and Y2 are supplied competitively, their prices are equal to the value of their
marginal product, thus
P1 = Y and P2 (1-Y)() y (3.19)
and the demands for intermediates, yl (i) and y2 (i), are given by the familiar isoelastic demand
curves:
qi(i) (Y()L and q2(i) = 2(i ) (3.20)
P Y1 P2 Y2]
The value of the monopolist for intermediate i in the s-intensive sector is given by
Vs(i,t) = a exp [- r(z)dz] 7r(i,v)dv, (3.21)
121
for s = 1, 2, where r, (i, t) = (q, (i, t) - mc, (i, t)) Y, (i, t) is the flow profits for firm i at time
t, with q given by the demand curves in (3.20), and minc is the marginal cost of production in
this sector. Given the production functions in (3.15), the cost functions take the familiar Cobb-
Douglas form, mc1 (i) = a l (1 - al) l - r1-alw l, and minc2 (i) = a2 a 2 (1 - a2)a2-1 rl-a2w a 2
In equilibrium, all firms in the same sector will make the same profits, so we have Vs(i, t) = Vs (t),
and we use Vl(t) and V2(t) to denote the value firms in the two sectors at time t. In Section
3.4, these value functions will be used to determine the equilibrium growth rate of the number
of intermediate goods, Ml and M2.
Each monopolist chooses its price to maximize (3.21). Since prices at time t only influence
revenues and costs at that point, profit-maximizing prices will be given by a constant mark-up
over marginal cost:
ql(i) = (V 1 ) (1-al)l-lrl-w a l, (3.22)
q2(i) = ( a2) (1 - 2)2 rl-a2Wa2. (3.23)
Equations (3.22) and (3.23) imply that all intermediates in each sector sell at the same price
ql = ql(i) for all i < M1 and q2 = q2(i) for all i < M2. This combined with (3.20) implies that
the demand for, and the production of, the same type of intermediate will be the same. Thus:
yl(i) = 1 (i) k (i) -"1 = Y, = l~k-01 Vi < M1
Y2(i) = 2 (i)2k 2 (i) 2 = y 2 = 2 k 2 Vi < M2,
where 11 is the level of employment in all intermediates of sector 1, etc.
Market clearing conditions, (3.16) and (3.17), then imply that 11 = L1/M 1, k = K 1 /M1,
12 = L2/M2 and k2 = K 2/M2, so we have the output of each intermediate in the two sectors as
La1Kl-c1 L 2K21-a2
Y1= M and Y2 = (3.24)
Ml Ms
Substituting (3.24) into (3.14), we obtain the total supply of labor- and capital-intensive
goods as
Y = M- L Kl- and Y2 = M -1 L2 K21- . (3.25)
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Comparing these (derived) production functions to (3.1) and (3.2) highlights that in this econ-
omy, the production functions G1 and G2 from the previous section take Cobb-Douglas forms,
with one sector always having a higher share of capital than the other sector, and also that
1 1
Al = Ml-l and A2 = M2 - 1.
In addition, combining (3.25) with (3.12) implies that the aggregate output of the economy
is:
Y -V':ya l C1 -- -a2 (.Y= [ (Ml-'1 LKl) +(1-7y) (M L2 ) ] . (3.26)
Using (3.24) and (3.25) we can rewrite the prices for the labor- and capital-intensive inter-
I1 1 1
mediates as ql = yM, -' ()-; and q2 = (1- Y) M2- () s , and the flow profits from the
sale of the labor- and capital-intensive intermediates are:
1 1
7rl = o (y) Ml and r2 = ( (3.27)Y Ml (3.27)
Finally, factor prices and the allocation of capital between the two sectors are determined
by:1 2
-ya . (3.28)
1
= (1 - ) a2 ( (3.29)
( v- Y) YY(3.31)
These factor prices take the familiar form, equal to the marginal product of a factor from (3.26)
with a discount, ( - 1) /u, due to the the monopoly markup in the intermediate goods.
'
2To obtain these equations, start with the cost functions above, and derive the demand for factors by using
Shepherd's Lemma. For example, for the sector 1, these are 11 = ( )-  yl and kl = ( ) y.1-l W-yl l 
Combine these two equations to derive the equilibrium relationship between r and w. Then using equation (3.22),
eliminate r to obtain a relationship between w and ql. Now combining with the demand curves in (3.20), the
market clearing conditions, (3.16) and (3.17), and using (3.25) yields (3.28). The other equations are obtained
similarly.
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3.3.3 Static Equilibrium: Comparative Statics
Let us now analyze how changes in the state variables, L, K, M1 and M2, impact on equilibrium
factor prices and factor shares. As noted in the Introduction, the case with e < 1 is of greater
interest (and empirically more relevant as pointed out in footnote 4), so throughout, we focus
on this case (though we give the result for the case in which > 1, and we only omit the case
with = 1, which is standard).
Let us denote the fraction of capital and labor employed in the labor-intensive sector re-
spectively by rK K1/K and A _ L1/L (clearly 1 - c = K2/K and 1 - L2/L). Then
Equations (3.28), (3.29), (3.30) and (3.31) imply:
[= 1+ ) )Y ] (3.32)
and
%=[( 1-1 2- a) + 1 (3.33)
Equation (3.33) makes it clear that the share of labor in the sector 1, , is monotonically
increasing in the share of capital in the sector 1, . We next determine how these two shares
change with capital accumulation and technological change.
Proposition 38 In equilibrium,
1.
dln _ dln (1 -) (l - 2) (1 ) (3- 34)
> 0 (a, - a2) (1 - ) > . (3.34)dlnK dlnL 1+ (1 - e) (tal - 2) ( - )
2.
d In dInr (1-0) (1- )/(v-1)35)
-_= > 0 e= e < 1. (3.35)dlnM 2 dlnM1 1 + (1 - E) (a - a2) (K - A)
The proof of this proposition is straightforward and is omitted.
Equation (3.34), part 1 of the proposition, states that when the elasticity of substitution
between sectors, e, is less than 1, the fraction of capital allocated to the capital-intensive sector
declines in the stock of capital (and conversely, when e > 1, this fraction is increasing in
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the stock of capital). To obtain the intuition for this comparative static, which is useful for
understanding many of the results that will follow, note that if K increases and n, remains
constant, then the capital-intensive sector grows by more than the other sector. Equilibrium
prices given in (3.19) imply that when E < 1, the relative price of the capital-intensive sector
falls more than proportionately, inducing a greater fraction of capital to be allocated to the
sector that is less intensive in capital. The intuition for the converse result when > 1 is
straightforward.
Moreover, equation (3.35) implies that when the elasticity of substitution, , is less than
one, an improvement in the technology of a sector causes the share of capital going to that
sector to fall. The intuition is again the same: increased production in a sector causes a more
than proportional decline in its relative price, inducing a reallocation of capital away from it
towards the other sector (again the converse results and intuition apply when E > 1).
Proposition 38 gives only the comparative statics for i. Equation (3.33) implies that the
same comparative statics applies to A.
Next, combining (3.28) and (3.30), we also obtain relative factor prices as
w 1 - al (L' (3.36)
and the capital share in the economy as13
sK = 1 - yc 1l - ( (3.37)
Proposition 39 In equilibrium,
1.
dln(w/r) _ dln(w/r) _ 1
dlnK dlnL 1 + (1 - ) (al - a2) ( - A)
'
3 Notice that we define the capital share as one minus the labor share, which makes sure that monopoly profits
are included in the capital share. Also sK refers to the share of capital in national income, and is thus different
from the capital shares in the previous section, which were sector specific. Sector-specific capital shares are
constant here because of the Cobb-Douglas production functions.
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2.
dln(w/r) dln(w/r) _ (1-e)(;-A)/(-1)dn = dInM 1 + (1 - e) (a - ( - < 0 => (al - o2) (1 - ) > 0.d In M2 d InM 1 + (1 - e)(al-a2) (K-)
3.
d n K < E< 1.dInK
4.
d In SK d In sKdnSK dlnSK < 0 X (al - a2) (1 - e) > 0.dlnM 2 dInM
The proof of this proposition is provided in the Appendix.
The most important result in this proposition is part 3, which links the equilibrium rela-
tionship between the capital share in national income and the capital stock to the elasticity of
substitution. Since a negative relationship between the share of capital in national income and
the capital stock is equivalent to capital and labor being gross complements in the aggregate,
this result also implies that, as claimed in footnote 4, the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor is less than one if and only if e is less than one. Intuitively, as in Theorem 36,
an increase in the capital stock of the economy causes the output of the more capital-intensive
sector to increase relative to the output in the less capital-intensive sector (despite the fact that
the share of capital allocated to the less-capital intensive sector increases as shown in equa-
tion (3.34)). This then increases the production of the more capital-intensive sector, and when
E < 1, it reduces the relative reward to capital (and the share of capital in national income).
The converse result applies when e > 1.
Moreover, when E < 1, part 4 implies that an increase in Ml is "capital biased" and an
increase in M2 is "labor biased". The intuition for why an increase in the productivity of the
sector that is intensive in capital is biased toward labor (and vice versa) is once again similar:
when the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors, , is less than one, an increase in
the output of a sector (this time driven by a change in technology) decreases its price more than
proportionately, thus reducing the relative compensation of the factor used more intensively in
that sector. When e > 1, we have the converse pattern, and M2 is "capital biased," while an
increase in Ml is "labor biased"
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3.3.4 Dynamic Equilibrium
We now turn to the characterization of the dynamic equilibrium path of this economy. We start
with the Euler equation for consumers, which takes the familiar form'4
C~ = (r -p). (3.38)
To write the transversality condition, note that the financial wealth of the representative con-
sumer comes from payments to capital and profits, and is given by W (t) = K (t)+Ml (t) V1 (t)+
M2 (t) V2 (t), where recall that V, (t) is the present discounted value of the profits of a firm in
the sector 1 at time t and there are M1 (t) such firms, and similarly for V2 (t) and M2 (t). The
transversality condition is then:
lim W (t) exp (- r () d-r = 0, (3.39)
which together with the resource constraint given in (3.13) determines the dynamic behavior
of consumption and capital stock, C and K. Equations (3.10) and (3.18) give the behavior of
L, M1 and M2.
We can therefore summarize a dynamic equilibrium as paths of interest rates, labor and
capital allocation decisions, r, A and , satisfying (3.28), (3.29), (3.30) and (3.31), and of
consumption, capital stock, technology, values of innovation satisfying (3.13), (3.21), (3.38),
and (3.39).
Let us also introduce the following notation for growth rates of the key objects in this
economy:
L1 L2 L
L1 L2 L
ki _ k2 k
Zl, -Z2, ZK1 K 2 K
Y, Y2 Y
14Throughout, we assume that in equilibrium consumption, capital and factor prices are differentiable functions
of time, and work with time derivatives, e.g., C, etc.
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so that n and z denote the growth rate of labor and capital stock, m8 denotes the growth
rate of technology, and g, denotes the growth rate of output in sector s. Moreover, whenever
they exist, we denote the corresponding asymptotic growth rates by asterisks, i.e.,
n* = lim n * = lim z, and g* = lim g,.t-0oo t--oa t-OO
Similarly denote the asymptotic capital and labor allocation decisions by asterisks
~* = lim rc and A* = lim A.t-oo t--oo
We now state and prove two lemmas that will be useful both in this and the next section.
Lemma 40 If e < 1, then n n2 zl > Z2 gl9 < 92. If E > 1, then n1 n2 z1 z 2 X•
91 92
Proof. Differentiating (3.28) and (3.29) with respect to time yields
lb1 E -1 w 1 e-1
- + n = g + g91 and - + n2 = -9 + - 92 (3.40)W E E W E E
Subtracting the second from the first gives n1 - n2 = ( - 1) (1 - 92) /e, and immediately
implies the first part of the desired result. Similarly differentiating (3.30) and (3.31) yields
1 E-1 1 e- 1
-+Z= g + gz and- + z2 = - + -- 92. (3.41)
r E r E E
Again, subtracting the second from the first gives the second part of the result. 
This lemma establishes the straightforward, but at first counter-intuitive, result that when
the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors is less than one, then the equilibrium
growth rate of the capital stock and labor force in the sector that is growing faster must be less
than in the other sector. When the elasticity of substitution is greater than one, the converse
result obtains. To see the intuition, note that terms of trade (relative prices) shift in favor of
the more slowly growing sector. When the elasticity of substitution is less than one, this change
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in relative prices is more than proportional with the change in quantities, and this encourages
more of the factors to be allocated towards the more slowly growing sector.
Lemma 41 Suppose the asymptotic growth rates 9g and g exist. If E < 1, then g*
min {g*,g*}. If > 1, then g* = max {gl,g2}.
Proof. Differentiating the production function for the final good (3.26) we obtain:
Y -gl + (1 - ) Y2" 92
g = - E- (3.42)
[ Y1 + ( 1 ) Y2
which, combined with e < 1 implies that as t - oo, 9* = min {g*,g*}. Similarly, combined
with E > 1, implies that as t -, oc, g* = max {g, g}. ·
Consequently, when the elasticity of substitution is less than 1, the asymptotic growth rate
of aggregate output will be determined by the sector that is growing more slowly, and the
converse applies when E > 1.
3.3.5 Constant Growth Paths
We first focus on asymptotic equilibrium paths, which are equilibrium paths that the economy
tends to as t -, oo. A constant growth path (CGP) is defined as an equilibrium path where the
asymptotic growth rate of consumption exists and is constant, i.e.,
Clim-= 9c.
From the Euler equation (3.38), this also implies that the interest rate must be asymptotically
constant, i.e., limt-oo = 0.
To establish the existence of a CGP, we impose the following parameter restriction:
max 1) (A2)a, a2 < ( - 1 A
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This assumption ensures that the transversality condition (3.39) holds. Terms of the form
ml/al or m2/a2 appear naturally in equilibrium, since they capture the "augmented" rate
of technological progress. In particular, recall that associated with the technological progress,
there will also be equilibrium capital deepening in each sector. The overall effect on labor
productivity (and output growth) will depend on the rate of technological progress augmented
with the rate of capital deepening. The terms ml/a or m2/a 2 capture this, since a lower al
or a2 corresponds to a greater share of capital in the relevant sector, and thus a higher rate of
augmented technological progress for a given rate of Hicks-neutral technological change. In this
light, Assumption (A2) can be understood as implying that the augmented rate of technological
progress should be low enough to satisfy the transversality condition (3.39).
The next theorem is the main result of this part of the paper and characterizes the rela-
tively simple form of the constant growth path (CGP) in the presence of non-balanced growth.
Although we characterize a CGP, in the sense that aggregate output grows at a constant rate,
it is noteworthy that growth is non-balanced since output, capital and employment in the two
sectors grow at different rates.
Theorem 42 Suppose Assumptions Al and A2 hold. Define s and s such that m =
min al, M2 } nd = max m m2l when E < 1, and ml = max ml, m2 and m
Qt1 CO2 c 1 'kl C12 Cks Ctl CO2 C~~
min {ml, when E > 1. Then there exists a unique CGP such that
g* = 9g = gS = z = n + m (3.43)
Cas ( 1)
* _ (1-e)m~ 8 [l+a. 8 l)Jm(1- E) 34,Z* = n (- ) + + a ) (3.44)
(V - a, (V - 1)
9* = + M + [1> 9* (3.45)(V - 1) as (v - 1)[1 - a,, (1 - )]
n* = n and n s =n- (1 - (, m - , ms) (3.46)
N9 a ('- 1)
Proof. We prove this proposition in three steps.
Step 1: Suppose that e < 1. Provided that g* > g > 0, then there exists a unique
CGP defined by equations (3.43), (3.44), (3.45) and (3.46) satisfying g*s > g* > 0, where
m = min {m ml, } and m- = max ma }'Ors Q01 ' 0~2 Q~,.,s Q~ 1 30 2
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Step 2: Suppose that > 1. Provided that g*s g < 0, then there exists a unique
CGP defined by equations (3.43), (3.44), (3.45) and (3.46) satisfying g*,s < g < 0, where
-max { ' , mz2 and m =min {m m, 2a', CaI a /2 / s 1 ' al2'
Step 3: Any CGP must satisfy g* - > g > 0, when e < 1 and g* gs > 0, when E > 1
with m_ defined as in the theorem.
as
The third step then implies that the growth rates characterized in steps 1 and 2 are indeed
equilibria and there cannot be any other CGP equilibria, completing the proof.
Proof of Step 1. Let us assume without any loss of generality that s = 1, i.e., m_ _ m.-
Given g* > g > 0, equations (3.32) and (3.33) imply condition that A* = nE* = 1 (in the case
where s = 2, we would have A* = * = 0) and Lemma 41 implies that we must also have
g* = g. This condition together with our system of equations, (3.25), (3.40) and (3.41), solves
uniquely for , , z, z, g* and g9 as given in equations (3.43), (3.44), (3.45) and (3.46).
Note that this solution is consistent with g2* > g9 > 0, since Assumptions Al and A2 imply
that g2* > g9 and g* > 0. Finally, C < Y, (3.11) and (3.39) imply that the consumption growth
rate, g9, is equal to the growth rate of output, g* (suppose not, then since C/Y -* 0 as t - o,
the budget constraint (3.11) implies that asymptotically K (t) = Y (t), and integrating the
budget constraint gives K (t) - fot y (s) ds, implying that the capital stock grows more than
exponentially, since Y is growing exponentially; violating the transversality condition (3.39)).
Finally, we can verify that an equilibrium with Z, z*, m*, m2, g* and g* satisfies the
transversality condition (3.39). Note that the transversality condition (3.39) will be satisfied if
lim (t) < r*, (3.47)
t w (t)
where r* is the constant asymptotic interest rate. Since from the Euler equation (3.38) r* =
Og* + p, (3.47) will be satisfied when g* (1 - 0) < p. Assumption A2 ensures that this is the
case with g* = n + 1(vl )ml. A similar argument applies for the case where ms - _2
Proof of Step 2. The proof of this step is similar to the previous one, and is thus omitted.
Proof of Step 3. We now prove that along all CGPs g > g* > 0, when < 1 and
gs > 9*s > 0, when E > 1 with l defined as in the theorem. Without any loss of generality,
suppose that = . We now separately derive a contradiction for two configurations, (1)
a,, 0/1
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g91 g2, or (2) g* > g* but g9 < 0.
1. Suppose g > 92 and E < 1. Then, following the same reasoning as in Step 1, the unique
solution to the equilibrium conditions (3.25), (3.40) and (3.41), when e < 1 is:
9 = 9 = = z* = n + m2 (3.48)
Q2(v- 1)
,i =n (1 - e) m + [1 + cl (1 - )] m2
Eml [1 - a1 (1 - eCa1 (1- ))] m2
9{ = _ + (a.5)(V- ) ( -(1)[1 - ck (1 - E)I
*; -- -- (1 -E) [0~l2 - z2ml]n7 = n + E) jM2 - a2M11 (3.51)
a2 (v - 1)
But combining these equations implies that g < g*, which contradicts the hypothesis
g{ > g* > 0. The argument for > 1 is analogous.
2. Suppose g2* > g and e < 1, then the same steps as above imply that there is a unique
solution to equilibrium conditions (3.25), (3.40) and (3.41), which are given by equations
(3.43), (3.44), (3.45) and (3.46). But now (3.43) directly contradicts g < 0. Finally
suppose g > g* and > 1, then the unique solution is given by (3.48), (3.49), (3.50) and
(3.51), then (3.50) directly contradicts gl < 0, and this completes the proof.
There are a number of important implications of this theorem. First, as long as mi/al 
m2/o2, growth is non-balanced. The intuition for this result is the same as Theorem 1 in
the previous section. Differential capital intensities in the two sectors combined with capital
deepening in the economy (which itself results from technological progress) ensure faster growth
in the more capital-intensive sector. Intuitively, if capital were allocated proportionately to the
two sectors, the more capital-intensive sector would grow faster. Because of the changes in
prices, capital and labor are reallocated in favor of the less capital-intensive sector, but not
enough to fully offset the faster growth in the more capital-intensive sector. This result also
highlights that the assumption of balanced technological progress in the previous section (in
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this context, ml = m2) was not necessary for the theorem, but we simply needed to rule out
the precise relative rate of technological progress between the two sectors that would ensure
balanced growth (in this context, ml/al = m2/a2).
Second, while the CGP growth rates looks somewhat complicated because they are written
in the general case, they are relatively simple once we restrict attention to parts of the parameter
space. For example, when ml/al < m 2/a 2, the capital-intensive sector (sector 2) always grows
faster than the labor-intensive one, i.e., g < g. In addition if e < 1, the more slowly-growing
labor-intensive sector dominates the asymptotic behavior of the economy, and the CGP growth
rates are
g = g91 = Z = n + ml,
ai (v- 1)
, +eM2 [1-a 2(1 -ea 2(1 -e))]m g
92 (YV-1) 1 (v -1)[1-a2 (1-)] > 9
In contrast, when e > 1, the more rapidly-growing capital-intensive sector dominates the as-
ymptotic behavior and
1g* = g~=g~=z:~=~a2(* l9 9C = 92 = 2 = + (V 1)M2
* eml [ a1 - (1 - al (1- ))] m2 
Tl =- 1) a2 (-1) [1-al (1-E)]
Third, as the proof makes it clear, in the limit, the share of capital and labor allocated
to one of the sector tends to one (e.g., when sector 1 is the asymptotically dominant sector,
A* = * = 1). Nevertheless, at all points in time both sectors produce positive amounts, so this
limit point is never reached. In fact, at all times both sectors grow at rates greater than the rate
of population growth in the economy. Moreover, when E < 1, the sector that is shrinking grows
faster than the rest of the economy at all point in time, even asymptotically. Therefore, the
rate at which capital and labor are allocated away from this sector is determined in equilibrium
to be exactly such that this sector still grows faster than the rest of the economy. This is the
sense in which non-balanced growth is not a trivial outcome in this economy (with one of the
sectors shutting down), but results from the positive but differential growth of the two sectors.
Finally, it can be verified that the share of capital in national income and the interest rate are
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constant in the CGP. For example, when ml/al < m2/a2, rK/Y = 1 - al (v - 1) /v and when
ml/al > m2/a 2, rK/Y = 1 - a2 ( - 1) /v. The interest rate, on the other hand, is equal to
r = (1 - al) (v - 1) - (X*)- al / in the first case and r = (1 - a2) ( - 1) yE-1 (X*)- a 2 / V
in the second case, where X* is defined below. These results are the basis of the claim in
the Introduction that this equilibrium may account for non-balanced growth at the sectoral
level, without substantially deviating from the Kaldor facts. In particular, the constant growth
path equilibrium matches both the Kaldor facts and generates unequal growth between the
two sectors. However, in this constant growth path equilibrium, one of the sectors has already
become very small relative to the other. Therefore, this theorem does not answer whether along
the equilibrium path (but away from the asymptotic equilibrium), we can have a situation
in which both sectors have non-trivial employment levels and the equilibrium capital share
in national income and the interest rate are approximately constant. This question and the
stability of the constant growth path equilibrium are investigated in the next section.
3.3.6 Dynamics and Stability
The previous section characterized the asymptotic equilibrium, and established the existence
of a unique constant growth path. This growth path exhibits non-balanced growth, though
asymptotically the economy grows at a constant rate and the share of capital in national income
is constant. We now study the equilibrium behavior of this economy away from this asymptotic
equilibrium.
The equilibrium behavior away from the asymptotic equilibrium path can be represented by
a dynamical system characterizing the behavior of a control variable C and four state variables
K, L, M1 and M2. The dynamics of aggregate consumption, C, and aggregate capital stock,
K, are given by the Euler equation (3.38) and the resource constraint (3.13). Furthemore, the
dynamic behavior of L is given by (3.10) and the one of M1 and M 2 by (3.18).
As noted above, when e > 1, the sector which grows faster dominates the economy, while
when e < 1, conversely, the slower sector dominates. We want to show that, in both cases,
the unique CGP of the previous section is locally stable. Since the case with e < 1 is more
interesting, we emphasize this case in our analysis. Moreover, without loss of generality, we
restrict the discussion to the case in which asymptotically the economy is dominated by the
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labor-intensive sector, sector 1, so that
9* = 9 = z a = n + mi.
C1 (Y- 1)
This means that when we assume e < 1, the relevant part of the parameter space is where
ml/al < m2/ta2, and, when e > 1, we must have ml/la > m2/a2 (for the rest of the parameter
space, it would be sector 2 that dominates the asymptotic behavior).
The equilibrium behavior of this economy can be represented by a system of autonomous
non-linear differential equations in three variables,
C K
c - ~ , X - 1 and .
LM1'-' LM l(-l)
Here c is the level of consumption normalized by population and technology (of the sector which
will dominate the asymptotic behavior), and is the only control variable; X is the capital stock
normalized by the same denominator, and rI determines the allocation of capital between the
two sectors. These two are state variables with given initial conditions X0 and mo.15
The dynamic equilibrium conditions than translate into the following equations:
c 1 [ ) ( Y A (X) - n -] 1 ml, (3.52)C 8 a (v 1a
X Al = l--kl (-Y- X-- n - 1 ml,
X X aI- c 1u (v - 1)ml
c - ( (1- +) [(a1-C2)- +(-) (m2 -a 2 -ml)]
-e +2 + (1 )(1 -) - (1 - 2) c- + (1 - ) ( )
where
Y ),- [-(1 - a2 ) ( -
and
[(1 l)( C2 ) 1 1]-
15Xo is given by definition, and Ko is uniquely pinned down by the static equilibrium allocation of capital at
time t = 0, given by (3.32).
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Clearly, the constant growth path equilibrium characterized above corresponds to a steady-
state equilibrium in terms of these three variables, denoted by c*, X* and ,c* (i.e., in the CGP
equilibrium, c , X and will be constant). These steady-state values are given by K* = 1,
v ( [n+ (-)m1 ]+ )]
X*
e-1 (- ) ( 1
and
C* = E-- X*l X* n I lm 
Since there are two state and one control variable, local (saddle-path) stability requires the
existence of a (unique) two-dimensional manifold of solutions in the neighborhood of the steady
state that converge to c*, X* and *. The next theorem states that this is the case.
Theorem 43 The non-linear system (3.52) is locally (saddle-path) stable, in the sense that in
the neighborhood of c*, X* and K*, there is a unique two-dimensional manifold of solutions that
converge to c*, X* and K*.
Proof. Let us rewrite the system (3.52) in a more compact form as
x= f (x), (3.53)
where x ( c X K ) . To investigate the dynamics of the system (3.53) in the neighborhood
of the steady state, consider the linear system
z=J(x*)z,
where z = x - x* and x* such that f (x*) = 0, where J (x*) is the Jacobian of f (x) evaluated
at x*. Differentiation and some algebra enable us to write this Jacobian matrix as
acc acX aCK
J (X*) axc axx axK
aKC aKx aKK 
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where
acc = arc = ax = O
aCX = -_ (X*)a1 (ai (1-ai)) (_~ 1)
=el (x*)1 (1--Ol)(_~)[GaO) (1O2(1-) ]
ax = -(x*) -
(X*) (1a) [1 ( ( V ) ] X*)-l p
x = y-1 (X*) [(1- al) + 1- ) ([ 1- + a21-]
M2-6 - Ml 
asK = -( j 1 m2---ml)
The determinant of the Jacobian is det (J (x*)) = -aacxaxc. First, aX and axc are clearly
negative. Next, it can be seen that a,, is always negative since we are in the case with
E 1 m2/ac2 ml/al. 1 6 This implies that det (J (x*)) > 0, so the steady state is hyperbolic.
Moreover, either all the eigenvalues are positive or two of them are negative and one positive. To
determine which is the case, we look at the characteristic equation given by det (J (x*) - vI) =
0, where v denote the eigenvalues. This equation is
(a,, - v) [v (axx - v) + axcacx] = 0,
and shows that one of the eigenvalue is equal to a,, and thus negative, so there must be two
negative eigenvalues. Consequently, there exists a unique two-dimensional manifold of solutions
in the neighborhood of this steady state, converging to it. This proves local (saddle-path)
stability. ·
This result shows that the constant growth path equilibrium is locally stable, and when the
initial values of capital, labor and technology are not too far from the constant growth path,
the economy will indeed converge to this equilibrium, with non-balanced growth at the sectoral
level and constant capital share and interest rate at the aggregate.
16 As noted above, this is not a parameter restriction. When we have e > 1 and m2/ct2 > ml/al, for example,
then it will be sector 2 that grows more slowly in the limit, and stability will again obtain.
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We next investigate the dynamics of some parameterized economies numerically. In partic-
ular, we wish to study the speed of convergence to the asymptotic equilibrium, and how the
economy behaves along the path of convergence, for example, whether the interest rate and the
share of capital change by large amounts along the transition path. Since the economy with
e < 1 is our main focus, we only report simulations for this case.
Recall that our economy is fully characterized by ten parameters, y, e, v, ca, a2, p, , n,
ml, and m2. We choose a period to correspond to a year, and take a baseline economy with
a 1% annual population growth (n = 0.01), p = 0.02 and 0 = 2 as in the baseline calibration
of the neoclassical growth model in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). We choose the rest of the
parameters to be consistent with 3% total growth rate of output (g = 0.03), a capital share
in national income of approximately 35% (SK = 0.35), and an interest rate of approximately
12% (r = 0.12).17 These choices imply that c1 - 0.8 (essentially to match the share of capital
asymptotically), e = 0.5 and v 5 (to match the interest rate) and ml ~ 0.125 (to match the
growth rate). Finally, in the benchmark simulation, we choose a capital intensity in sector 2
close to that in sector 1, a2 = 0.75 and m2 = ml - 0.125 to highlight the non-balanced growth
resulting from differential capital intensities in the two sectors. In addition, we choose a low
level of y, y = 0.15, to generate a fraction of employment in sector 1 of approximately 40%,
and the following initial values: L (0) = 1, K (0) = 1, ML (0) = 1 and MH (0) = 0.1.
Figure 1 shows the results of the simulations.18 The four panels depict A, c, the interest
rate (r) and the capital share (SK). The solid line is for the benchmark. The first remarkable
feature in the simulation is the rate of convergence. The units on the horizontal axis are years,
and range from zero to 3000. This shows that it takes a very very long time for the fraction
of capital and labor allocated to sector 1 to approach their asymptotic equilibrium value of 1.
17Since there is no depreciation in our model, the interest rate also corresponds to the rental rate of capital.
We choose 12% as the benchmark value to approximate a reasonable rental rate (e.g., an interest rate of 7% plus
5% depreciation).
18To perform the simulations, we first represent the equilibrium as a two-dimensional non-autonomous system
in c and X (rather than the three-dimensional autonomous system analyzed above) since K can be represented as a
function of time only. This two dimensional system has one state and one control variable. Following Judd (1998,
ch.10), we then discretize these differential equations using the Euler method, and turn them into a system of
first-order difference equations in ct and X, which can itself be transformed into a second-order non-autonomous
system only in Xt. This second-order equation can be analyzed numerically by reversing time, perturbing X away
from its steady-state value, and then integrating it backward to (Xo, Ko) (given the exogenously given sequence
of state variables, {Lt, Ml,t, M2 ,t}t=0 and boundary conditions XT+1 = XT = X*).
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For example, initially, about 40% of employment is in sector 1 and even after 500 years, less
than half of employment remains there. This illustrates that even though in the limit one of
the sectors employs all of the factors, it takes a very long time for the economy to approach
this limit point. Second, in the baseline simulation, the interest rate is essentially constant,
and varies only between 0.112 and 0.115 throughout the convergence process. The share of
capital in national income is declining visibly, but its range of movement is small (between 0.35
and 0.375). Moreover, in the first 500 years, the capital share essentially moves between 0.37
and 0.375). This is the basis of our claim that this type of model may lead to a pattern of
non-balanced sectoral growth (as shown by A and /c in the top two panels), while generating
only small movements in the interest rate and the capital share, thus remaining approximately
consistent with the Kaldor facts.
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Figure 1. Solid line: a2 = .75. Dotted line: 2 = .72. Dashed line: 2 = .78.
The dashed and dotted lines in Figure 1 show variations with 2 = 0.78 and 2 = 0.72. The
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dashed line shows that when ac2 is increased even further, convergence is even slower, and now
after 3000 years only less than 70% of employment is in sector 1. Moreover, the interest rate
and the share of capital in national income are now essentially constant. When a2 is reduced
so that the gap between the capital intensity of the two sectors becomes larger, the speed of
convergence is a little faster, but is still very very slow. The range of change of the capital share
also becomes larger (between 0.35 and 0.39).
Figure 2 investigates the consequences of varying m2. The solid line is again for the bench-
mark simulation, with m2 = ml - 0.125, while the dashed and the dotted lines show simulations
with m2 = 0.12 and m2 = 0.13. They show that when the TFP growth rate in the capital-
intensive sector is reduced, convergence takes much longer. For example, after 3000 years, a
little above 60% of employment is in sector 1. The capital share also changes by very little
over this time period. In contrast, when the TFP growth rate of the capital-intensive sector
is increased, convergence is faster than the benchmark case but still very slow. For example,
it takes 2000 years for the share of employment in sector 1 to reach 90%. These simulations
therefore show that this class of economies may be able to generate significant non-balanced
sectoral growth, without substantially deviating from the Kaldor facts.
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3.4 Non-Balanced Endogenous Growth
In this section we introduce endogenous technological progress. This investigation is motivated
by two questions. As already emphasized, non-balanced growth results from capital deepening,
and so far, capital deepening was a consequence of exogenous technological change. The first
question is whether similar results obtain when technological change itself is endogenous. Second
and more important, one may wonder whether endogenous technological change will take place
in such a form as to restore balanced growth. The analysis in this section will explicitly show
that this is not the case. Finally, endogenizing technological change in this context enables
us to derive a model of non-balanced endogenous technological change, which is an important
direction for models of endogenous technology given the non-balanced nature of growth in the
data.
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Demographics, preferences and technology are the same as described in the previous section,
except that instead of the exogenous processes for technology given in (3.18), we now need
to specify an innovation possibilities frontier, i.e., the technology to transform resources into
blueprints for new varieties in the two sectors. In particular, we assume that
1 = blMl X 1 and M2 = b2M2'PX 2, (3.54)
where X1 > 0 and X2 > 0 are research expenditures in terms of the final good, bl and b2 are
strictly positive constants measuring the technical difficulty of creating new blueprints in the
two sectors, and W E (-1, oo) measures the degree of spillovers in technology creation.19
Finally, we assume that there is free entry into research, and a firm that invents a new
intermediate of either sector becomes the monopolist producer with a perpetually enforced
patent. Given the value for being the monopolist for intermediate in (3.21), we have two free
entry conditions, which will pin down equilibrium technological change:
V1 < M1 and V2 < M (3.55)
b1 b2
with each condition holding as equality when there is positive R&D expenditure for that sector,
i.e., when X1 > 0 or X2 > 0.
The resource constraint of the economy is also modified to incorporate the R&D expendi-
tures,
+ l + X2 < Y. (3.56)
Now a dynamic equilibrium is represented by paths of interest wages and rates, w and r,
labor and capital allocation decisions, A and re, satisfying (3.30) and (3.31), and of consump-
'
9When po = 0, there are no spillovers from the current stock of knowledge to future innovations. With W < 0,
there are positive spillovers and the stock of knowledge in a particular sector makes further innovation in that
sector easier. With W > 0, there are negative spillovers ("fishing out") and further innovations are more difficult
in sectors that are more advanced (see, for example, Jones, 1995, Kortum, 1997). Similar to the results in Jones
(1995), Young (1999) and Howitt (1999), there will be endogenous growth for a range of values of p because
of population growth. In the remainder, we will typically think of o > 0, so that there are negative spillovers,
though this is not important for any of the asymptotic results.
Also, this innovation possibilities frontier assumes that only the final good is used to generate new technologies.
The alternative is to have a scarce factor, such as labor or scientists, in which case some amount of positive
spillovers would be necessary.
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tion, capital stock, technology, values of innovation and research expenditures satisfying (3.21),
(3.38), (3.39), (3.54), (3.55) and (3.56). It is also useful to define a path that satisfies all of
these equations, possibly except the transversality condition, (3.39), as a quasi-equilibrium.
Since the case with e < 1 is both more interesting, and in view of the discussion in footnote
4, also more realistic, in this section we focus on this case exclusively.
We first note that Propositions 38 and 39 from Section 3.3 still apply and characterize the
comparative static responses, and Lemmas 40 and 41 from there determine the behavior of
the growth rate of sectoral output, capital and employment. For the analysis of the economy
with endogenous technology, we also need an additional result in the next lemma. It shows
that provided that (i) e < 1, (ii) there exists a constant asymptotic interest rate r* (i.e.,
limt_,, = 0), and (iii) there is positive population growth, in the asymptotic equilibrium the
free entry conditions in (3.55) will both hold as equality:
Lemma 44 Suppose that < 1, n > 0, and limt_,,o , = 0, then limt-. (V1 - Mr/bl) = 0 and
limt,, (V2 - M /b2) = 0.
The proof of this lemma is rather long and is provided in the Appendix.
This lemma is an important result for the analysis of non-balanced endogenous growth. It
enables us to solve for the asymptotic growth rates from the free entry conditions and obtain a
relatively simple characterization of the constant growth path equilibrium.
The economic intuition for the lemma comes from population growth; with population
growth, it is always optimal to allocate more capital to each sector, which increases the prof-
itability of intermediate producers in that sector. Consequently, the value of a new blueprint
increases asymptotically. This rules out asymptotic equilibrium paths with slack free-entry con-
ditions, because along such paths, the cost of creating a new blueprint would remain constant,
ultimately violating the free-entry condition.
To establish the existence of a CGP, we now impose the following parameter restriction,
which replaces (A2) in the exogenous technology case:
( > max ,_ I1- n (A3)
1 (v -1) (1 + p). This assumption ensures that the transversality condition (3.39)
where (v - 1) (1 + p). This assumption ensures that the transversality condition (3.39)
143
holds. Notice that in contrast to Assumption A2 only acl features in this assumption, since,
given Assumption Al, al < a2 and with endogenous technology, this will make sure that sector
1 is the more slowly growing sector in the asymptotic equilibrium. Assumption A3 also rules
out quasi-equilibrium paths where output and consumption grow more than exponentially.
Lemma 45 Suppose Assumption A3 holds and e < 1, then there exists no quasi-equilibria
with limt,, C/C = oo.
This lemma is proved in the Appendix, where, for completeness, we also show that Assump-
tion A3 is "tight" in the sense that, if first inequality in this assumption, ( > 1/al, did not
hold, there always exist quasi-equilibria with more than exponential growth.
Combined Lemmas 44 and 45 imply that the asymptotic equilibrium has to converge either
to a limit with constant growth of consumption, or to a limit cycle. Using these results, the
next theorem establishes the existence of a unique constant growth path, with non-balanced
sectoral growth, but constant share of capital and constant interest rate in the aggregate. It
is therefore the analogue of Theorem 42 of the previous section, and is the main result of this
section.
Theorem 46 Suppose Assumptions Al and A3 hold, e < 1, and n > 0, then there exists a
unique CGP where
9" * -l n9 = 91 = z= l( 1n, (3.57)
g al (1 - E ( - a2) n>g, (3 .58)2 (a 1- -e+( >g* (3.58)
al( E + (a -2)( - e) g ,z~2 =(o -1) (l-+ () n < 9 (3.59)
n =n and n* = [L1(alp-1) [1-E + ] , (3.60)
1 11-r- 4 and m*= 4 (3.61)
mi l~= p 1 2 +
The proof of this theorem is also given in the Appendix.
There a number of important features worth noting. First, this theorem shows that the
equilibrium of this non-balanced endogenous growth economy takes a relatively simple form.
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Second, given the equilibrium rates of technological change in the two sectors, ml and m*,
the asymptotic growth rates are identical to those in Theorem 42 in the previous section, so
that the economy with endogenous technological change gives the same insights as the one
with exogenous technology. In particular, there is non-balanced sectoral growth, but in the
aggregate, the economy has a limiting equilibrium with constant share of capital in national
income and a constant interest rate. Finally, technology is also endogenously non-balanced, and
in fact, tries to counteract the non-balanced nature of economic growth. Specifically, there is
more technological change towards the sector that is growing more slowly (recall we are focusing
on the case where < 1), so that the sector with a lower share of capital has an increasing
share of capital, employment and technology in the economy. Nevertheless, this sector still
grows more slowly than the more capital-intensive sector, and the non-balanced nature of the
growth process remains. Therefore, endogenous growth does not restore balance between the
two sectors as long as capital intensity (factor proportion) differences between the two sectors
remain. 2 0
3.5 Conclusion
This paper shows how differences in factor proportions across sectors combined with capital
deepening lead to a non-balanced pattern of economic growth. We first illustrated this point
using a general two-sector growth model, and then characterized the equilibrium fully using a
class of economies with constant elasticity of substitution between sectors and Cobb-Douglas
production technologies. This class of economies shows how the pattern of equilibrium may be
simultaneously consistent with non-balanced sectoral growth (the so-called Kuznets facts) while
also generating asymptotically constant share of capital in national income and interest rate in
the aggregate (the Kaldor facts). We also constructed and analyzed a model with endogenous
technology featuring non-balanced economic growth.
The main contribution of the paper is theoretical, but it also raises a number of empirical
questions. In particular, the analysis suggests that differences in factor proportions across
20Since there are two more endogenous state variables and two more control variables now, it is not possible to
show local stability analytically. In particular, in addition to c, X and , we need to keep track of the endogenous
evolution of M 1, M2 , X1 and X2 (or their stationary transformations). Given the size of this system, we are
unable to prove local (saddle-path) stability.
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sectors will introduce a powerful force towards non-balanced growth, which could be important
in accounting for the cross-sectoral patterns of output and employment growth. Whether this
is so or not, especially in the context of the differential growth of agriculture, manufacturing
and services, appears to be a fruitful area for future research.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Proof of Proposition 39
Parts 1 and 2 follow from differentiating equation (3.36) and Proposition 38. Here we prove
parts 3 and 4. Recall the expression for the equilibrium capital share
rK -1
sK y 1
with
-1 +1 
where combining the production function and the equilibrium capital allocation we get
e-1
(Y i [ (l Y 2) ])
( 1 - a2
+ 1-a1 )
Then, using the results of Proposition 38, we have
dlnSK S1-SKJ 1l-al
d In K SK I - a2
d In SK
d n Ml
(1 -) (a1 -a2 ) ( - )/
+ (1 - E)(al - a2)(~- X)
(1 - e) (1 - a2) (K -1)
I + (1 - ) (l - )( - x)
(1-al) ( 1)7  ((t)+ (I ) (4
S < 0 X al > a2.
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(1
and
dlnSK
dln M2
(3.62)
where
S(1SK) (1-a)SK 1 \- f2J
S- (1+
(3.63)
with
- 1 -
= y- 
- 1 - 1
h= [(~)( a 1
This establishes the desired result that
dlnKd ln K
and
d In sK d In sK
> 0 '# (a - a2) (1 - ) > 0.d In Ml d In M 2
3.6.2 Proof of Lemma 44
We will prove this lemma in four steps.
Step 1: m* = m* = 0 imply g = g = n.
Step 2: limsupt, (V1 - Mr'/bl) > 0 or limsupt. (V2 - M2/b2) > 0.
Step 3: limsupt, (V1- Mr1/bl) > 0 and limsupto (V2 - M/b 2) > 0.
Step 4: limt,, (V - M1/b l) = 0 and limt,, o (V2 - M2/b2 ) = 0.
Proof of Step 1: We first prove that mt = m = 0 imply g = g = n. To see this,
combine equations (3.30) and (3.31) to obtain
( YY 1 - al K1
Differentiating gives
1 -e 1-e i -e(o2n2 - Qinli) + (1 - a2) Z2 - (1 - al) Zl - Z2. (3.64)
E C
To derive a contradiction, suppose that g* > g. Then, from Lemma 40 n* < n and z2* < z
and from Lemma 41, g* = g. Next, differentiating (3.25), we obtain
1 19 = alnl + (1 - al) z + - ml and 92 = c2n + (1- a2) Z2 + LM2- (3.65)
-- -l
Moreover, since limt,c, r = 0, equation (3.41) and the fact that g* = g{ imply that g = z.
This combined with equation (3.65) and m = 0 implies that Z =   z = n, which together with
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(3.64) implies
0 > (1 - 2 ) - > -Z2
yielding a contradiction. The argument for the case in which g < g is analogous. Since
2*= = g* and m = m = 0, it must also be the case that g* = g = n, completing the
proof of step 1.
Proof of Step 2: First note that lim supt_,, (V1 - M'/bl) < 0 and
limsupt,,o (V2 - M2/b 2) < 0 imply that the free entry conditions, (3.55), are asymptotically
slack, so ml and m* exist, and limt,, ml (t) = m = 0 and limt-,, m2 (t) = m = 0 (since
they cannot be negative). In particular, note that if limsupt. (V1 - Mf/bl) < O, this implies
that there exists no "infinitely-recurring" interval in the limit where the free entry condition
holds for sector 1.
Now to derive a contradiction, suppose that m* = m -= 0, which, as shown above, implies
g9 = 92 = = n > 0. Then, differentiating the second equation in (3.27), we obtain:
lim 2 = g* > 0. (3.66)
t-00oo 7r2
Combining this with limt,, o = 0 and the value function in (3.21) yields: limtoo V2 = oo.
Since m* = 0 by hypothesis, M2 ' is constant, and we have limt-,O V2 = o0 > limt-oo M2/b 2 ,
violating the free entry condition (3.55). This proves that ml and m* cannot both equal to 0,
and thus limsupt,,O (V2 - M/b 2) < 0 and limsupt, (V1 - Ml/bl) < 0 is not possible.
Proof of Step 3: We next prove that limsupt_~, (V1 - Mf/bl) > 0,
lim supto (V2 - M/b 2) > O, lim supt_0 ml > 0 and lim supt. m2 > 0.
Suppose, to derive a contradiction, lim suptO m2 = m = 0 and
limsupt, (V2 - M/b 2) < 0 (the other case is proved analogously). Since, as shown above,
m = m = 0 is not possible, we must have lim supt,O (V1 - M /bl) > 0 and lim suptO ml >
0.
We start by noting from (3.27), that asymptotically
*r2 1lim 2 - - (9 - 92) + 92, (3.67)t--*oo 72 E
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because m* = 0. Since
lim (9g -92) + 92 -Z2 = t-oo r C
from (3.31), z2 > 0 implies that limtO ir2/7r 2 > 0. But by the same argument as in Step 2, we
have limt,c V2 = oo > limt, 0 M2/b 2, violating the free entry condition (3.55). We therefore
only have to show that z2 > 0 (i.e., limsupt_, Z2 > 0). Suppose, to obtain a contradiction,
that z* = 0. Using (3.40) and (3.41) from the proof of Lemma 40, we have z2 - n2 = Zl - nl,
which implies that n* = 0 (recall that either nl > n or n2 > n, and since limtZ g > n, either
zl > n or Z2 > n). But then with n* = z* = m = 0, we have g = 0 < g, which contradicts
n* < n = n from Lemma 40. A similar argument for the other sector completes the proof that
limsupt_. (V1 - Mrw/bl) > 0 and limsupt, (V2 - M/b 2 ) > 0.
Proof of Step 4. From the free entry conditions in (3.55), we have that V1 - Mjw/bl < 0
and V2 - M/b 2 < 0, thus limsuptO (V1 - Mr/bl) < 0 and limsupt_, (V2 - M2/b 2) < 0.
Combined with Step 3, this implies limsupt. (V 1- Mf/bl) = 0 and
limsupt, 0 (V2 - M/b 2 ) = 0. Hence, we only have to prove that lim inft, 0 (V1- Mf/bl) > 0
and liminft, (V2 - M2/b 2) > 0. We prove the first inequality (the proof of the second is
similar).
Suppose, to derive a contradiction, that lim inft- . (V1 - M1/bl) < 0. This implies that
there exists a (recurring) interval (tb, t) such that V1 (t) - M1 (t) /b1 < 0 for all t E (tb, t').
Suppose that (tb, t) is unbounded; this would imply that limsupt_, ml = m = 0, yielding a
contradiction with Step 1. Thus (tb, t') must be bounded, so there exists (to, t2) D (tb, t2) such
that for t E (to, t 2) \ (tb, t'), we have V1 (t)-Mr (t) /bl = 0. Moreover, since limsupt_ OO ml > 0,
there also exists an interval (tO, t') (to, t2) such that for all t E (to, t2) \ (t, t2 ), ml > 0.
Next, since ml = 0 for all t E (t, t'2), we also have M1 (tb) = M 1 (t'). This implies
V1 l M2= r( = V(to). (3.68)
Figure Al shows this diagrammatically.
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Figure Al: The solid line represents Mf1/b and the thick line represents V1.
Let us rewrite (3.21) in the Bellman equation form
() = V1 (t)- () Vt. (3.69)r r
Equation (3.69) also shows that V1 (t) is well-defined, so Vi (t) is continuously differetiable in t.
Equation (3.68) and the fact that V1 (t) - M[ (tb) /b1 < 0 for all t (tb, t) imply that V1 (t)
reaches a minimum over (tb, t) with 11 (t) = 0. Let t < t be such that V (t') is the first
local minimum after t, which naturally satisfies V (t') < V (t). Moreover, using (3.27) and
(3.31), we have that for all t
Il (t) 1 K1 (t)
r* (v - 1) (1 - al) M1 (t)'
where r* = limt r (t) is the asymptotic equilibrium interest rate, which exists by hypothesis
that limt-,
, (t) = 0. Also, using the fact that limt,,O r (t) = 0 and the interest rate condition,
(3.30), we obtain that since m = 0 and n > 0, K1 (t') > K1 (tb). In addition, since M1 (t') =
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M1 (tb), we can use (3.69) to write
(V1K t<V, /l) 1 K1 (tl) I K1 (t) V1 (t)
= V (t) 1)(1 ( < V1 (t) (v -1)(1 - ) M (t <0 
which contradicts the fact that V1 (t') is a local minimum, completing the proof of the lemma.E
3.6.3 Proof of Lemma 45 and The Converse Result
Proof of Lemma 45: First, recall that C < Y, (3.11). Hence it is enough to prove that
limt,, g = oo will violate the resource constraint. We will prove this separately in two cases,
when g* > g* and when g < g*
Suppose g g and g* = oo. Then, Lemma 41 implies = g*  *= o, and equation (3.41)
together with (3.40) and (3.65) yields
g = n- -+ mi.
al) r a 1 (v - 1)
Given n < oo and limt,, /r > O, it must be that asymptotically
1
g* = ( )m. (3.70)
a, (v - 1)
Combining the technology possibility frontier (3.54) and (3.70) we have
lim 1 = lim l + al (1 + T) ( - 1) g*.
t- oo X1 t Mo ml
Then, the first inequality in Assumption A3, ~ > 1/a1 , implies
lim > 9*,
t- oo X 1
which violates the resource constraint (3.13).
Next suppose that g* > g~and g* = oo. Then, following the steps of above, Lemma 41
implies g* = g* = oo, and equation (3.41) together with (3.40) and (3.65) yields
( ) g = a i n + g(- (1 al( ) r+ )
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Since g* = , a fortiori g = oo, and, given n < oo and limt- ,i /r > 0, we have that
asymptotically
ml = (-1) [( 11- 1 -e))g )g*] (3.71)
Once again the innovation possibilities frontier (3.18) implies
lim -1= lim n 1 (1a-l)m .lt-boo X1 t-too ml
Then equation (3.70) together with the first inequality in Assumption A3, ( > 1/al, implies
lim l > al (1- o) ( - 1)g* > g*,t-oo X1
which violates the resource constraint (3.13), completing the proof that when Assumption A3
holds any quasi-equilibrium with more than exponential growth violates the resource constraints.E
For completeness, we also prove the converse of Lemma 45, which shows that the use of the
first inequality in Assumption A3, > 1/al, in this lemma is "tight" in the sense that, if it
were relaxed, the converse result would obtain.
Lemma 4': Suppose Al holds, but (-- (v - 1) (1- Ap) < , then there exists quasi-
equilibria with limt,, g = oo.
Proof. This lemma will be proved by showing that in this case
9 = = g* = o and z = z* = Z* (3.72)
z* =* (3.73)r
- = [1=- M2 g(3.74)
ml m2
is a quasi-equilibrium.
From the interest rate conditions in the two sectors (3.30) and (3.31), and (3.72) we obtain
z* = g*- lim rt--oo r
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which is exactly condition (3.73). By substituting into (3.65), we obtain
_ 1
\ il t-*oo r Q ( -1)
g* = nl-2(1 - lim - + 1
9* = \ n _ (2 - 1) r2
which gives g* = a -i)ml and g* = (L)m 2, and hence
m = am 2.
Differentiating this condition gives equation (3.74).
Finally, we need to check feasibility, i.e., that the R&D expenditures do not grow faster
than output. From the technology possibilities frontiers, (3.18), this requires
lim X- = h + a1(g* < 9*
t-0oo X 1 ml
lim = h2 + ca2(* < g*
t-oo X 2 m2
and both these conditions are satisfied given (3.74) and al > a2. 
3.6.4 Proof of Theorem 46
We prove this proposition in two steps.
Step 1: Provided that g* > g > 0, then there exists a unique CGP defined by equations
(3.57), (3.58), (3.59), (3.60) and (3.61), satisfying g > g* > 0.
Step 2: All CGP must satisfy g2 > g{ > 0.
Proof of Step 1. Lemma 44 establishes that as t -, oo the free-entry conditions (3.55) must
asymptotically hold as equality. Combining (3.55) as equality with (3.69) (and the equivalent
for sector 2), we obtain the following conditions that must hold as t - oo:
_1 _1
Y = and 2 = (3.75)
r - mlj bl r - pm2 b2
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Differentiating (3.75) yields:
1 191g--(g91-g)-(1 +o)ml =0 and 92-- (92- 9)-(1 +)m2 = 0. (3.76)6 e
Then g2* > g > 0 and Lemma 41 imply that we must also have g* = g. This condition
together our system of equations, (3.40), (3.41), (3.65), (3.76), solves uniquely for n*, n*,z*, z*,
m*, m*, g and g2* (and * = A* = 1) as given in equations (3.57), (3.58), (3.59), (3.60) and
(3.61). Note that this solution is consistent with g* > g > 0, since Assumptions Al and A3
immediately imply that g > g9 and g* > 0 (which is also consistent with Lemma 44). Finally,
C < Y, (3.11) and (3.39) imply that the consumption growth rate, g*, is equal to the growth
rate of output, g*.
Finally, we can verify that an equilibrium with *, A*, n, n*, z, z*, ml, m, g and g
satisfies the transversality condition (3.39) with a similar argument to the one spelled in the
first step of the proof of Theorem 42.
Proof of Step 2. The proof that along all CGPs g2* > g* > 0 must be true, is analogous
to the one of the second step in the proof of Theorem 42.0
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